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2 US-China: A turn for
the worse By Benjamin A Shobert
WASHINGTON - Founded in 2000, the US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) is
chartered by the US Congress to report on the
interaction of economic and national-security
issues that impact the US-China relationship.
While the commission's recommendations are not
binding for either Congress or the president, they
do represent an opportunity to catch a glimpse of
leading indicators of anticipated changes in
direction to US economic, military and political
policy toward
China.
Last Thursday
and Friday constituted the first meeting of 2007,
and while covering a host of issues, the session
seemed particularly to emphasize three policy
issues: what meaning should be given to the
January 11 Chinese ASAT (anti-satellite) test, if
and how the US should respond to China's uneven
World Trade Organization (WTO) compliance, and
whether the assumption that economic incentives
will necessarily lead to Chinese democratization
should be an ongoing basis of US policy toward
China. To the credit of the USCC, most of the
discussion that unfolded last week managed to be
substantive and eager to explore the nuances
unique to questions of China policy.
Buttressing each of these issues was
testimony from a wide range of witnesses in the
field of US-China relations, including Republican
Congressman J Randy Forbes and Democratic Senator
Sherrod Brown - both of whom spoke to questions of
job loss in their respective states due to the
much-lauded "China price". Also speaking were
representatives from the George W Bush
administration: Richard Lawless, deputy under
secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific
security affairs, and David Pumphrey, deputy
assistant secretary for international energy
cooperation.
A number of scholars on
US-China relations rounded out the two days of
testimony by presenting, among other topics of
discussion, what the US should make of the
People's Liberation Army's military-modernization
efforts, and how internal instability might impact
the country's posture toward a host of internal
and external questions.
Hanging over any
exploration of the PLA's military agenda was what
should be read into the recent ASAT test by
Beijing. If at one point US policymakers were
willing to bend language deftly and attempt to
avoid outright calling Beijing a "military
threat", the ASAT test has, among other things,
made it increasingly difficult for such verbal
ambiguity to continue.
Because the ASAT
test was unannounced and since such technology is
considered an offensive weapons platform, it was
almost impossible for those providing testimony to
avoid characterizing the move as a strategic
escalation. Beijing's decision to exhibit this
particular technology poses its own interpretive
challenges, but equally daunting is attempting to
understand what the US should make of how the test
itself was conducted.
During the
question-and-answer period following the testimony
from Lawless, Commissioner Larry Wortzel asked
whether Beijing had filed NOTAMs (notices to
airmen) in advance of the test, or whether it had
notified any of the same international bodies such
as the International Air Traffic Association that
China had previously made aware, in July 1995, of
its missile test-firing in the Taiwan strait.
Because China provided no similar notification
prior to the recent ASAT test, Washington is
forced to wonder what to make not only of the test
itself, but of Beijing's opacity in providing
internationally accepted notification and
warnings.
While some people particularly
invested in Beijing's economic and political
future might wish to ascribe naivety to the ASAT
test, the exhibition of the technology itself and
the abrupt means by which it was publicly
acknowledged have shaken the confidence of those
who might otherwise give China the benefit of the
doubt. If the test was a move on the part of
Beijing to push back against the United States'
own role in regional Asian affairs and announce
the extent of its own geopolitical independence,
an exhibition of another military technology would
probably have sufficed.
That Beijing chose
a technology that is an ominous reminder of the
vestiges from the Cold War may force a number of
changes to US policy that has, at its base, a
similar shared history from that friction-filled
time.
Beijing's decision to go forward
with the ASAT may have a particularly unexpected
consequence: increased resistance to providing
China with access to dual-use technology.
Washington now must consider whether US technology
found its way into the various components used in
the test. When asked about this, Lawless provided
a less-than-illuminating response - "We know what
we know" - and went on to suggest that any
disclosure related to that particular question
would need to be addressed in a venue with a
higher security classification.
The Bush
administration has already halted plans for joint
space projects with China in light of the January
11 ASAT test. The ventures included joint
exploration of the moon and projects on the
International Space Station to allow Chinese
spacecraft the ability to dock. The test-firing of
the anti-satellite weapon has left debris in orbit
that has the potential to damage or destroy US and
foreign satellites. According to a Washington
Times article, US National Aeronautics and Space
Administration spokesman Jason Sharp said the
weapon test undermined an agreement reached
between President Bush and Chinese President Hu
Jintao during an April summit.
Should it
be proved that US dual-use capabilities made their
way into the guidance systems, launch vehicle or
other components from the ASAT test, Beijing may
find the United States taking much stronger
stances, which could present real challenges to
China's ongoing entry to the world's markets and
technologies. Additionally, those in Washington
who believe a more hawkish
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