China's new North Korea
diplomacy By Jing-dong Yuan
North Korea's unexpected decision that it
is prepared to return to the six-party talks
caught many by surprise. Announced in Beijing
after a hastily scheduled three-way meeting of
China, North Korea and the United States,
Pyongyang's change of heart offers signs of hope
for the resumption of the process to make the
Korean Peninsula nuclear-free.
Without
question, China's role in facilitating North
Korea's return to the negotiation table has been
critical. In a major departure
from
its traditional low-profile diplomatic posture and
long-held principle of non-interference in other
countries' domestic affairs, Beijing swiftly
joined the international community in condemning
the North Korean nuclear test in the strongest
terms and adopted United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1718 imposing sanctions.
Beijing's diplomatic coup has won kudos
from Washington. President George W Bush thanked
China for encouraging Pyongyang back to the talks.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said during a
recent trip to Asia that "it is an extraordinary
thing for China to be now where it is". Likewise,
assistant secretary of state Christopher Hill
observed that "what we are doing with China today
with respect to a neighbor of China is
unprecedented. So perhaps in the history books Kim
Jong-il will get a lot of credit for bringing the
US and China closer together."
Indeed, one
of the most important factors that influences
China's North Korea policy is how it will affect
Sino-US relations. Beijing has sought to maintain
a good, stable bilateral relationship with
Washington that serves China's interests. That
includes US willingness to rein in any moves by
Taiwan for independence. Despite their differences
and disputes over a range of issues, both
countries share a common interest in making the
Korean Peninsula nuclear-free.
However,
the two countries' visions of the endgames for
North Korea are different. For Beijing, the best
outcome is a non-nuclear (or de-nuclearized) but
surviving North Korean regime; for Washington,
nuclear disarmament is the fundamental issue and
to the extent that this can only be achieved by a
regime change, even if with non-military means,
that should be the way to go. At the minimum,
punishment is critical to demonstrate to those
seeking nuclear-weapons capabilities that
proliferation does not pay.
Clearly, key
differences in tactics remain. At times, the
Chinese are frustrated with US inflexibility and
suspicious of its real intentions regarding the
resolution of the Korean nuclear crisis. One
widely cited example is the US imposition of
financial sanctions on North Korea soon after the
September 19, 2005, Joint Statement was adopted.
Chinese analysts suggest that Washington
is using the crisis to advance its own strategic
interests in the region, including bringing Japan
and South Korea in a strong bond under its
alliance systems, justifying enhanced military
presence and force deployments in the region,
forcing China to make the difficult choices and
creating unstable regional security environments
to disrupt and delay China's economic process.
Since the beginning of the current nuclear
crisis in October 2002, China has done its utmost
to facilitate dialogue and discussion aimed at
defusing the nuclear crisis and finding ways to
its eventual solution.
Beijing has sought
to pursue a two-pronged approach of keeping the
peninsula nuclear-free without causing instability
in Northeast Asia. For these reasons, China has
painstakingly nurtured and promoted the six-party
talks while providing energy and food to North
Korea.
However, Pyongyang repaid Beijing's
good offices, patience, and generous assistance
with actions that have been detrimental to Chinese
interests. It openly defied Beijing's advice and
embarrassed China by going ahead with the missile
tests in July and the nuclear test in October. Its
nuclear and missile brinkmanship has alarmed Japan
and provided it with the convenient justification
for bolstering missile defenses, spy-satellite
launches and the strengthening US-Japan security
alliance, developments that China would rather not
have taken place.
This has had an
important impact on Beijing's North Korea policy.
China had for some time resisted calls for
exerting greater pressure on North Korea,
including significant cutoffs of oil and food
supplies. It had legitimate reasons to be
cautious. Aside from its aversion to imposing
sanctions as a principle, China has serious
concerns over the consequences of the North Korean
regime either imploding or resorting to extreme
action in response to external pressure and
sanctions. Military conflicts could ensue; massive
refugees could swamp northeastern China; and a
post-Kim North Korea could be absorbed by the
South, with US military personnel deployed along
the China-Korea border.
North Korea's
nuclear test was more than Beijing could accept.
China sought closer consultation with the other
major powers and sent a special envoy to North
Korea to deliver a stern message to Kim Jong-il.
While continuing to emphasize diplomacy, China
tightened its border controls and instructed banks
to halt financial dealings with North Korea, in
addition to reported suspension of oil exports to
the country in September.
All these
demonstrate significant efforts on China's part in
seeking a solution to the North Korean nuclear
issue. Diplomacy has played a useful role in
establishing and facilitating multilateral talks
over the past three years. But processes cannot
substitute for substance and progress.
Now
that Pyongyang has crossed the red line, Beijing
is re-evaluating its policies and weighing
alternative options. China's security interests
counsel diplomacy, patience and balance, but they
also call for new courses of action. Pyongyang's
return to the six-party talks may be the first
testimonial to Beijing's new North Korea
diplomacy.
While Washington and Beijing
have cooperated closely on the North Korean
nuclear issue, it would be unrealistic to expect
that China would be as cooperative on the Iranian
nuclear issue. In fact China, together with
Russia, has so far indicated it does not support
adopting any UN Security Council resolution
imposing tougher sanctions on Tehran for its
refusal to halt its uranium-enrichment program,
considering Iran a different case and pushing for
diplomatic solutions instead.
Several
factors likely could influence how Beijing's
diplomatic script on Iran may get written. These
include China's growing economic ties with Iran,
especially in the energy sector, where the two
countries have signed major contracts worth
billions of US dollars in recent years; China's
aversion to sanctions in general as a diplomatic
tool; how Russia would act on the issue; the forms
and extent of any UN Security Council resolutions
on Iran; and its image as a responsible rising
power and stakeholder in international nuclear
non-proliferation.
But consideration of
its relationships with both the United States and
the European Union is not insignificant. However
important Iranian supplies of oil are, China could
ill afford alienating the US, where it has much
larger stakes in market, investment and
technologies. Beijing also needs Washington's
cooperation in reining in the independence
elements in Taiwan, as well as working out
differences with Tokyo. Likewise, China needs a
good and stable relationship with the EU for
expanding trade, investment, and the latter's
lifting of the arms ban imposed in 1989.
The pending Security Council deliberation
on Iran in the coming weeks offers a unique
opportunity for the international community to
size up China's growing influence and its
diplomatic mettle. Beijing will be making tough
decisions as it contemplates balancing its energy
security interests, its relationship with the
United States and other Western powers, and its
image as a responsible rising power and
stakeholder on the global stage.
Dr
Jing-dong Yuan is research director of the
East Asia non-proliferation program at the Center
for Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
of International Studies, where he is also an
associate professor of international policy
studies.
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