Page 2 of
2 BOOK REVIEW The third way for
China The China
Fantasy by James Mann
might look like the small gold
stars on the Chinese plain; they would be
surrounded by a sea of red" (p 51).
Mann
argues that the new Chinese middle class may fear
a wave of populism that could turn back the tide
of economic modernization and consequently destroy
the fragile well-being they currently enjoy. As a
result, the rush to embrace political reform that
would put the middle class on the same footing as
the
peasantry has built-in
resistance from precisely the people most
Americans engage when traveling to China.
This is a particularly sophisticated part
of Mann's argument: the predominant stakeholders
in China's economic growth have their own reasons
for seeing a one-party state stay in power, and
these interests are not fully understood by US
politicians and policymakers. Mann never asserts
that democratization in China is impossible, nor
that it is unlikely; but his book is a snapshot of
where China really is - in all of its complexity -
which undoubtedly raises the question of what we
can and should assume about China's development.
The Upheaval Scenario The second
scenario Mann explores looks at the chasms between
rich and poor, the empowered and powerless, and
asserts that it is inevitable that these
differences will lead to a collapse in China. As
Mann writes, theories about what will happen after
this collapse varies widely. Some, such as Bruce
Gilley in China's Democratic Future, assert
that crisis will result in democracy.
Others, most commonly Gordon Chang in his
popular The Coming Collapse of China, [1]
believe the situation will lead to broad
regression, decay and disintegration. Mann is
clearly doubtful that this is likely to happen,
noting that "mainland China has a long history of
managing to hold itself together. The country may
be broken up or may split up for a time, as it did
in the 20th century during the Japanese invasion
and during the Chinese Civil War. But the Chinese
mainland has always managed to re-emerge as a
distinct, unified political entity. Predictions
that China will fall apart run counter to this
strong historical tradition" (p 9).
In the
aftermath of America's misadventures in Iraq, it
would seem an argument that collapse inevitably
leads to democratization should require only the
most minimal of responses; it is an assumption
Americans would do well not to make again.
The Third Scenario Mann's final
scenario is clearly the one he is most drawn to:
"To contemplate this Third Scenario, one does not
have to assume that a quarter-century from now
China will still be run by the same Communist
Party that holds power today. Perhaps the names
and the language will change ... Nevertheless, one
way or another, the essentials of the current
political system would remain intact.
"There would be no significant political
opposition, no freedom of the press, no elections
beyond the local level. There would be an active
security apparatus to forestall organized
political dissent. In other words, China, while
growing stronger and richer, wouldn't change its
political system in any fundamental way. It would
continue along the same political course it is on
today" (p 11).
Recognizing that many will
point to changes in the overall rule of law in
China and village efforts at democracy as
indicative of meaningful change, Mann suggests
these are more consistent with projecting the
"appearance of change, while leaving the
fundamentals of China's political system
undisturbed" (p 21). Whether Mann is correct or
whether these changes will ultimately result in
positive changes outside a one-party system is a
question only history will answer.
During
Mann's testimony at the last US-China Economic and
Security Review Commission meeting, this scenario
clearly met with some incredulity on the part of a
couple commissioners who found it difficult to
believe that China's modernization was not
inevitably, if gradually and slower than we might
all like, tending toward democracy. In part, the
commissioners' questions have at their base a
frustration with "if not this, then what?" Many
people who are drawn toward Mann's argument will
find themselves frustrated at what to do with the
questions he is asking and the concerns he raises.
His book, an achingly short 112 pages,
makes clear that he has no policy proscription;
the point of his book is to ask a question, to
force Americans to re-evaluate their policies and
determine whether they will be comfortable with
the outcome he believes is likely. Proponents of
the Soothing and Upheaval scenarios will
contribute their predictable criticism of Mann,
but the greater question he is asking begs an
answer or, at the least, a system of
accountability that will allow outsiders to
determine in which direction China is going.
Inevitably, some will believe that Mann's
questioning of the metaphors and ideas employed to
engage China holds the potential to disrupt the
good that is going on, and not build the country
up through constructive criticism. However, Mann
believes much more is at stake: "America's failure
of imagination on China is comparable in some ways
to its inability to come to grips with terrorism.
In both instances, the main obstacle has been
conceptual in nature" (p 101). If the US looks
back and realizes that its engagement with China
was ultimately sustained for economic reasons
only, and that it actually reinforced a repressive
authoritarian system instead of changing one, will
Americans accept this?
Might an abrupt
change in policy when the US comes to this
realization actually be worse than more immediate
pressure on China, even if said pressure creates
economic unease between the two countries? The
question takes on added depth when we realize that
the trade policies that have benefited China have
hurt many parts of the United States but have been
sustained in no small part because Americans
believe that such pain is worth bearing if it
means democracy for China.
History is
marked by the frustrating necessity of compromise.
Few would disagree that the world is compromising
with China now, agreeing to allow it gradually to
come into the modern era as long as it makes some
progress toward change. But what is sufficient
change? What is only cosmetic change? And what if
no meaningful change takes place, with the result
being an empowered and resource-rich authoritarian
China?
Mann's book asks important
questions, but he leaves it to readers (at least
for now) to come up with answers. If Mann is
right, the historical significance in the
aftermath of China's recent growth may have more
to do with the broad realization that we may not
always compress our ideas about freedom and
liberty into economic and financial compartments.
Sometimes change must begin with an
acknowledgement of ideals beyond those the market
can value. As lessons go, this could be
particularly painful, but would go a long way
toward refining our grasp of how countries and
cultures change.
Note 1.
For a review of The Coming Collapse of
China, see The pessimist's case,
Asia Times Online, January 4, 2003.
The
China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away
Chinese Repression by James Mann. Viking Adult
(February 15, 2007). ISBN-10: 0670038253. Price
US$19.95, 144 pages.
Benjamin A
Shobert is the managing director of Teleos Inc
(www.teleos-inc.com), a consulting firm dedicated
to helping Asian businesses bring innovative
technologies into the North American market.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd.
All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
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