Once considered the strategic domain of
the United States and before that of Europe, the
South Pacific is falling under the spell of China.
As the US and its allies have gradually scaled
back their involvement in the region since the
early 1990s - closing embassies and reducing aid -
China has steadily been moving in. Beijing now has
nine diplomatic posts in the South Pacific
(including a caretaking group
in Kiribati), more in the region than any other
country.
In December, Politburo member Luo
Gan and his delegation made a two-day stopover in
Tahiti while en route to South America. The visit
came a day after the official announcement that
China would open a consulate general and cultural
center in Tahiti's capital Papeete this year.
Concurrently, Beijing conferred Approved
Destination Status (ADS) enabling Chinese tourists
to visit French Polynesia. These moves are
symbolic of China's efforts to increase its
presence in the South Pacific.
The South
Pacific has long been a diplomatic battleground
between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
Taiwan (as the Republic of China). Currently,
eight of the 14 members of the Pacific Islands
Forum (excluding Australia and New Zealand)
recognize the PRC, while six recognize Taiwan.
Sometimes the island nations change allegiances as
one side or the other offers inducements -
so-called "checkbook diplomacy" - to defect. For
example, Kiribati once recognized the PRC; now it
recognizes Taiwan.
But the rising strength
of the PRC economy has boosted Beijing's
confidence in its ability to win over island
states and keep them loyal. Countries that
recognize the PRC have been showered with major
infrastructure and assistance projects, including
a US$5.5 million sports complex in Kiribati,
another $4 million sport facility in Fiji, and the
donation of two cargo ships worth $9.4 million to
Vanuatu.
China's contribution to help set
up the Pacific Islands Trade Office in Beijing in
2000 came only after the Forum agreed to switch
the chairmanship from Palau (which recognizes
Taiwan) to Kiribati (which at the time recognized
the PRC). Last October Beijing lobbied against
Taiwan's inclusion in the South Pacific Tourism
Organization (SPTO), saying this would "sabotage"
China's own relations with the region. After China
pledged an additional $500,000 in organizational
support, the members vetoed Taiwan's admission the
following week.
Not just checkbook
diplomacy China's forward posture in the
South Pacific mirrors its aggressive diplomacy in
other regions such as the Middle East, Africa and
Latin America: increasing numbers of high-level
visits, no-strings-attached aid packages, and
investments in industries and critical
infrastructure. Checking Taiwan remains a high
priority for Beijing, but it no longer explains
all of its activities in the South Pacific.
Commercial deals mainly involve developing
natural resources needed in China, particularly
minerals, timber and fish, while providing
much-needed investment for the aid-reliant South
Pacific - a win-win situation for both parties.
Such agreements have included a $625 million
nickel and cobalt mine in Papua New Guinea (PNG)
and millions to reinvigorate a Cook Islands
fishing and processing plant. In June 2004,
Tonga's sole electric-power company received $17
million in "technical assistance" from the Bank of
China.
Many South Pacific leaders now make
Beijing their first overseas trip after taking
office. Between March 2004 and July 2005, eight
regional heads of state paid official visits to
China at the invitation (and most likely with the
financial support) of the Chinese government. An
80-person entourage accompanied PNG Prime Minister
Michael Somare on his February 2004 visit.
In international organizations where "one
country, one vote" is the rule, regional blocs can
be important. China is a major donor to the
Pacific Islands Forum and the highest-paying
subscriber to the South Pacific Tourism
Organization. China has also had a hand in
promoting or delaying votes on United Nations
membership for Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu.
Over the long term, the South Pacific may
also prove an important strategic asset to
Beijing. In 1997 China established a
satellite-tracking station on South Tarawa Atoll
in Kiribati. Ostensibly built to assist with
China's space program, there was press speculation
that the station may have also been used to spy on
the US missile range in the nearby Marshall
Islands. The station was dismantled after
Kiribati's diplomatic defection to Taiwan in
November 2003, but Beijing is reportedly looking
for another place in the region to set up shop.
Although Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
the European Union and the United States remain
major partners for the region, China's
contributions have mushroomed in the past five
years. In addition to becoming an increasingly
important aid and trading partner, China is
engaging the region in other ways. These include
broadcasting Chinese television programming,
expanding student exchanges and paving the way for
more Chinese tourists with the granting of ADS to
the Cook Islands, Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu in 2004.
South Pacific nations are responding positively to
these Chinese initiatives.
US
neglect China's growing activities have
occurred in the context of an increasingly
distracted and disengaged United States. In the
1990s Washington closed its US Information Agency
offices and its USAID (United States Agency for
International Development) Regional Development
Office and ended the Fulbright study exchange
program in the region. The number of Peace Corps
missions in the South Pacific has been halved
since 1995.
As well, the United Kingdom
recently closed three diplomatic posts in the
region and withdrew from the Pacific Community,
the regional development body.
Relatively
small investments in scholarships, such as those
offered by the East West Center's Pacific Islands
Development Program, and other public-diplomacy
initiatives provide an opportunity for an exchange
of ideas between the US and the South Pacific and
convey the message that Washington cares about
something beyond the "global war on terrorism",
such as supporting democracy, human rights,
development and trade. The US needs to work with
its allies in the region, not to contain China,
but to strengthen governments and economies in the
South Pacific.
Influence is not
necessarily a zero-sum game, but the US is sending
all the wrong signals. South Pacific nations want
a range of options, not an exchange of one
dominant partner for another. However, the current
message is that China is paying attention to the
region and the US is not. If Washington continues
to look the other way, Beijing will not only woo
the South Pacific but possibly win it.
Tamara Renee Shie (tamara.shie@nsepnet.org)
is a research assistant on East Asian security
issues at the Institute for National Strategic
Studies at the National Defense University in
Washington. She is also a member of the Pacific
Forum's Young Leaders Program. Her comments
represent her views and do not reflect official
policy or the position of the National Defense
University or the US government.
