In a surprise concession to Japan, China
has dropped its objection to Tokyo raising the
issue of Japanese citizens kidnapped by the North
Korean government during the next round of
six-party talks on Pyongyang's nuclear program.
While the gesture will certainly be
welcomed in Tokyo, its salutary effect on
Sino-Japanese relations will be short-lived if it
isn't combined with additional diplomatic pressure
from China aimed at bringing the North Koreans
back to the six-party process for serious talks.
Early last month, Japan's call for a
binding resolution under Chapter 7 of the United
Nations Charter in the Security Council after
North Korean missile tests appeared to threaten
the recent
thaw
in Sino-Japanese relations. The first meeting
between the two countries' foreign ministers in
more than a year occurred on May 23; that was
followed by Japan's lifting its freeze on yen
loans to China on June 6. China's condemnation of
Japan's proposed Security Council resolution as an
"overreaction" seemed to put the two countries at
odds again after a brief yet significant
improvement in their tense relationship.
The two countries appear to have reached a
tentative accord with regard to policy on North
Korea. Japan has agreed to back China's
alternative non-binding resolution against North
Korea in the Security Council, and on July 28
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing approved the
inclusion of the abduction issue within the
framework of the six-party talks during his
meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso on
the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum.
Li's reminder to Aso during the same
meeting that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine remain an obstacle
to improved relations indicates that the bilateral
relationship remains on rocky ground.
Nevertheless, the Chinese concession on the
abduction issue, which it had previously dismissed
as an unrelated bilateral issue between Japan and
North Korea, seems to indicate that Beijing is
increasingly concerned about North Korea providing
political cover for changes in Japan's
politico-military profile.
Such changes
were highlighted after the missile tests when
Japanese political leaders renewed their debate
over the need for Japan to create a legal
framework that would allow the country to develop
the capability to strike missile bases in North
Korea if a missile attack were imminent. Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu responded to
these comments by stating that Japan was "pouring
oil on fire" and that these types of threats were
"extremely irresponsible and incomprehensible".
A national poll by Japan's Yomiuri
newspaper shortly after the missile tests
indicated that 77% of the public felt an increased
sense of threat from North Korea and 90% supported
Japan's tough Security Council resolution. That
sense of threat translated into 62% of the
Japanese public favoring speeding up development
of Japan's missile-defense system and 65%
supporting the imposition of additional sanctions,
in addition to banning the North Korean ferry
Manyongbong from Japanese ports.
With the
presidential elections of Japan's ruling Liberal
Democratic Party set for next month, the Chinese
seem to have decided to try to limit Japanese
domestic support for further sanctions on North
Korea or broader changes in Japan's security
policies, such as those advocated by Chief Cabinet
Secretary Shinzo Abe, Koizumi's likely successor.
Abe, who has a reputation as a hardliner on both
North Korea and China, has strongly pushed for
Japan to revise its constitution and engage in
collective defense agreements.
The Chinese
would like to slow - if not stop - the
deconstruction of Japan's constitutional
restraints on security cooperation as long as
possible, especially given Japan's growing
interest in the Taiwan issue (as evidenced in the
joint statement of common objectives issued by the
US-Japan Security Consultative Committee in
February 2005). China expressed "grave concern"
over the United States and Japan including a
reference to Taiwan in their common strategic
objectives, with a Foreign Ministry spokesman
stating that any "irresponsible remarks" related
to China's national defense were "untenable".
Although other factors, such as a desire
to continue strengthening economic relations with
Japan, may have been involved in China's decision
to make the concession on the abduction issue, the
timing of this gesture leaves little doubt that
the connection between Japan's security transition
and North Korean provocations has Beijing on
alert.
Still, there is no date for a
resumption of the six-party talks, and many
observers believe that North Korea will wait out
the remainder of US President George W Bush's
administration before engaging in real
negotiations, hoping that a change in the White
House may yield a better deal.
Without
commitment from all parties involved, there is
little reason to believe that Japan will make any
headway with the North Koreans on the abduction
issue even if the talks do reconvene soon. The
positive effect of China's rare concession to the
Japanese public will most likely be temporary.
David Fouse
(foused@apcss.org) is assistant professor
at the department of regional studies at the
Asia-Pacific Center for security studies in
Honolulu.
