China's recently
acquired ability to disable space-based satellites
received due attention by practically every major
power around the world. Much of the analysis
surrounding the January 11 test has centered on
the threat that this capability poses for the
United States. Clearly, the US position in space
has been somewhat compromised by the Chinese,
since more than half of all artificial satellites
in Earth's orbit are American, and Washington
stands most to lose if China expands its space
capabilities.
In reality, however, China
has a long way to go before it can openly and
directly challenge US dominance in space. Research
and
development (R&D), manufacturing, testing and
fielding of any future Chinese anti-satellite
system will be answered by the United States and
its allies. At the moment, the US has both the
funds and the ability to field extensive
countermeasures to Chinese space advances, a cost
many other countries would find prohibitive.
Lost in the chorus of analysis is how
Russia likely perceives the Chinese test. Although
Russia has been mentioned by most analysts as one
of the concerned states, nearly every assessment
has centered on the United States. Clearly, it is
not popular today to argue that Russia considers
China a potential threat. Numerous official visits
and even joint Sino-Russian military exercises
seem to underscore the developing relationship
between China and Russia. Both Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao
take every opportunity to underscore the
"friendship and cooperation" between the two
states in trade, military ties and diplomacy.
Still, China's sudden breakthrough in space and
anti-satellite technology did not go unnoticed in
Moscow.
First, Russia has many of its
military, intelligence and even communication
satellites in low Earth orbit, somewhere between
320 and 800 kilometers above ground. Such distance
puts them within easy reach of China's new
capabilities. Beijing, for example, destroyed its
aging satellite at about 865km above ground.
While Russia has advocated many changes to
its military doctrine - including greater funding
for its high-tech military assets - it still
operates many satellites that were put into orbit
toward the end of the Soviet Union or just after
its breakup. Russia relies on these "eyes and
ears" in the sky for its security. Nowhere is that
more relevant than on the huge open spaces of
Siberia and the Far East - the massive territory
east of the Ural Mountains.
Russia's
sparse population in that region, the need to
monitor the borders, and the existence of
high-profile military and R&D assets in
Russia's eastern territory necessitate constant
surveillance and observation. The recent economic
development of the region - oil and natural-gas
exploration and the importance Moscow now attaches
to such industries - makes it ever more necessary
to keep an eye on this expanse.
China's
recent interests in the Russian Far East and the
constant debate about Chinese cross-border
immigration to that region add to the importance
of constant observation of vast open spaces that
hold huge quantities of much-coveted natural
resources. If Moscow's ability to observe and
monitor even a part of that region were to be
degraded to any degree, it would be at a
disadvantage in its ability to see what takes
place on the ground. Lack of roads and railroads
and degraded infrastructure already make any
official Russian response to a military or a
humanitarian emergency there difficult. If Moscow
went "blind" suddenly in huge portions of its
eastern territories, there is no sure way to
predict its response.
Second, and perhaps
more important, is Russia's realization that there
is now one fewer advantage it holds over China.
When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, Russia
inherited a huge arsenal of state-of-the-art
weaponry and manufacturing capabilities,
practically on par with the United States. At the
time, China had only begun its crash program to
upgrade its military, which was still armed
according to 1960s and 1970s standards.
Since that time, the overall state of the
Russian military has eroded, notwithstanding some
of its weapon-development programs. Its best
creations are not fielded in proper quantities in
its military services. Such key assets as the
Su-37, the MiG Multirole Front-Line Fighter,
Ka-50, Ka-52 and Mi-28 helicopters and T-90 battle
tanks, as well as armored vehicles, on-board
electronics and computer systems, are fielded in
very small quantities with a few select services,
or still exist as manufacture-ready prototypes
that need to be put in production.
Notwithstanding Russia's robust global
weapons trade, much of what it sells dates to the
late 1980s, just before the end of the Cold War.
Its latest developments that can match the best of
the West still await proper funding and oversight.
China's military is still behind Russia's in many
respects, but it is catching up. One area where
Russia has been able to maintain a lead over China
has been in its ballistic-missile forces. Now,
with China's recent test, the gap has narrowed
even further. Beijing has joined an elite,
high-tech club consisting only of the United
States and Russia.
Furthermore, while
Russia is happy to sell military hardware to
China, there is a clear line that Moscow will not
cross with its neighbor. Moscow's military
leadership has stated on a number of occasions
that Russia will not supply its latest high-tech
weapons to China for security reasons, even if the
price is right. There is a growing level of
discomfort in Moscow with China's rapid ascent.
Now, China can potentially threaten one Russian
asset that still gives it enormous strength and
confidence - its space-based assets.
Despite the recent improvement in
relations, the Kremlin is getting both
apprehensive and uncomfortable with its growing
role as a staple supplier to China's growing
economic miracle. Ballistic and space-based
technology was, until this month, one area where
Russia still felt like a superpower when compared
with China. That crucial advantage has now been
eroded significantly.
It is prudent to
watch Moscow's political and military reaction to
China's test since Beijing's actions have narrowed
an ever-closing gap between the two neighbors,
raising new questions about the future and
progress of Sino-Russian relations. The time when
China can overtake Russia militarily is
approaching. It has already done so economically,
and is steadily gaining on Russia politically with
its powerful diplomatic drive buttressed with
trade incentives. How Russia will react to China's
continued drive for high-tech military dominance
will have a powerful and lasting effect on the
future of international relations.
Published with permission of thePower and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
tocontent@pinr.com.
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