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    Greater China
     Oct 27, 2006
Democracy with Chinese characteristics
By David Fullbrook

BANGKOK - In 1976, chairman Mao Zedong died after leading a decade of the murderous Cultural Revolution that nearly broke China. Three decades later, the contrast could not be starker, except for one thing: the Chinese Communist Party's continuing grip on power.

After some loose talk about political reform in the 1980s, out of which came elections for village officials and which ended with the June 4 Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the Chinese



Communist Party (CCP) has not seriously revisited the issue. Yet a quiet alarm discomforts the leadership. If a few thousand Falungong practitioners could gather to meditate outside Beijing's Zhongnanhai, headquarters of China's power center, in 1999 without any warning, what else might be brewing?

Many autocracies have been swept aside by democracy, mostly of a questionable quality, over the past few decades. Communist parties figure larger in history than in life these days. Velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus this decade have put more writing on the wall for dictatorships.

Instead of a blanket clampdown or revolutionary campaign that Mao might have launched, the CCP has refashioned some democratic ways to strengthen its grip and temper public discontent.

National legislators, nominated by local party branches, have over the past decade become bolder, openly chastising policy, occasionally rejecting draft laws. Wider consultations are held with experts, researchers and the public to gather information and insights to help the party shape its policies to dampen opposition.
Instead of packing all of its critics and challengers off to labor camps or forcing them underground, the CCP has given back some political space, carefully nurturing public debate. New state-sanctioned civil-society organizations have captured emerging political consciousness, opening up talk between the ruled and rulers, notes Bruce Dickson, an expert on Chinese politics.

Pei Minxin, a respected sinologist, argues that the CCP has also seduced the intelligentsia, muting prospects for new ideas and leaders that might focus public anger, these days often vented through riots against venal local officials.

Better in than out, it seems. Since the late 1990s, party recruiters have been working overtime. More than 68 million now carry the CCP card, up 13% since 1997, while the population grew only 5%. Many new members are investors and entrepreneurs, whose growing power and influence the party wants to co-opt before they become a threat.

For the ambitious or cunning, the CCP is a parallel universe offering shortcuts to contracts, grants, promotions and protection. It is a monumental pyramid of patrons and clients stretching from the humblest dirt-road villages up to the grand ministries of Beijing. Predictably, corruption flourishes in this universe.

But the CCP still has plenty of tools to suppress dissent and maintain its power. The paramilitary People's Armed Police, 1.5 million strong, has honed its tactics for quelling demonstrations and riots. About 30,000 cyber-police hunt dissidents on the Internet. Former president Jiang Zemin allegedly established a special unit, Office 6-10, to stalk, jail and torture Falungong practitioners. Since at least 2005, censors have been pruning media freedom that had blossomed in 2003 and 2004.

But what has probably done more to shore up the party than anything is economic reform. For many, incomes have risen and lives improved in years rather than decades. State banks endlessly lend to hopeless state firms, which keeps unemployment in check while the government struggles to finance a proper social-security system. Whether the winners exceed the losers is hard to say, but such is their number, so bright are the lights of the boomtowns, that even losers probably remain optimists.

Teresa Wright, who examined the CCP's hold on power for the East West Center, found that workers commonly believe the CCP is able to protect them, never mind its authoritarianism. That is not entirely surprising - there would seem little else for them to believe in. China's boom has also been lucrative for many state agencies and bureaucrats, drawing bribes or handing out contracts to their own firms while causing headaches for competitors.

Moreover, China's schools are not teaching thinking, nor knowledge of political alternatives. Democracy is commonly imagined as a world where officials cannot abuse citizens, rather than one of debate, disagreement and compromise, in which political opponents are not enemies.

The CCP forever?
So is the party's position unassailable? Possibly, were people not migrating from villages most Chinese currently call home to cities in search of jobs and better schools and hospitals. By 2020, more Chinese will live in cities than in villages. Cities in most places tend to be more liberal than villages. People are generally better informed, more demanding and richer, and chances are they will push for a greater say in who governs.

Before the 1970s, dictatorships looked permanent in deeply Catholic countries such as Spain, Portugal and the Latin American states. Many political scientists wondered whether democracy could work in these conservative, neo-feudal societies. Today, most are democracies. Meanwhile, Chinese villagers have picked up the voting habit.

"There is growing scholarly consensus that, despite great variation, grassroots electoral democracy has progressed and is flourishing, affecting the lives of ordinary Chinese villagers in important ways, for the better ... democratic electoral quality is most evident at the lowest level, where it matters greatly for governance and stability but least of all for policy making," concluded Melanie Manion, author of a recent study of village elections.

Democracy with Chinese characteristics is how party hacks see village voting for local leaders, whose decisions must still pass muster with the local appointed party boss. It looks rather pale against another democracy with Chinese characteristics called Taiwan, a culturally Chinese society where parties compete ferociously. Clearly there is every chance that democracy will work in mainland China if the Communist Party steps aside.

It might fall over before that happens, though. Pei, the sinologist, thinks that eventually there may be too many mouths pushing and shoving at the party trough. More members mean bigger factions, more factions, and more squabbling over the spoils of power. Hu Jintao's China Youth League faction is only now finishing off Jiang Zemin's Shanghai clique this autumn, arresting key members for corruption in the city.

There is little ideologically to keep members together save self-interest. Searching for a new big idea to replace worn-out communism, the party has come up with Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents". Comrades and citizens, however, are too busy with the Internet, massive computer games, and zippy magazines trashing celebrities to pay attention. The party has also uncorked the genie of nationalism, but keeping it tamed may prove impossible. Anti-Japanese demonstrations came close to getting out of hand in April 2004.

In the meantime, keeping a lid on unemployment is likely to get harder. China's torrid economic growth, off a low base, will not last forever. For the past three summers China's economy has looked dangerously hot, only to be cooled by rapid policy fanning from Beijing. Success in the future is by no means certain.

Across the Pacific, a slowdown in the US economy could, if it turns severe, mean sharp job losses among the export factories of Guangdong and Zhejiang. "However one frames it, performance-based legitimacy is a delicate and perilous strategy for sustaining authoritarian rule indefinitely," pointed out Larry Diamond, a Stanford University expert on democracy in developing countries.

The CCP's position will be secure if it can survive the discontent of an increasingly sophisticated and demanding public during a recession without resorting to severe repression that would further choke the market and throttle confidence. The party's toughest test is yet to come.

(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)


Beijing gives local governments more say (Oct 18, '06)

China yearns for Hu's 'harmonious society' (Oct 11, '06)

Out from under Jiang's shadow (Sep 27, '06)

 
 



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