SPEAKING
FREELY The US finger on China's
pulse By Richard Seldin
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
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WASHINGTON - With
the exceptions of the Iraq war and the fight
against terrorism, China-watching has become the
major foreign-affairs interest in the legislative
branch of the US government, both within
long-established agencies with broad missions and
in those that were formed more recently for a
China-related purpose.
Thus, over the past
decade, the US Government Accountability Office
(GAO) and Library of Congress' Congressional Research
Service (CRS) have churned
out a plethora of reports for Congress on US-China
political and trade issues.
Also, since
they were established by Congress in 2000, the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China and
the US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission have both convened numerous hearings
and provided annual reports to Congress,
respectively, on human rights in China and China's
development of the rule of law, and the national
security implications of the US-China trade and
economic relationship.
Aside from these
legislative-branch agencies, there are five groups
within Congress itself that are involved in
US-China-related activities. In chronological
order of formation, they are the House US-China
Inter-parliamentary Exchange - 1999; the Senate
US-China Inter-parliamentary Exchange - 2004; the
Congressional China Caucus - mid-June 2005; the
US-China Congressional Working Group - late June
of 2005; and finally, the US-China Senate Working
Group - 2006. All of these groups are bipartisan
in their memberships.
For fear of
overwhelming the reader with details about all
seven entities, all I will say here about the GAO
and CRS is that their activities have been
described in great detail elsewhere. I also will
not comment in depth on three of the five in-house
congressional groups. Thus the House and Senate
Inter-parliamentary Exchanges work with China's
National People's Congress to arrange meetings in
the US and China between members of the two
congresses.
The exchanges don't meet
often, involve relatively small numbers of House
and Senate members, and don't, as groups, evaluate
or take positions on US-China-related issues.
Although the Senate Working Group's mission is
broader - it is intended to serve as a forum for
discussing China's political, economic and
military rise and how this affects US national
interests - as the group was only recently formed,
its doesn't really have a sufficient track record
for evaluation, and it is too early to predict the
direction it will take.
This leaves us
with the China Congressional Caucus and the
US-China House Working Group, to date the most
active and probably best known of the five
in-Congress entities. Both of these groups have
relatively large and expanding memberships - at
last count, 35 for the caucus and 40 for the
working group, with at least nine members
belonging to both.
Congressmen Randy
Forbes (a Republican from Virginia) and Ike
Skelton (a Democrat from Missouri ) formed the
China Caucus not long after they returned from a
congressional trip that Forbes led to China early
last year. Forbes was both greatly impressed and
concerned by what he saw first-hand of China's
rapid economic and military development.
He was particularly concerned about
China's knowing far more about the US than the US
knew about China, its rapidly growing number of
engineers, its intellectual-property theft, its
huge trade surplus with the United States, and its
quickly expanding energy needs.
Furthermore, when Forbes returned and
looked into federal-agency analysis of
US-China-relations issues, he was displeased to
find that neither the executive branch nor
Congress had mechanisms in place that allowed for
comprehensive analysis of how the US should deal
with this supercharged China.
In his view,
US-China issues primarily were being resolved in a
stovepiped, agency-by-agency manner, and the
agency analyses that did exist were poorly done.
As a consequence, Forbes and Skelton
established the China Caucus for the purpose of
having a congressional body that could make
comprehensive analyses of US-China-relations
issues. This includes evaluating the pluses and
minuses of policy choices and stimulating a debate
within the executive branch and Congress about how
to deal with China.
The caucus meets
regularly, holds briefings with China experts both
within and outside the US government, and has
discussions with Chinese Embassy officials, though
it has few direct contacts with Chinese
ministries. Caucus members tend to break into
groups consistent with their areas of expertise.
For example, Congressman Frank Wolf focuses on
human-rights issues.
Perhaps in response
to media assertions that the caucus is only
security-oriented, Forbes stressed that the caucus
looked at all areas of US-China relations,
including trade, health care, environmental
cooperation, human rights, the one-child policy
and even differences in psychology between the two
countries.
Nevertheless, the caucus also
does weigh in heavily on security concerns. Among
them, Forbes has identified China's military
modernization, including its increased military
expenditures; its high-tech shipbuilding
capabilities, which would allow it to repair
military ships quickly in the event of a conflict;
military theft; and industrial espionage. Forbes
also emphasized that the caucus is neither pro-
nor anti-China.
Although the House
US-China Working Group was formed soon after the
China Caucus, Congressmen Mark Kirk (a Republican
from Illinois) and Rick Larsen (a Democrat from
Washington), founders and current co-chairs, both
denied that the working group was intended to
operate as a counterpoise to the caucus.
Rather, the working group was established
primarily for educating congressional members
about US-China-relations issues and for promoting
in-depth discussions of these issues away from the
floor of the House. Kirk emphasized that this
process would help members develop better-nuanced,
more sophisticated views about how US-China
problems can be resolved.
The working
group does not have any particular litmus test for
membership and includes pro-China and anti-China
members. Furthermore, the group itself does not
take positions on the major US-China issues of the
day.
Like the caucus, the working group
convenes regularly, though not pursuant to a
formal meeting schedule, and meets often with
executive-branch officials, China experts,
business representatives, and the Chinese Embassy
in Washington.
The working group has also
formed academic and business advisory groups
through which academic and business experts
provide advice on issues of interest to the group.
Examples of working-group activities over the past
year include a classified briefing with Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, several meetings with
Chinese Ambassador Zhou Wenzhong, and a meeting
with Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez.
Although the group does not have formal
contacts with Chinese officials not located in
Washington, DC, when the opportunity presents
itself group members do meet with Chinese
officials, either in DC or in Beijing. For
example, both Kirk and Larsen were among six
members of Congress, including Forbes, who met
privately with President Hu Jintao on his recent
summit visit to the United States.
Kirk
and Larsen informed this writer that the working
group evaluated a broad spectrum of US-China
political, economic, military and cultural issues.
Nevertheless, the group tends to focus on issues
where there are possibilities for immediate
resolution, in contrast to larger, long-term
problems, such as Taiwan and alleged currency
manipulation, which are more difficult to resolve
and attract more public attention.
For
example, the working group currently is interested
in promoting greater US-China cooperation in
space, including joint rescue missions;
development of common third-generation wireless
standards; and independent audit of fully licensed
software used by the Chinese government and
state-owned enterprises as a way of lessening
piracy of US software products. In the
security area, the working group supports
establishing a US-China military-to-military phone
line, a kind of insurance check that the US has
with more than 20 countries, and increasing
military-to-military exchanges of senior, junior
and mid-level officers to increase transparency
and allay inter-military suspicions and distrust.
Indeed, on security issues, Larsen
believes that he and Forbes have shared concerns,
notably about China's military intentions and the
lack of transparency about those intentions. In
this regard, Larsen told this writer he had been
skeptical of answers given to him by Chinese
officials with whom he had discussed security
issues. This common concern predictably will be
heightened by observations in the Department of
Defense's (DoD's) recent report to Congress,
"Military Power of the People's Republic of
China", about the lack of transparency in China's
military buildup.
From talk to
legislative recommendations Although both
the caucus and the working group address a broad
range of issues, they differ in their approach to
making legislative recommendations. The caucus is
putting together legislation - a "National
Strategic Staffing Proposal" - which will be
based, to some extent, on a recommendation in this
year's Quadrennial Defense Review calling for the
DoD to establish a National Security Planning
Guidance that would replace DoD-centric with
interagency approaches for resolving security
challenges.
This China-based legislation
will establish a new entity - not a new agency -
in the executive branch that would allow federal
agencies to deal comprehensively with US-China
problems. To facilitate retention of employees
with expertise on evaluating these problems, this
entity is intended to be composed of staff who
will be provided with strong career opportunities.
The legislation is still being drafted and Forbes
couldn't estimate when he will introduce it.
In contrast, Larsen said that, at least
for the present, the working group does not plan
to make legislative proposals as a group, though
members might introduce bills in their individual
capacity.
As an example, Larsen mentioned
HR 5199, the "United States-China Engagement Act
of 2006", which both he and Kirk recently
introduced. The bill calls for enhancing the
United States' role in the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) group - strengthening the US
diplomatic presence in China and increasing
Chinese-language and cultural studies in US
elementary and secondary schools.
Forbes,
Kirk and Larsen all emphasized that their groups
were neutral about China, yet there are notable
differences in their perceptions of the country.
In testimony before the US-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, provided soon
after he formed the Congressional Caucus, Forbes
analogized China's quick emergence on the world
stage to the giant shark in the movie Jaws
suddenly leaping from the water to grab bait the
local sheriff had casually tossed from his boat.
Moreover, as an example of the poor
coordination Forbes believes exists among US
agencies that deal with China problems - in this
case the State Department, the DoD and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation - Forbes cited the
espionage potential raised by large numbers of
Chinese coming to the United States for study.
According to Forbes, some of these
students have remained behind, infiltrated
defense-contractor firms, stolen their industrial
secrets and provided them to China.
Also,
last year Forbes spearheaded the congressional
charge that led to passage of a House resolution
criticizing the China National Offshore Oil Co's
proposed purchase of the US oil company Unocal.
This congressional opposition to the deal was a
major factor in CNOOC's decision to abandon its
offer. Aside from Forbes, 30 of the other 35
members of the Congressional Caucus voted for the
resolution, with only one member of the caucus
voting against.
Congressman Forbes'
unflattering comparison of China to a killer
shark, raising the old bugaboo of espionage, and,
perhaps, overreacting to energy-security concerns,
do raise questions about both his and the caucus's
objectivity about China.
Also, Forbes'
real interest in China only began in January 2005
during the first trip - a relatively short visit -
that he ever took there. While a fresh look at a
problem can be quite valuable, it may be imprudent
to put too much faith in someone without an earned
track record on US-China issues.
In this
regard, Forbes' point about the executive branch
not always coordinating its policies on how to
deal with China seems substantially overstated.
Aside from the US Trade Representative-led Trade
Policy Subcommittee, which includes numerous
federal agencies that regularly meet to discuss
US-China trade issues, the National Security
Council, the State Department, DoD and the
intelligence agencies do coordinate on US-China
political and military issues as they arise.
As for the working group and its leaders,
Kirk and Larsen have been criticized for being
cheerleaders for China, to a great extent because
of their both having companies in their districts
- respectively, Boeing and Motorola, and Boeing -
which are on the A-list of businesses that have
done very well in the China market. Also, Larsen's
comment to this writer, "Shouldn't we be doing
everything possible not to have a conflict with
China rather than only prepare for a conflict?"
sounds a bit heavy on the deference side.
Though even China hawks would probably
disagree that only preparing for a conflict with
China is sound policy, one would think that
avoiding any behavior that China might view as
confrontational would also not be in the United
States' best national interests.
Nevertheless, Kirk's and Larsen's emphasis
on a small-step, careful (touch the stones as you
cross the river) long-term approach to resolving
problems with China seems like most reasonable
one.
Given a choice between this approach
and the more fear-driven, in-your-face stance, I
certainly would go with the former. Indeed, Kirk
and Larsen were only two of 15 congressmen who
voted against the House resolution criticizing
CNOOC's proposed purchase of Unocal.
Kirk
suggested that a number of House members voting
for the resolution were shooting from the hip in
condemning the deal and were not familiar with the
facts. For example, they mistakenly believed that
Unocal operated many gasoline stations in the US.
Also, while Kirk and Larsen may not have
been certified China hands before they formed the
working group, they both have backgrounds that
offered some preparation for leading a group
focusing on relations with China. Before being
elected to Congress, Kirk had substantial
experience in international affairs at the World
Bank and the State Department, and Larsen hails
from a state that has had both an important and
continuing relationship with China, and, in Henry
"Scoop" Jackson and Warren Magnuson, late senators
with formidable records on US-China-relations
issues.
As for the recent summit between
presidents George W Bush and Hu Jintao, Forbes and
Larsen agreed that the meeting was valuable in
providing the two leaders some face time together,
despite the lack of concrete deliverables.
While Forbes, Kirk and Larsen were all
part of the six-member congressional group that
meet privately with Hu, media accounts suggested
that only Forbes confronted Hu. Both at that
meeting and later in a publicly announced formal
request, Forbes asked the Chinese president
whether he would permit him "to lead a
congressional delegation to China that would have
unfettered and unrestricted access to Christian
groups in China". Kirk and Larsen seemed to take a
more low-key approach.
Only time will tell
whether the proliferation of China groups in
Congress will help or impede analyses of US-China
relations issues. There is no question that
deepening interest in and expertise about China
can be of great value, and some of the legislative
proposals that members of the China Caucus and the
US-China Congressional Working Group promote could
have beneficial consequences.
Thus Forbes'
staffing proposal, despite this writer's doubts,
could well improve interagency coordination of
China issues, and Kirk's and Larsen's support for
greater Chinese instruction in US schools is
definitely a step in the right direction.
Nevertheless, part of the congressional
rush to form so many China-based groups could well
reflect oversensitivity to a perceived threat from
China. Of course, this has happened before.
Congressional fear-mongering about Japanese
economic power in the 1970s and 1980s, and more
recent executive-branch exaggeration of the
threats posed by Iraq, are just two familiar
examples.
The problem the United States
has had in rushing to judgment in the area of
foreign relations counsels well for the slow,
step-by-step, reasoned approach suggested by
Larsen. This is particularly true when dealing
with a country like China, whose economic, social
and even some political development over the past
27 years, generally, has been positive.
Richard Seldin is a senior legal
consultant and freelance writer.
(Copyright 2006 Richard Seldin.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
