Why a rising China can't dominate
Asia By Robert Sutter
"The United States has nothing to fear
from China's emergence as a global economic power
... We want you to succeed ... The tasks faced by
Beijing are so daunting that the biggest risk we
face is not that China will overtake the US, but
that China won't move ahead with the reforms
necessary to sustain its growth and to address the
very serious problems facing the nation."
- US Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson, who is due in Beijing for two
days of talks with Chinese officials next week.
"China can't dominate Asia; there are too
many governments in
Asia." This comment by a
senior Chinese official during a
recent interview in Beijing reflects realities
of power that make Chinese leadership in Asia
unlikely under foreseeable circumstances.
The findings of private interviews and
discussions with 75 officials in China and seven
other Asian governments about China's rise, the
balance of influence in Asia, and Asian regional
dynamics contradict much public discourse that
depicts a powerful China coming to the leading
position in Asia at a time of US decline.
Although prevailing commentaries focus on
Chinese strengths and US weaknesses, government
officials in Asia privately show an equal
awareness of Chinese weaknesses and US strengths.
They also recognize that
independent-minded governments in Asia maneuver
and "hedge" in reaction to China's rise. These
governments work quietly among themselves and with
the United States to ensure that their freedom of
action will not be negatively affected as China
rises. Such actions reinforce US leadership in
Asia.
US policymakers and regional
observers can choose to adopt the one-sided view
of those commentators who predict China's
dominance and US decline in Asia. They tended to
do the same thing in the late 1970s, when the US
was weak and divided after the defeat in Vietnam
and when it was predicted that the rising power,
the Soviet Union, would dominate Asia. The same
pattern prevailed in the late 1980s, when
respected US commentators said that Japan would
dominate Asia as US influence in the region
declined.
Of course, those earlier
predictions were dead wrong; they focused on the
strengths of the rising powers, the USSR and
Japan, and did not adequately consider their
weaknesses; and they focused on the weaknesses of
the US and did not adequately consider its
strengths.
A more sensible path is to
listen to the more balanced and carefully
calibrated views of Asian government officials,
summarized below. While media, vocal
non-government elites and public opinion matter in
some Asian countries, it is government officials
who make foreign policy.
Chinese
strengths and limitations Growing Chinese
prominence in Asia is based on rapidly growing
economic interchange and adroit diplomacy. Chinese
and most Asian officials play down the
implications of China's impressive buildup of
military power, though Japanese and some Taiwanese
officials focus on this perceived Chinese threat.
Burgeoning trade and growing Asian
investment in China are the most concrete
manifestations of greater Chinese prominence in
Asia. China has become the largest trade partner
of many Asian neighbors, and Chinese trade expands
at almost twice the rate of China's fast-growing
economy.
Entrepreneurs from the more
advanced Asian economies provide the bulk of the
US$60 billion in foreign investment China receives
annually. Chinese wealth and economic importance
support growing popular exchanges in tourism and
education.
Attentive Chinese diplomacy
involves an often dizzying array of leadership
meetings and agreements with Asian neighbors and
increasing adroit Chinese interchange with the
growing number of Asian regional organizations. As
a result, China's positive image has grown,
particularly in South Korea, much of Southeast
Asia, and Australia.
Heading the list of
limitations and weaknesses of China's rise in Asia
is strong Chinese nationalism; this seriously
complicates Chinese relations with Japan and
Taiwan, and causes significant difficulties with
South Korea, Singapore and India, among others.
Chinese territorial claims are a serious
concern in the East China Sea, a major drag on
improving relations with India, and an underlying
concern in Southeast Asia. China's authoritarian
political system is unattractive to many, though
certainly not all, of China's neighbors.
Chinese economic and diplomatic strengths
also reflect significant limitations and
complications. More than half of Chinese trade
with Asia and the world is processing trade, which
leads to double and triple counting as a product
crosses borders, sometimes several times, before
completion and (often) export from China to the US
and Europe.
The value added by China in
this trade is frequently low, and the trade
depends heavily on US and European consumers.
Reflecting this reality, Chinese President Hu
Jintao in 2005 said his country was "a major
trading country" but had not yet become "a major
trading power".
Chinese economic
competitiveness means that Asian manufacturers
often cannot compete directly with China. In
response, Asian entrepreneurs increasingly invest
in and integrate their businesses with China, but
Asian workers cannot move to China and often
suffer. Investment in Asian economies declines and
Chinese investment and foreign assistance in Asia
remain very small and do not offset these negative
implications.
China's "win-win diplomacy"
focuses on common ground, which receives great
positive publicity but does little to resolve
differences or deal with issues. With few
exceptions, China does not do hard things; it
carefully avoids major international commitments
or risks.
US weaknesses and
strengths US weaknesses dominate public
discourse on the United States in most of Asia.
They center on the decline in the US image amid
widespread criticism of the US war in Iraq, the US
position on North Korea, unilateral US actions on
significant international issues, and perceived
inattentive US policies regarding the economic
development and other concerns in Asia.
Nevertheless, Asian government officials
were almost uniform in emphasizing the importance
of the US role as Asia's security guarantor and
vital economic partner. The main exceptions were a
Communist Party of India (Marxist) official and,
to a degree, some Chinese officials, who
criticized the US security role in Asia.
Asian government officials are well aware
that Asian governments generally don't trust one
another. The suspicion and wariness one sees today
between China and Japan characterize most
relationships between and among Asian governments.
And yet Asian governments need stability
to meet their nation-building priorities. In this
context, the US looms very large in their
calculations. Unlike their Asian neighbors, the US
does not want their territory and does not want to
dominate them. It, too, wants stability and, in
contrast with China's reluctance to undertake
major risks and commitments, the United States is
seen to continue the massive expenditure and major
risk in a US military presence in Asia, viewed as
essential in stabilizing the often uncertain
security relationships among Asian governments.
Not only does the US continue to occupy
the top security position as Asia's "least
distrusted power", the US also plays an essential
economic role in the development of Asian
governments, most of which are focused on
export-oriented growth. It continues to allow
massive inflows of imports essential to Asian
economic development, despite an overall US trade
deficit approaching $700 billion annually. Against
this background, when asked if overall US power
and influence in Asia were in decline, Asian
officials were uniform in saying no.
Asian maneuvering and hedging All Asian government officials consulted
acknowledged that China's rise added to incentives
for most Asian governments to maneuver and hedge
with other powers, including the US, to preserve
their independence and freedom of action.
A Singapore official said that "hedging is
the name of the game" in Southeast Asia, while an
Indian official said that Asian governments "are
not going to put all their eggs in one basket".
Asian governments hedge against the US and
other powers as well, but their recent focus has
been on China's rise. The governments tend to
cooperate increasingly with China in areas of
common concern, but they work increasingly in
other ways, often including efforts to strengthen
relations with the US, to preserve freedom of
action and other interests in the face China's
rise.
In sum, such hedging by Asian
governments in an Asian order supported by
undiminished US security and economic power and
influence adds to factors that preclude Chinese
leadership or dominance in Asia; it reinforces US
leadership in Asia.
The majority of Asian
government officials assumed that China sought
eventual "pre-eminence" in Asia, but Chinese
officials said no, even though Chinese
foreign-policy specialists said that secret
Chinese Communist Party documents over the years
had continued to refer to a general goal of Asian
leadership.
As noted, when asked whether
China sought leadership or domination in Asia, a
senior Chinese official acknowledged the
complications of US power and influence and the
role of many independent-minded Asian governments;
he responded that "China can't dominate Asia,
there are too many governments in Asia".
He nonetheless went on to advise that
China's influence in the region would grow as
China's "weight" would become increasing important
to the governments in the region and China would
have increasing success in reassuring Asian
governments of Chinese intentions.
Robert Sutter
(sutterr@georgetown.edu) is professor of
Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University.
