While policymakers in the European capital
Brussels acknowledge Taiwan's existence when there
are opportunities to make money, they turn silent
when cross-strait tensions threaten to work their
way on to the agenda. To avoid any kind of
"misunderstandings" about the nature of EU-Taiwan
relations, the European Union repeatedly points
out that Brussels only discusses "non-political
matters" with Taipei.
Like the US, the EU
officially espouses a "one-China principle",
acknowledging that there is only one China and
that Taiwan is a
part
of China. However, it is at least questionable
whether the one-China policy automatically forbids
the EU to address security issues with Taiwan that
are of direct interest to business, such as the
sensitive matter of embargoed arms.
The
European parliament takes a different, and by
Brussels standards a "courageous", position from
the bureaucrats when dealing with Taipei. Much to
Beijing's chagrin, the parliament has passed
numerous resolutions over the past two years
urging the member states not to lift the weapons
embargo imposed on mainland China after the 1989
Tiananmen massacre. The parliament cites lack of
progress in human rights, the continuing
imprisonment of peaceful Tiananmen demonstrators,
and military threats against Taiwan.
To be
fair, Europe's elected lawmakers are less bound by
political realities and sensitivities than their
counterparts outside Europe. Members of parliament
worry less about being accused of "interfering" in
China's internal affairs. Brussels-based Chinese
diplomats, for their part, seem to have given up
complaining about parliament's harsh criticism on
the human-rights situation in China. The
interaction between Beijing and the Foreign
Affairs Committee must be described as limited at
best.
Then again, the influence of
parliament on the EU's Taiwan policies is limited
at best because of its advisory role on foreign
and security policies. The assembly's advice,
however, is seldom appreciated when Taiwan and the
Taiwan Strait make it on to the agenda. Official
diplomatic relations or not, the EU's reluctance
to talk politics and East Asian security with
Taiwan appears odd in the light of strong
EU-Taiwan trade and business relations.
Taiwan is the EU's tenth-largest trading
partner and its fourth-biggest in Asia after
mainland China, Japan and South Korea. Bilateral
trade in 2004 amounted to roughly 37 billion euros
(US$34 billion). The EU accounts for roughly 11.5%
of Taiwan's external trade in goods, buys 13% of
Taiwan's exports and provides 10% of its imports.
Common sense suggests that the EU should be more
involved in efforts to ease cross-strait tensions,
going beyond simply supporting "constructive
dialogue" between Beijing and Taipei.
"Any
arrangement between Beijing and Taipei can only be
achieved on a mutually acceptable basis, with
reference also to the wishes of the Taiwanese
population." Such is the official position. The
increasing the number of Chinese missiles
(currently about 700) directed at Taiwan, however,
is hardly "mutually acceptable" to one of the
parties concerned and does not present mainland
China as a self-described "responsible rising
foreign-policy actor".
To be fair,
Taiwan's leaders do some provocative things too.
Taipei's recent decision in effect to abolish its
National Unification Council was politically
unwise, alarming Beijing's policymakers into
thinking that Taipei was hell-bent for de jure
independence, something that Beijing says would be
a pretext for an attack on the island.
Nonetheless, the question remains: Why is
the EU so reluctant to get more involved in
cross-strait issues? Are they too politically
sensitive? Does it reflect concerns about possible
economic retaliation by Beijing for "interfering"
in China's internal affairs? It is probably a bit
of both, coupled with Brussels' fears of
jeopardizing the smooth implementation of its
envisaged "strategic partnership" with Beijing
that is so close to the heart of EU policymakers.
However, Beijing's occasional threats to
sever or downgrade business ties if the EU gets
more involved in cross-strait relations should not
necessarily be taken at face value. Developing
China still needs Europe as much as Europe needs
China. Beijing will think twice before
jeopardizing such a lucrative business
arrangement. Besides, discussing sensitive issues
should be part any "strategic partnership" and
does not necessarily constitute the interference
in internal affairs that Beijing seems so
concerned about.
The EU deserves credit
for openly opposing China's Anti-Secession Law
that the National People's Congress passed a year
ago and which formally authorizes Beijing to use
force should Taipei declare independence.
Opposition to the law led the EU to postpone
lifting the weapons embargo. On the other hand, it
did not result in any Chinese economic retaliation
and must have surprised Beijing's increasingly
cocky policymakers, who had hoped that it was all
business over principles when dealing with
Brussels.
However, ignoring Taiwan
politically does not necessarily boost the EU's
credibility as an international foreign-policy
actor, and Brussels should make sure not to betray
its own values, such as democracy, freedom of
speech and human rights. Indeed, the EU is not shy
about openly and at times vehemently criticizing
the human-rights records of North Korea and
Myanmar, while muting its criticism of China's
arguably equally poor human-rights record.
It remains to be seen whether the policy
of ignoring democratic Taiwan politically and in
terms of security is sustainable and in the EU's
interest in view of mainland China's growing
regional and global weight and influence. The
European Union envisages itself as a foreign- and
security-policy actor with a global reach that
includes East Asia. Judging by its lack of
enthusiasm to develop a more outspoken position on
cross-strait relations and tensions, however, East
Asia minus Taiwan is what it really is.
Hiding behind the one-China principle
forever and deferring to Beijing's political
sensitivities should not replace a more
comprehensive policy in East Asia and is not
worthy of an institution that in theory promotes
democracy, free speech and human rights. For the
time being, though, it is realpolitik at its best
- or worst, depending on what side of the Taiwan
Strait you live in.
Dr Axel
Berkofsky is a senior policy analyst at the
European Policy Center in Brussels. The views
expressed here are his own.
(Copyright
2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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