In 2003, while still serving as deputy
assistant secretary of state for East Asia, I was
asked by Taiwanese reporters what the US view
would be on the proposal for Taiwan to hold a
national referendum in conjunction with the 2004
presidential election to see whether the people of
the island agreed that it should apply to join the
United Nations using the name "Taiwan". I gave a
rather lengthy, rambling and convoluted answer
that could have been summarized in a more concise
form by saying, "It depends." The
same
remains true today.
Why does a referendum
pose difficult questions for the United States?
Why are officials unwilling simply to endorse any
referendum on any subject of Taiwan's choosing?
The core challenge faced by US officials
when such matters are considered comes from the
tension that emanates from asking two questions:
How can the US be pro-Taiwan, but not anti-China?
And how can the US be pro-democracy, but not
pro-independence?
Clearly the US is a
longtime supporter of Taiwan, sustains a great
affinity for its people, and stands to benefit
from investing further in the bilateral
relationship. But the US also needs good relations
with mainland China, which views Taiwan as a
breakaway province.
The US has a strong
interest in seeing Taiwan's democracy succeed and
strengthen. Such an outcome not only supports a
regional and global strategy to broaden the
international community of democracies, it also
best positions Taiwan to be a like-minded partner
to the US on a range of important issues such as
counter-terrorism, trade liberalization, and
maritime security. But the administration of
President George W Bush, like the six preceding US
administrations, will not support Taiwanese
independence.
It is important for
government leaders in Taipei and people in Taiwan
to understand that these are the questions that
will inform policy discussions in Washington. It
is the dynamic analysis surrounding these
questions that leads Washington to conclude that
the subject matter of a referendum in Taiwan is
consequential, and the timing of public
announcements related to a referendum matter as
well.
Too often, frustrated people in
Taiwan interpret a US policy statement as being
animated by a desire to curry favor with Beijing.
The truth is that US policy decisions are often
more complex than would be the case if the sole
objective were to please mainland China. It is
more accurate to acknowledge the balancing act as
being pro-Taiwan, but not anti-China.
Returning to the question of a national
referendum in Taiwan in this context, let's
consider what US officials are likely discussing
as Taiwan conducts its own debate regarding the
wisdom of holding a referendum next year. One can
imagine categorizing referendums in Taiwan in
three ways from the US perspective.
Category 1 is a referendum on a topic that
relates to good governance, increasing efficiency
and resolving a contentious public debate that the
legislature is unable to resolve (eg, Taiwan
should build a fourth nuclear power plant). A
second-order benefit of a referendum in Category 1
is that the collective experience resulting from
conducting the referendum in and of itself would
help strengthen Taiwan's democracy.
Category 2 is a referendum that most
clearly addresses the question of independence
and/or sovereignty (eg, an actual referendum on
whether Taiwan should declare its independence).
And finally, Category 3 would be a
referendum that is highly symbolic in nature (has
no consequential impact on governance and policy),
and touches obliquely on questions of Taiwan's
status or sovereignty.
From the US
perspective, a referendum in Category 1 is quite
easy to support despite pressure that might come
from Beijing. In such a case, the US could
comfortably support a referendum in the spirit of
being pro-Taiwan (but not anti-China), and being
pro-democracy (without being pro-independence).
A referendum in Category 2 is quite easy
to oppose despite the deep desire among many in
Taiwan to see such questions addressed in a direct
fashion. The US would oppose a referendum in
Category 2 on the grounds that it would be
inconsistent with its non-support for Taiwan's
independence.
It is Category 3 that will
spark the most internal debate in Washington and
whose wording will become the Rorschach test for
Asia-policy experts in the US trying to manage a
set of competing interests. Ultimately, Washington
would likely discourage this type of referendum as
well because the cost-benefit analysis for the US
tilts in the negative direction.
Thus far,
the proposal on the table in Taiwan rests firmly
in Category 3. Holding a referendum on whether or
not to seek membership in the UN under the name
"Taiwan" (rather than "Republic of China") will be
problematic for Washington. It is a topic that
seems highly symbolic (no matter the results of
the vote, there is no chance Taiwan will be
admitted to the UN under any name as long as China
holds a veto) and certainly touches on Taiwan's
status (by virtue of specifying that the
application should be made under the name
"Taiwan").
There is also a chance that an
attempt to hold a referendum on this topic could
be a setback for Taiwan's democracy rather than a
step toward strengthening democracy (there is a
very real possibility that a referendum on such a
topic could draw another boycott from the
opposition "pan-blue" camp led by the Kuomintang).
Two referendums in a row that draw less than 50%
participation would constitute a blow to efforts
to deepen democratic culture.
So what
should the US do in response to the desire of many
in Taiwan to hold a referendum next year? Rather
than oppose Taiwan's efforts outright, officials
in Washington should encourage it to take steps
that will truly strengthen its democracy and
improve the quality of governance.
More
specifically, the US can actively encourage Taiwan
to employ the tool of a national referendum to
address issues that will be consequential in
improving the lives of the people in Taiwan,
rather than a more symbolic issue such as UN
membership. The US should also remind Beijing that
Washington supports democracy in Taiwan, including
support for democratic methods such as conducting
referendums.
Even if Taiwan ultimately
does pursue a referendum on seeking UN membership
under the name "Taiwan", Washington should urge
Beijing to show restraint (an expression of public
sentiment is hardly a casus belli) and
remind China that its overall posture toward
Taiwan, which has been characterized by missile
deployments and pressure on Taipei's government,
is doing more to drive Taiwanese away than to
attract them to better relations with the
mainland.
Finally, Washington should
encourage leaders in Taiwan to consider its
broader interests in bettering relations with the
US vs whatever short-term gain might come from
holding a symbolic referendum.
The US can
position itself for much more robust bilateral
ties across the full spectrum of activities
including trade, security, regional democracy
promotion, global issues and the like, but not if
it is consumed with squabbling over the true
intent behind a particular referendum.
Randall Schriver
(randy.schriver@armitageinternational.com)is
a founding partner of Armitage International LC.
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