On January 11, China became the third
country, after the United States and Russia, to
have successfully destroyed a low-Earth-orbiting
satellite with a ground-launched ballistic
missile. Most probably it was a DF-21 missile
carrying a "kinetic kill vehicle". Similar
operations with a DF-31 had repeatedly failed.
This Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT)
mission, which some alarmists have unnecessarily
termed "the first step toward a space war",
deserves careful analysis both from a general
strategic standpoint
and,
in particular, in relation to the space control
aspects involved. First of all, it should be
clearly understood that an action such as this is
not likely to give rise, in the short term, to a
space war or a race for space supremacy between
the United States and China. The technological gap
that still exists between these two countries is
too big.
Moreover, an ASAT mission of this
type does not constitute a breach of any
international treaty, and in particular it is not
in conflict with the most important international
agreement on the military aspects of space, namely
the Outer Space Treaty signed by the United States
in 1967 and by China in 1983.
The event
was certainly not greeted with beaming smiles in
Washington, but this was not because of fear of
some fantastic space war, but instead for the
following three concrete reasons:
The launch confirms the advances made in the
Chinese space program, today among the
technological areas in which Beijing is investing
most heavily and achieving the most rapid
progress.
The success of this experiment reveals China's
enhanced ability to protect its territory from
observation by reconnaissance satellites or other
space vehicles, both for defensive purposes
(reconnaissance and intelligence satellites) and
for potentially offensive uses (Global Positioning
or similar systems).
For the US military, satellite systems play a
vital role not only in data acquisition, but also
in the operation of high-precision weaponry. The
Pentagon, therefore, is extremely sensitive to any
actions that could undermine the use of these
systems.
China's strategy shows increasing
consistency, but in a regional rather than a
global framework: its aims lie not in the conquest
and militarization of space in terms of a global
confrontation with the United States, but instead
in acquiring instruments that can strengthen
China's position on its regional chessboard in the
event of a crisis in the area (Taiwan, the Spratly
Islands, North Korea, among other concerns).
Last year, US sources had already detected
attempts by China (in some cases with successful
outcomes) to jam US observation satellites by
"blinding" them with laser beams; these actions
revealed Beijing's "reduction and denial" efforts
to counter the observation capabilities of
satellites orbiting above Chinese territory.
The launch of an ASAT, however, attests on
the one hand to the achievement of a more direct
and decisive method of solving the problem, since
it avoids any passive countermeasures to prevent
lasers "blinding" satellites, and, on the other
hand, the intention to pursue a policy of "area
control of Chinese space", which in the event of a
regional crisis could cause serious difficulties
for US strategic assets.
The results of
the January 11 experiment, however, must be
assessed above all simply as what they are: a
successful attempt to pursue effective future
space denial, but which still leaves China in a
very backward position compared with Western
systems. By way of example, the United States
carried out similar operations as far back as
1959, as did the Soviet Union in 1963, with
technologies that were, at the time, even more
rudimentary.
It would have been a
different matter if what Beijing had been trying
to accomplish was a more versatile and lethal
weapon such as the United States' Miniature Homing
Vehicle systems, developed in the 1980s, which
consist of real two-stage, anti-satellite missiles
that can be launched from F-15 fighter planes with
a specific mission profile.
Last, in terms
of Sino-US confrontation, one crucial fact must
not be ignored: the more China shows progress in
these fields, the more the United States will
continue to develop its capabilities to defend (by
direct and indirect protection and concealment)
its orbiting assets. Given the technological
sophistication and high costs involved, the real
capabilities of military space devices must be
evaluated, and this necessarily involves trying
them out in tests that can hardly be concealed.
Any such experimentation will inevitably
inform, update and alarm the United States, thus
enabling Washington to pursue policies designed to
increase the already great technological gap
existing between the two countries. In the event
of a serious crisis, China's kinetic-energy
interceptors would be unlikely to find themselves
pitted against an opponent as easily knocked out
as their old Feng Yun 1C weather satellite.
Published with permission of thePower and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
tocontent@pinr.com.
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