James Mann is author
in residence at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He
is the author of the New York Times best-seller
Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War
Cabinet, and two books about China: About
Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship
with China, from Nixon to Clinton, and
Beijing Jeep.
His most recent book
is The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain
Away Chinese Repression. For a review of this book,
see The
third way for China
. Mann was
previously a diplomatic correspondent and
foreign-affairs columnist for the Los Angeles
Times, serving from 1984 to
1987 as Beijing bureau chief. He lives in Silver
Spring, Maryland. Mann spoke to Benjamin A
Shobert.
Benjamin A Shobert:
I would like to start with the most
general question: Why write this book now?
James Mann: No singular
event prompts writing this book now. Enough has
happened since the developments of the '90s,
beginning with the formulation of what I call the
"China fantasy", without fundamental change, that
it seemed time to look back and note how little
change has occurred and examine our assumptions. I
have done two other books on China, one focusing
on business and one on diplomacy, and had been
thinking for some time that I wanted to write this
book.
BAS: Would you quickly
characterize the three scenarios for China that
you present?
JM: The first
is the "Soothing Scenario": China is going to
evolve and develop toward political liberalization
and democracy, and that trade will help with this
change. The second is what I call the "Upheaval
Scenario": to use the vernacular, that China is
going to "blow up" - for example, that some
serious rupture in their banking system will in
turn lead to dramatic political change. One book
which argues for this is Gordon Chang's The
Coming Collapse of China.
There is
what I call the "Third Scenario": politically,
what we see in China is what we are going to get -
one political system, no organized opposition, no
independent judiciary. There are all kinds of
nuances on the ground within China, so I don't
mean to say that China is not changing.
Small-scale changes are taking place, but these
may not lead to fundamental changes.
BAS: Given your experience
in China and the analysis you completed for this
book, what do you believe are the primary crises
that could derail China's modernization efforts?
JM: I think their economic
growth is likely to continue; the banking system
could be a problem. But I don't see a crisis
within that sector leading to political change.
BAS: Is there any one
particular crisis that you believe is most
under-appreciated or misunderstood within the US
policy community?
JM: It is
difficult for many to appreciate the pressure that
is building up within China to preserve the status
quo. For obvious and understandable reasons,
people travel to Beijing and Shanghai, then meet
and talk to the urban elites. Outsiders don't go
into China and talk to migrants; they talk to
people who are highly educated, brilliant, really
sophisticated, and get the idea that China is
destined for political change. What they don't see
is that the urban elites have it in their interest
to maintain the status quo. They are doing quite
well and are extremely nervous about political
changes.
BAS: Your
suggestion that China's middle class, because of
their interests in seeing the economic system
continue to grow, might represent some of the most
strenuous resistance to political change within
the country stopped me cold. I found it profoundly
important.
JM: I am glad
that point came through clearly.
BAS: At the last US-China
Economics and Security Review Commission hearing,
your testimony about the inadequacies of what you
call the "Soothing Scenario" seemed to be unevenly
received by some. How would you characterize the
early criticism of your book, and your particular
point that justifications by the "Soothing
Scenario" might not be appropriate?
JM: Different ideas in my
book do run against the grain of beliefs people
have had for some time. These ideas should be up
for debate.
BAS: Reading
your book, it seemed to me that you want
policymakers and the American public to ask
themselves a pretty basic set of questions about
how Americans think about engaging
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