BEIJING - Strategically situated in the heartland of the Eurasian continent,
the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang is no stranger to the vagaries of
international trade and the machinations of major world powers.
In the latter half of the 19th century, Russia and Britain played out part of
their "Great Game" in Xinjiang, each vying for supremacy in the no-man's land
between the Russian and British empires through espionage, intrigue and
political brinkmanship. Further
back in time the region was a vital link in the famed Silk Route, criss-crossed
by thousands of kilometers of mercantile arteries facilitating the
omnidirectional flow of goods, thoughts and cultural identities.
Today, Xinjiang finds itself once more a key pawn in a game of geopolitical
chess, and the stakes are higher than ever. Well-worn trade routes bearing
heavily laden camel caravans have been replaced by multi-lane tarmacked
highways and serpentine pipelines. Bustling market towns with legendary names
such as Turpan, Kashgar and Yarkand increasingly cater to foreign tourists and
upwardly mobile traders from neighboring states looking to cash in on the
Chinese economic miracle.
China's energy plans for the early 21st century were unveiled at the 2000
National People's Congress. The focus was on construction of a now-functional
4,200-kilometer east-west network of gas and oil pipelines running all the way
from Xinjiang to Shanghai. Last May, oil was pumped directly into Xinjiang from
Kazakhstan for the first time, along a recently completed 960km cross-border
pipeline.
When fully functional, this pipeline will carry 20 million tons of Kazakh oil a
year, accounting for 15% of China's imports for 2005. It is just part of a
3,000km project that aims to join China to the Caspian Sea, thereby removing
the need for China's Middle Eastern oil supplies to navigate several
potentially risky sea lanes.
Driven by the need to sustain a booming and energy-hungry economy, the Chinese
government has made securing access to the largely untapped reserves of oil and
natural gas in Central Asia a cornerstone of its economic policy for the next
two decades.
Exploitation of energy resources close to home is essential if China is to
reduce its reliance on Middle Eastern oil and gas - at present Iran alone
accounts for about 15% of China's oil imports. Energy deals by Chinese
companies in politically sensitive areas such as Iran and Sudan have done
nothing to ease Sino-US relations, and recent US attempts to contain these
regimes have directly challenged China's energy-security policies. The need to
secure a safe oil supply is the major driver in Chinese thinking toward its
western neighbors.
China's ever expanding pipeline network has the potential to bring about a
significant strategic realignment of Xinjiang and the adjacent region. Central
Asia, with its huge reserves of oil, gas and minerals, has already seen some
sharp rivalry among the United States, Europe and Japan. All of the major
powers, in conjunction with multinational corporations, are seeking to secure
alliances, concessions and possible pipeline routes in the area.
Oil and gas pipelines to China from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could easily be
extended to link into the pipeline networks of both Russia and Iran. This model
has been dubbed the "Pan Asian Global Energy Bridge" - a Eurasian network of
pipelines linking energy resources in the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia
through to China's Pacific coast. A major part of the old Silk Route is
inexorably turning into the "Black Gold Route" of the new millennium.
Despite its geographical proximity, China has played only a marginal role in
Central Asia for the past century. Economically, politically and culturally the
Central Asian states were firmly locked within Russia's sphere of influence.
The breakup of the Soviet Union and subsequent independence in 1991 brought
radical changes, however, including the opening of the "Bamboo Curtain" to the
East. Shuttle traders bringing consumer goods began to fan out across the
region, then came big business and senior politicians.
Beijing has set up trade missions in every Central Asian country, invested in
local enterprises and infrastructure projects, and donated money to aid
organizations. The Chinese government has also raised the profile of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which aims to promote the joint interests of
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
Across Central Asia increasing numbers of Chinese shops, markets, products and
traders pay testament to Beijing's deliberate and well-orchestrated foreign and
economic policies. In addition to its role as a conduit and supplier of fossil
fuels, Xinjiang is experiencing rapid growth in cross-border trade, and the
autonomous region has become a bridgehead promoting China's economic and trade
ties with Central Asia and Russia. Trade between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan in
2005 was valued at more than US$6 billion, accounting for 73% of the total
trade between the two countries, and it is predicted that the value of all
Xinjiang's foreign trade will top $9 billion this year.
China and Kazakhstan are in the process of establishing a free-trade zone,
uniting 13 square kilometers of northwestern Xinjiang (Port Korgas) with a
smaller area of Kazakhstan near Almaty. With new rail lines, highways and an
international trade center under construction, the aim is to create an
industrial hub that will further stimulate the multilateral flow of goods and
services. A second border trade zone was opened last March at Jeminay -
Xinjiang currently has 16 "land ports" open to foreign traders and business
people.
With Xinjiang bordering eight countries, the Chinese government is also working
to encourage international trade in a southwesterly direction. A new highway is
under construction across the Taklamakan Desert from Alar to Khotan, and China
and Pakistan have recently agreed to open four new road links through the
Khunjerab Pass, doubling the number of overland routes between the two
countries. The Chinese government is also planning to build several new
highways into Nepal from Tibet, to supplement the existing Kodari Highway and
increase access to northern India.
Last July 6, the border between India (Sikkim) and China (Tibet) at Nathu La
was opened to trade for the first time in 44 years.
China's trans-border highways are no longer mere conveniences for the People's
Liberation Army, but instruments for the expansion of Chinese economic
influence into the subcontinent, breathing new life into the former Silk
Route's southern branches.
The huge Chinese infrastructure investment in Xinjiang has been accompanied by
a boom in tourism. The increasingly accessible Taklamakan dunes, snow-covered
mountains, clear glacial lakes, fabled oasis towns and distinctive Uighur
culture are proving a major drawing card for both foreign and Chinese tourists.
According to the Xinjiang Tourism Bureau, the region received 88 tourists and
earned $46,000 in 1978. Last year it hosted more than 310,000 overseas
travelers and recorded a foreign-exchange income of nearly $91 million, a
1,000-fold increase. Tourism-related turnover exceeded 11.6 billion yuan ($1.4
billion), accounting for 5.3% of the autonomous region's gross domestic
product. One-day travel packages, especially from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan,
have become increasingly popular, and a growing number of visitors from Hong
Kong, Macau and Taiwan are also being attracted by Xinjiang's scenic
landscapes.
In the next five years, to consolidate tourism as one of its pillar industries,
Xinjiang will step up efforts to promote a range of activities such as mountain
hiking, resort skiing and desert trekking, as well as further developing
tourist-related infrastructure. It is hoped that international air routes
between the regional capital Urumqi and Japan, Hong Kong and Europe can be
opened in order to increase accessibility.
So, what does the future hold for Xinjiang? Aided by lavish government
pump-priming, a major resettlement program has made this unlikely backwater the
richest provincial-level region outside China's coastal capitalist belt. Ways
of life are changing across the autonomous region, and changing fast.
Under a long-term program announced in 1999 to develop the west, Beijing poured
$30.7 billion into Xinjiang, with the current five-year plan calling for an
additional $51 billion. The Chinese government is aware that only intelligent
investment coupled with enlightened social policies and a genuine concern for
the environment will support Xinjiang's multiple roles as a thriving trade
axis, center for tourism, and crucial energy gateway.
Daniel Allen is a freelance writer and photographer from London who has
lived in China for the past three years.
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