Diminishing status of Taiwan's
status quo By Craig Meer
TAIPEI - Just three weeks after raising
the idea in his Chinese New Year's day address,
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian abolished the
National Unification Council (NUC) and National
Unification Guidelines (Guidelines). The move is
the latest step in a saga of increasing
Taiwan-China tensions that is particularly
significant for what it diminishes - the status
quo in cross-strait relations.
While the
initial proclamation on Monday used a lawyer's
language (Chen is a trial attorney by profession)
and spoke of "terminating" (zhongzhi) the
operations of the NUC and Guidelines
rather than "abolishing"
(feichu) them outright, this wording should
not be much consolation for Taiwan's
self-appointed guardian, the United States.
In Taiwan, freezing a government agency is
code for getting rid of it slowly but inevitably.
The Taiwan provincial government and the National
Assembly both started their trip to the dustbin of
history via this route.
The status quo in
cross-strait relations is a term that seems to
mean all things to all people. Some, including
pro-independence elements in Taiwan's ruling
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), believe that
it refers to Taiwan's indivisible status as a
sovereign state, and this is probably what Chen
believes as well.
The chairman of the
opposition Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT),
Ma Ying-jeou, has said recently he sees it as an
unspoken agreement between Beijing and Taipei to
define "greater China" as both sides see fit (the
so-called "1992 Consensus").
However,
implicit in all the definitions advanced by
stakeholders - including those of the US and China
- is a recognition that Taiwan's political status
is currently undecided or open to contest. It's
the difference between Taiwan's de facto or
practical independence in the international arena
that few openly dispute, and its final de jure
status that remains open to debate between
pro-independence and unificationist groups in
Taiwan today.
This is the essence of the
status quo, and the reason Monday's announcement
is not just more hot air in the cross-strait
imbroglio.
The NUC was established by
executive decree when the KMT was in power during
the early 1990s. Its first and arguably only
important function was to draft the National
Unification Guidelines, which commit the Republic
of China (Taiwan's official title) to uniting with
the mainland at some distant point in the future.
The Guidelines establish a series of stringent
criteria for Taiwan's return to the motherland
that include China's complete transition to
democracy.
The end game of the Guidelines
is less important than their mere existence. If
uniting with the mainland is the island's ultimate
goal, then now the place is in political limbo.
Being in limbo formally satisfies Beijing,
which has declared its intention to invade Taiwan
if the island makes the full transition to a de
jure independent state. It gives credence to
America's unwieldy "one-China" policy, which
allows the US to recognize Chinese sovereignty
even while providing military support to the
island of Taiwan.
Finally, being in limbo
also allows the Taiwanese people to concentrate on
the things they do best: namely developing the
island as a prosperous democracy and a shining
example of the potential for indigenous
modernization.
By freezing the NUC and
Guidelines, Chen has commenced the task of
removing one of the few substantive government
documents in Taiwan that indicates the current
status of the island is unclear. Contrary to the
president's claims, this is anathema to the spirit
of the status quo, which calls for more ambiguity,
not less, in the island's external politics.
Some observers have argued that the status
quo has already had its day, and Chen's initiative
is merely a response to external events. True
enough, the institution has suffered badly in the
past 12 months under the weight of Beijing's
Anti-Secession Law. This document codifies a
military response from the Chinese government in
the event of a formal declaration of independence
in Taiwan.
In so doing it not only reduces
Chinese political and strategic options in the
event of a cross-strait showdown, it demonstrates
a determination to decide the political destiny of
Taiwan. None of this is good for an institution
that is all about leaving Taiwan's status up in
the air.
But Chen's enthusiasm for
eradicating the NUC and Guidelines is only partly
driven by external factors. In large measure, the
timing of the event - following the DPP's
resounding defeat in last year's local elections -
suggests it is all about regaining the initiative
in domestic politics.
KMT chairman Ma has
been wrong-footed by Monday's announcement, and
appeared extremely uncomfortable while
participating with Chen and other leaders in
Taiwan's 228 celebrations on Tuesday. [1] As a
short-term political strategy for dealing with the
opposition, Chen is on a winner.
But more
can be expected from him. Finding ways to
reinforce the status quo is not only in Taiwan's
objective interests, according to nearly 20 years
of polling data, it's also what 70% or more of the
Taiwanese population actually want.
The
unenviable goal for all Taiwanese leaders is to
deliver this goal in the face of Chinese
aggression. Getting rid of the NUC and Guidelines
adds to the problem rather than fixing it.
Note [1] This memorial
celebration marks the date, February 28, 1947 of
an uprising by Taiwanese people against the Chiang
Kai-shek's Kuomintang government in which many
people were killed.
Craig Meer
is a freelance writer based in Taipei.
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