Page 2 of 2 Military backs China's Africa
adventure By Susan Puska
process, is to
facilitate transition to "credible" elections.
China contributes 218 of the 16,594 soldiers and 12
of the 713 military observers. The mission also
has 1,029 police.
United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
- Established in July 2000 to verify the
ceasefire agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia,
brokered by Algeria and the Organization of African
Unity. China contributes seven of the
202
military observers. The mission also has 1,594
soldiers.
United Nations Mission for
the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
- The mission was set up in September
1991 to monitor the ceasefire between the
Government of Morocco and the Frente Polisario, and
to organize and conduct a referendum on
the territory's status. The UN mandate was recently
extended until October 2007. [9] China contributes 13 of
the 195 military observers. MINURSO also includes
28 soldiers and six police.
Other Chinese
military activities in Africa China's
military-military activities in Africa also
include working-level professional contacts, such
as military aid and assistance to local militaries
in the form of "donations" and technical support,
training and exchanges; arms-sales related
support; and professional education. Military
cooperation in Africa has almost exclusively
focused on bilateral cooperation, but in 2003
China participated in a multilateral military
environmental protection conference hosted by
South Africa, which may indicate a future
direction for multilateral military engagement in
selected areas. [10]
China's
military-to-military activities in Africa,
including defense attache presence, naval ship
visits, arms sales and other missions to support
military cooperation can be expected to expand to
keep pace with China's growing national interests
throughout the region. An increase in its
diplomatic military representation and overall
presence may inadvertently be encouraged by the
establishment of the new United States Africa
Combatant Command, if China feels a new combatant
command impinges on China's security interests in
the region.
If China's limited number of
defense attache offices in Africa does grow, the
potential list of countries would likely begin
among the 11 that have already established offices
in Beijing, but lack a reciprocal counterpart in
Africa, as discussed above. Resource access and
associated security needs would likely influence
any expansion of China's defense attache offices
in Africa. Four of the six countries that China
currently maintains reciprocal, resident defense
attache offices with - Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and
Sudan - are among those countries that China has
interests in petroleum and other resources. Gabon
and Equatorial Guinea, which are among the main
producers of petroleum in Africa and already have
established defense attache offices in Beijing,
would be logical additions.
Military and
naval ship visits are also expected to develop.
China may enter into agreements with African
countries beyond South Africa to establish
bilateral defense consultations, and joint
exercises under the framework of anti-terrorist or
maritime safety scenarios could be an outcome of
China's increased military capability and overall
interest in Africa.
Finally, China will
increasingly be challenged to respond to security
threats to Chinese property and personnel in the
region that may necessitate a re-evaluation of the
role of China's military. The recent kidnappings
and killings of Chinese workers in Ethiopia and
Nigeria painfully demonstrated that China can no
longer depend on local security forces to protect
its oil interests (personnel and facilities) in
areas such as Ethiopia and the Niger Delta.
Potential attacks by local insurgents,
criminals, and even terrorists, demand skilled
defense practitioners. The PLA could provide this
either directly and openly in tailored military
units with or without Chinese police force
participation, through quasi-military or
"outsourced" rent-a-soldier security entities that
would be manned by trained soldiers who may retain
loose association with the PLA as demobilized
soldiers, or through other mechanisms based on
negotiations with the host African countries.
Implications for the US While
China's military-to-military contacts with Africa
have been quite modest, anxiety over China's
activities in Africa exceeds the present extent of
military activities for several reasons. Among
these are questions about China's future military
capabilities and its intentions in the region.
China's arms sale practices, particularly to
Sudan, demonstrate its willingness to look the
other way when sovereign states commit genocide
and persecution of its citizenry, if it serves
China's national interests - in this case, access
to oil. Even as China has responded to
international pressure to nudge the Sudanese
regime toward the settlement of the Darfur crisis,
it is woefully late.
Furthermore, China's
newfound support for the resolution of the Darfur
tragedy may be short-lived and ineffective, merely
a tactical move to counter the bad press that
could overshadow the 2008 Summer Olympics in
Beijing. There is certainly no indication China
will fundamentally reassess its indiscriminant
arms sale practices in Sudan.
Although
China is not alone in placing its national
interests and growing demand for resources above
the interests of African states, China's modern
self-identity as a leader of the developing world
moralistically insists it could never exploit
weaker states. As its power and wealth grow,
however, China will be increasingly judged for its
actions.
The implications for United
States interests in Africa need not lead to a
confrontational competition in response to China's
growing military profile. There is plenty of work
to do in Africa, and the Africans themselves will
ultimately decide what courses to follow. China
has a constructive role to play in Africa and
provides both a useful model for the successful
modernization of a developing country, and also
has a long-standing relationship, including
military-to-military contacts, with many nations
on the continent.
The United States and
others will do well to continue to press China on
issues of concern, such as Darfur, but also to
look for opportunities to work bilaterally and
multilaterally with China and its military in the
region.
Notes 1.
"China's African Policy", Embassy of the People's
Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa,
January 2006. 2. For the high end of this
estimate, see Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin,
"China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the
United States", Backgrounder, No 1916, The
Heritage Foundation, February 22, 2003. Estimates
of 1,200 soldiers are based primarily on UN PKO
statistics, as of March 2007, and an estimate of
Chinese military attache representation throughout
the continent. 3. Information is accurate as
of March 2007. Beijing Military Attache Corps in
Beijing. 4. China's National Defense in 2006;
directory of PRC military personalities, October
2006; Kenneth W Allen and Eric A McVadon, China's
Foreign Military Relations, Report No 32, The
Henry Stimson Center, Washington, DC, October
1999. 5. The 2004 and 2006 National Defense
White Papers provide detailed information on
China's military-to-military activities by country
and type of contact. Available online. 6. Among
African countries, it is highly likely that China
also conducts ongoing bilateral defense
consultations with Sudan and, possibly Zimbabwe,
as a minimum to support arms sales. 7. United
Nations Peacekeeping, website and Appendix V,
China's National Defense in 2006, Information
Office of the Sate Council of the People's
Republic of China, December 2006, Beijing. 8.
Contribution statistics are accurate as of March
2007. Available online. 9. United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007)
adopted by the Security Council on April 30,
2007. 10. Attendee List of the August 4-8, 2003,
Military Integrated Environmental Management
Conference is available online.
Colonel Susan M Puska (retired)
is a former US Army attache. She currently works
for Defense Group, Inc, in Washington, DC.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
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