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2 US-China: A turn for the
worse By Benjamin A Shobert
position toward China should be
taken, one that places economic considerations
below questions of regional containment, have been
given a shot of credibility.
The question
of escalation - militarily, politically and
economically - was a common thread throughout much
of the meeting. Testimony from James Mann, author
of the forthcoming book The China Fantasy: How
Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression,
emphasized that the central assumption of engaging
China economically to
democratize the country may be fatally flawed.
Mann's primary contribution to the session
was to emphasize that just because China has
become the world's factory and embraced elements
of free-market theory, we should not assume that a
break in the power of the one-party system is
inevitable. Mann argued that the US government has
been able to justify with its constituents a
policy of engagement for China because US citizens
believe in the ideals of personal freedom for
everyone, and have bought into the idea that
economic liberalization will lead to political
equality for their Chinese counterparts.
Thus far, Americans have done so with
minimal backlash against China given the jobs lost
to Chinese workers; however, Mann argued that
assuming economic engagement will lead to
political liberalization in China may be
misplaced.
While this theory, which Mann
calls the "soothing scenario", has constituted the
rationale for most US dialogue with China over the
last several administrations, he believes another
scenario must be considered. In Mann's written
testimony he stated, "What if China manages to
continue on its current economic path and yet its
political system does not change in any
fundamental way?
"What if, 25 or 30 years
from now, a wealthier, more powerful China
continues to be run by a one-party regime that
continues to repress organized political dissent
much as it does today; and yet at the same time
China is also open to the outside world and,
indeed, is deeply intertwined with the rest of the
world through trade, investment and other economic
ties? Everyone assumes that the Chinese political
system is going to open up - but what if it
doesn't?"
Given Mann's 23-year history as
a reporter covering China, the questions he asked
last Thursday simply cannot be played down. If
liberalization in trade will accomplish nothing
more than relocating sectors of the US economy to
China, why should Washington continue to support
policies of economic engagement with Beijing? What
type of political changes will the US need to see
from China to continue asking for time and trust
from Americans who see jobs transition to Chinese
shores? Compelling as Mann's testimony was, his
central arguments need additional exploration,
which may well be put forth in his book, to
address what other model of engagement should
guide the US forward.
Mann's testimony
provided a number of crucial insights that
undoubtedly will play a role in the questions
asked by the USCC in 2007, perhaps none more
critical than whether or not the US should
escalate political pressure on China to liberalize
its own internal policies. It remains to be seen
whether external pressure from the US will result
in additional political openness or withdrawal
from forums of global accountability.
While Mann stopped short of suggesting a
policy of escalation, other panelists did
recommend that the US formally file a WTO case
against China. Among the issues suggested for a
WTO grievance were the artificial support of the
yuan, fraud perpetuated through lax
intellectual-property enforcement, continuing
unfair labor practices, and the subsidies granted
to Chinese manufacturers related to bank debt that
their accounting practices do not take into
account.
Those panelists who recommended
such action with the WTO understood that the US
cannot count on winning; however, most who
suggested a strategy of escalation believed that
the act of filing with the WTO would provoke some
necessary changes on China's part.
For the
USCC, Congress and the Bush administration,
questions of escalation are complicated. The
interests of large multinational US companies who
wish to manufacture goods in China at low cost
both for export and for domestic Chinese
consumption must be balanced against the political
costs of smaller businesses and independent
laborers who perceive China primarily as a threat
and are sensitive to inequities in policy.
That the larger multinationals have by far
the greater political lobbying arm in Washington
undoubtedly will continue to play a role in how
aggressive the US is with China in near-term WTO
engagements; however, economic instability within
the United States or additional threatening
military moves on the part of China could make it
more likely that US politicians will be willing to
take more assertive positions against free trade
with China.
The year 2007 began on an
ominous note for US-China relations; whether
consciously or not, Beijing's decision to go
forward with the ASAT test has sharply redirected
attention on China within Washington. Past
military muscle-flexing - the 2001 downing of a US
EP-3 spy plane near Hainan Island or last year's
shadowing of the USS Kitty Hawk by a Chinese
Song-class attack submarine - have been
understandable, if undesirable. The ASAT test is
of another level altogether, and its impact will
be felt beyond US-China military policy, but in
economic and political arenas as well. If last
week's USCC hearings are any indication, 2007 may
be a year when the US broadly revisits its
policies toward Beijing and begins pushing more
assertively for substantive changes and
compliance. The Bush administration has posited
that the standard by which China should be judged
is that of a "responsible stakeholder";
responsibility from everyone will indeed be a
necessary virtue if Beijing and Washington are to
continue vesting their respective futures with
each other.
Benjamin A Shobert
is the managing director of Teleos Inc
(www.teleos-inc.com), a consulting firm dedicated
to helping Asian businesses bring innovative
technologies into the North American market.
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