Page 2 of 2 The 'not an anti-American'
bloc By Yu Bin
diverse
interests is guaranteed to be time-consuming and
inefficient.
Perhaps the SCO's biggest
achievement is its survival. In retrospect, the
SCO's continued existence and growth after
September 11, 2001, can be attributed to the "law
of avoidance", for the organization has often
avoided confronting the differences among members
rather than resolving them. When faced with
difficult issues, the SCO
tends to do little or nothing as a group, as was
the case in the immediate post-September 11
period. The SCO's resilience is, ironically,
derived from rather than compromised by its
weakness and slowness.
As such, member
states concentrate their efforts in areas where
they can all agree and benefit, particularly on
non-security issues. Nowadays the bulk of SCO
activities are in the areas of trade, investment,
finance, education and culture. Of the 10
coordinating mechanisms of the SCO, four belong to
the categories of "low" politics (meetings of
ministers of economy, transportation, etc), four
for law and order, and only two really function at
the level of "high" politics (defense and foreign
affairs). And it is in the economic area that the
SCO is fast expanding its interlocking mechanism.
In 2003, the SCO set the goal of becoming a
free-trade zone in the not-too-distant future.
Petropolitik China's economic
influence permeates the SCO. In recent years,
Beijing earmarked US$900 million in long-term,
low-interest loans and grants for member-state
infrastructural development and the training of
1,500 technicians from other SCO states. More
resources are being poured in from China's public
and private sectors. Russia, perhaps more than any
other major power, keenly observes China's moves.
For Russia, China's economic "intrusions"
into traditionally Russian-dominated areas are
part of the realpolitik game, be they in the name
of geopolitics, geo-economics or, more
fashionably, petropolitik. Its economy buoyed by
high oil prices, President Vladimir Putin's Russia
is ready and able, perhaps more than at any time
in the post-Soviet era, to consolidate and perhaps
expand its influence in these "near abroad"
regions of Russia. Indeed, the once super military
power has now become the super petro-power under
Putin, whose mission is to remake Russia as a
world power to be respected, if not feared.
In this context, the oil czars in the
Kremlin may not particularly welcome the newly
operational Kazakh-China oil pipeline with its
200,000-barrels-per-day capacity. After all, this
pipeline competes with the long-talked-about but
never built oil pipeline from Russia's Siberia to
China's northeast. For Beijing, this Boris
Yeltsin-initiated, Putin-stalled and
Japanese-frustrated eastern pipeline project may
eventually be built.
China's thirst for
energy, however, cannot wait. The United States
was certainly not enthusiastic about the Kazakh
pipeline (Vice President Dick Cheney made a
surprise visit to the oil-rich Central Asian
republic this year to cement relations with its
autocratic leader and lobby for a new oil pipeline
to Europe that would bypass Russia). Beijing's
real goal is perhaps to achieve energy
independence from constraints imposed by both
Washington and Moscow.
The Sino-Russian
rivalry in Central Asia, however, has its limits.
After some 300 years of conflict and mutual
suspicion, the two largest Eurasian powers have
embarked on a genuine and mutually beneficial
rapprochement. The SCO serves as an interfacing
mechanism for Beijing and Moscow to trade off
interests and coordinate policies regarding
Central Asia. Indeed, certain divisions of labor
seem to have developed in dealing with regional
issues, with Beijing opting for more of an
economic role and Moscow emphasizing its military
presence.
Under these circumstances,
Beijing's growing influence in Central Asia may
well be balanced or even checked not by Washington
but by Moscow. Given its proximity, Russia is
perhaps more concerned than the United States is
with growing Chinese economic power and political
influence. These concerns will persist beyond the
Russian presidential elections in 2008 and
regardless of whether the current Russian leader
builds his legacy as Putin the Great by staying in
office or Putin the Ghost by working largely
behind the scenes.
Crouching nukes,
hidden opportunities? Given the
complexities of the region and the divergent goals
of the major powers, the current strategic hedging
between Washington and Beijing in Central Asia is
far from an end game. There is considerable room
for cooperation.
Rather than a hit-and-run
US strategy with a limited attention span or an
"us versus them" approach to the complex regional
issues, Beijing would certainly welcome more
sustained US diplomatic and economic input into
the delicate and volatile region. A stable,
secular and prosperous Afghanistan is also in the
interests of China. And, perhaps more than any
other major power, Beijing will be the first to
reap the economic and diplomatic benefits of a
secure region.
In the same vein, Beijing
would like to see the United States adopt a more
moderate and pragmatic approach to the Iran
nuclear issue, with or without an Iraqi meltdown.
China is not simply considering the $200 billion
oil contract it recently locked in with Iran.
Regional and world stability is at stake.
Indeed, Beijing has become a profoundly
conservative power with a growing stake in the
stability of the international trading and
security mechanisms. A less catastrophic
resolution of the Iraq situation, a soft landing
for the six-party nuclear talks with North Korea
and for Iran, plus a more realistic and more
responsible domestic US fiscal policy are all
essential ingredients for a healthier
international system.
In this category, an
influential Chinese foreign-policy analyst
recently sparked a provocative debate about the
negative connotation of the US "decline", real or
perceived. The consensus among China's
America-watchers seems to be that such a decline
may not necessarily be a "good" thing for China
and the world. A self-confident, secure and
moderate if not humble US is perhaps in the best
interests of all.
That said, Central Asia
remains the geostrategic playground of the world's
major civilizations: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism
and Confucianism. And by the end of the 20th
century, all had become nuclearized. Understanding
and managing the region would be hard enough
during times of relative tranquility. The current
major power politics in this part of the world,
with all of its pronounced noble goals, allows for
very little margin of error in the age of weapons
of mass destruction.
Yu Bin is
senior research associate for the Shanghai
Institute of American Studies and professor of
political science at Wittenberg University, Ohio.
He can be reached at byu@wittenberg.edu.
