Page 2 of 3 China's flawed fight against
corruption By Wu Zhong, China
Editor
left virtually unchecked within his
jurisdiction. Hence absolute power leads to
absolute corruption.
A start of
restructuring Shocked by widespread
smuggling activities across the country after the
exposure of the Zhanjiang and Xiamen cases,
Beijing began to ponder where its customs system
had gone wrong. Until then the local customs
branch had been regarded as a local
government department and as
such was under the leadership of the local party
committee. The local customs officials, including
the chief, were appointed by the local party
committee, hence they would be unlikely to
jeopardize their careers by disobeying an order
from local party and government officials.
At that time, all regional governments
were eager to take shortcuts to boost local
economic development. For coastal cities, one
shortcut was to tolerate or even encourage
smuggling that would boost "trade" and lure in
huge "capital". In fact, at that time, some cities
worked out their own tariffs for imports that were
much lower than the national rates so as to lure
some import businesses. When such local rules were
endorsed by the local party committees or
governments, the local customs branches, being
part of the local government, could not help but
obey. And in the worst cases like those of
Zhanjiang and Xiamen, when the local party chiefs
were colluding with smugglers for personal gain,
local customs chiefs often became major
accomplices.
Beijing must have concluded
that the lack of independence in the operations of
customs branches was a major reason for rampant
smuggling. So it launched a restructuring plan to
centralize the customs operations. Since the
restructuring, all customs branches are now
directly under the General Administration of
Customs, with their officials, including the
chiefs, directly appointed by the general
administration. Independent of local party
committees and governments, local customs branches
directly carry out orders from, and directly
report to, the general administration.
The
new system appears to be working well, as fewer
major smuggling cases have been reported. One
explanation for this may be that, on the one hand,
a local customs branch, independent of the local
authorities, would closely monitor likely
smuggling activities within its jurisdiction. On
the other hand, the operations of the local
customs is being double-checked - it is not only
directly supervised by the general administration
but is also being watched by the local party and
government authorities, including the local
anti-graft watchdogs.
So now, the power
center of the CCP wants a somewhat similar
restructuring of its own anti-graft system. From
the middle of this year, it has begun to appoint
officials directly from the power center,
particularly those from the CCDI, to head the
regional anti-graft bodies. This is a departure
from the decades-old practice of the regional
party committee picking the head of a regional
CDI. The restructuring has been speeded up after
the exposure of Chen Liangyu's case.
Late
last month, Shen Deyong, a member of the CCDI
Standing Committee and vice president of the
Supreme People's Court, arrived in Shanghai. Days
later, he made his first public appearance in the
largest commercial metropolis of China, with the
local media reporting him as the new secretary of
the party's Shanghai Municipal CDI.
At
about the same time, Beijing Daily reported that
the CCP power center had appointed Ma Zhipeng,
another member of the CCDI Standing Committee, to
be the secretary of the party's Beijing Municipal
CDI. And according to Tianjin Daily, Zang Xianfu,
an official from the power center, took over the
post of secretary of the Tainjin Municipal CDI.
Analysts point out that the power center's
timing for the reshuffle of the anti-graft
watchdogs in Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin is
significant as investigations into corruption
scandals involving senior officials in these three
municipalities are ongoing. In Shanghai, the Chen
Liangyu scandal is snowballing, with more than 50
local officials netted so far. The investigation
in Beijing focuses on former vice mayor Liu
Zhihua, who has been kicked out of the party while
waiting for prosecution. The investigation in
Tianjin centers on chief public prosecutor Li
Baojin. But it is expected that more local
officials in Beijing and Tianjin will be snared as
investigations deepen. So with the reshuffle, the
power center also wants to show its determination
to push forward the current crackdown on
corruption in these municipalities.
Earlier media reports said that in May, Xu
Jingye, then the party's graft buster in the
Ministry of Commerce, was appointed as secretary
of the Chongqing Municipal CDI.
Beijing,
Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing are the four
provincial-level municipalities directly under the
central government. By now, the CCP power center
has replaced the head of the anti-graft watchdogs
in all four municipalities.
Ta Kung Pao, a
Beijing-funded daily newspaper in Hong Kong, said
this is just the first stage of a nationwide
reshuffle. The power center plans to appoint
secretaries for anti-graft watchdogs
