China's influence in Latin America has been growing since the late 1990s.
According to Chinese economic data, trade between China and the region reached
the US$50 billion mark in 2005. While minute compared with US trade with Latin
America, one must remember that it has grown from $10 billion in 2000.
In recent years, Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested massively in the
energy and infrastructure sectors. In 2004,
Chinese foreign direct investment in Latin America accounted for 40% of the
total FDI.
Despite this increase in trade and economic activity, Beijing's political and
military influence have remained minimal. However, in recent years certain
developments in Latin America have created an environment far more conductive
to the expansion of Chinese political and military influence. The introduction
of left-wing regimes hostile to the United States, particularly in Bolivia and
Venezuela, has allowed China to begin to establish some meaningful connections
with the region's armed forces.
Military relations
When analyzing China's military relations with Latin America, most observers
tend to dismiss it as insignificant and argue that it is likely to remain so
for some time to come. Many have pointed to arms sales as a clear indicator of
China's insignificant military position in the region. But while Chinese arms
sales to Latin America have been minuscule, they are not the only instrument
available to a nation bent on expanding its military influence abroad.
Defense and military education is becoming an increasingly important, albeit
largely unnoticed, instrument of Chinese defense policy. If arms sales to the
region have so far been insignificant, the training of Latin American military
officers in People's Liberation Army (PLA) academies has certainly been on the
rise. Until recently, few Latin American military officers attended Chinese
military academies. But in the past few years, more than 100 officers from 12
countries have graduated from PLA academies.
The training ranges from courses at the grand-strategy level to short courses
for junior officers and specialized education in artillery, engineering,
logistics, intelligence and communications. These extensive educational
programs mean that China is now training officers at all levels of command and
in all services. For instance, at the PLA Navy (PLAN) Staff College, it is not
uncommon to have Latin American junior and senior officers attending different
levels of education in the same year. This allows the Chinese military to get
acquainted with officers from different generations and from all services.
In doing so, the PLA trains foreign military personnel who become accustomed to
its ways. This can only enhance China's influence and prestige among Latin
America's armed forces. Perhaps more significant are the upper-echelon military
officers trained at the National Defense University in the Changping district
of Beijing. There the PLA conducts an intensive four-and-a-half-month course on
grand strategy. The course is carried out every year and is attended by
officers from all services with the minimum rank of lieutenant-colonel up to
major-general. [1]
Contrary to what some may expect, these courses are no longer being frequented
just by officers from countries hostile to the US, such as Cuba or Venezuela.
Various countries with traditionally close relations with the US such as
Colombia, Chile and Argentina have also sent regular participants.
In addition to training increasingly large numbers of Latin American officers,
the PLA sends its own officers to courses in Brazil, Chile, Argentina,
Venezuela, Cuba and Mexico.
Beijing has also strengthened its military diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere.
Nearly all the ministers and chiefs of defense forces from Latin America have
visited China in the past five years. Last August, Bolivian Defense Minister
Walker San Miguel Rodriguez visited for a week. This was followed a month later
by a visit to Beijing by then-Uruguayan army commander Lieutenant-General
Carlos Diaz (Diaz was sacked by President Tabare Vasquez in October) and naval
commander Admiral Juan Heber Fernandez Maggio. This April, the Bolivian
minister of defense visited Beijing, and he was followed last month by his
Chilean counterpart.
The fact that Chinese arms sales to the Western Hemisphere have been marginal
has led many observers to underestimate the role of Chinese arms in fostering
closer defense ties. For instance, while Chinese arms sales to Bolivia have
been negligible, donated military material has not. Since President Evo Morales
came to power last year, China has donated significant quantities of military
equipment to Bolivia ranging from non-lethal logistical material such as
trucks, jeeps and engineering supplies as well as combat gear such as
medium-range artillery and assault rifles.
China as also supplied other South American countries, such as Guyana, with
uniforms, tents, field kitchens, vehicles and engineering equipment. China as
also provided various countries in the region with police and paramilitary
equipment, including sidearms, anti-riot equipment and communications gear.
This year China is also reported to be in the process of donating an
unspecified number of river patrol gunboats to the Bolivian Navy. [2] The most
significant arms transfer, if reports are correct, is China's replacement of 38
Chinese HN-5 shoulder-launched air-defense missiles that were reportedly taken
out of the country by a US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation.
The HN-5s have been a source of great concern to the US military. A few years
before the alleged CIA operation, some found their way to the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) narco-guerrillas, who used them against US-made
helicopters operated by the Colombian Army. The Chinese missiles proved to be
very effective against the choppers, hence the reported CIA operation to take
them out of Bolivia. [3]
Even in the area of arms sales, the situation may be slowly changing because of
sophisticated Chinese sales strategies. In 2005, China signed a contract with
the Venezuelan government to supply three JVL-1-type radars. The contract also
included the provision of a complete command and control system, spare parts,
training, technical assistance and the lease of a communication satellite, all
for the modest price of US$150 million. [4]
The cost of such a system and its related assets in the West would have been at
least two to three times as much. Even by low-cost Chinese standards, the deal
was a bargain.
While making little, if any, profit, the provision of weapons at "friendship
prices" may slowly allow China to penetrate a new market and build goodwill
among the region's military forces. Venezuela's government has also shown
considerable interest in Chinese missile and electronic-warfare equipment.
China has also sold air-defense artillery and military bridges to Ecuador.
In June 2001, the Washington Times reported that three Chinese ship-carrying
weapons and explosives entered the Cuban port of Mariel, although the reports
have never been fully verified. However, there is hardly any doubt about the
close nature of China's military relations with Cuba.
For several years the Chinese have reportedly been operating a former Soviet
electronic eavesdropping facility in Bejucal, south of Havana. It reportedly
contains a cyber-warfare unit that monitors some US computer data traffic and
primarily civilian telephone communications. The base was Russia's main
electronic eavesdropping facility in the area until 2001, when Moscow abandoned
it for economic reasons. China took over the facility a year later.
A China threat?
While China's military contacts with Latin America have increased
substantially, its military influence in the region is minimum when compared
with that of the United States and regional powers such as Brazil. The US
remains by far the single largest provider of military equipment and aid to the
region.
The relevance of China's growing military relations with the region lies in the
fact that it grew rather rapidly from almost nothing. However, this rising
military influence is a natural development of China's rising economic presence
in the Western Hemisphere. Beijing's interests in Latin America are primarily
economic, particularly in the energy sector and Chinese exports.
China is rather reluctant to increase its Latin American military ties for fear
of antagonizing the United States. While some regimes have urged further
military cooperation and arms sales, China has so far adopted a very cautious
approach. However, it remains to be seen how far Beijing will be willing to
stretch its defense and military ties to further its economic interests,
particularly its vital energy needs.
Conclusion
Looking at China's defense and military relations with Latin America solely
from an arms-sales perspective belies the true extent of China's growing
influence in the Americas. However, if one looks at other aspects such as
military training and education, visits and exchanges of military personnel,
equipment donations and "friendship prices", it is apparent that China's
defense relations with Latin America are increasing.
The relationship is multidimensional and sophisticated and reflects the growing
level of refinement and professionalism of the PLA and the Chinese bureaucracy
in general.
Notes
1. Loro Horta, "Defense and military education: A dimension of Chinese power",
September 29, 2006, Power and Interest News Report.
2. Interview with a senior South American military officer.
3. B Gertz, "China proposes missile replacement for Bolivia", Washington Times,
February 27, 2006.
4. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2006,
p 91.
Loro Horta is a PhD candidate at the S Rajartnam School of International
Studies, Nanyang Technology University, Singapore. He is also a graduate of the
National Defense University of the People's Liberation Army (PLANDU). He is
currently based in Beijing.
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