Page 2 of 2 China's man behind the
missiles By Jason Kelly
appointment to Base 52 is noteworthy. Following the 1995-1996 crisis and the
subsequent US deployment of two carrier battle groups to international waters
near Taiwan, PLA planners began to focus greater attention on targeting ships
and submarines at long ranges as a means to deter US intervention should future
conflicts erupt. Jing’s arrival at Base 52 in 1997 thus put him in command of a
key Nanjing Military Region missile base during a
critical juncture.
The upshot of this background is that Jing Zhiyuan makes for an interesting
interlocutor not only because of his current position as the head of the Second
Artillery, but also because his mode of thinking and analytical frameworks were
forged during the years he spent serving in and commanding key PLA missile
bases.
Missiles matter
Hosting Jing Zhiyuan is an enticing prospect also because the Second
Artillery's missile forces will play an integral role in the event of any
future conflict with the United States over Taiwan. According to Zhanyi Xue, an
authoritative PLA text, conventional missile strikes are gaining in prominence
and utility in the post-cold war security environment. Joint campaigns,
amphibious landings, and blockades - all directly relevant to potential Taiwan
scenarios - demand that conventional missile attacks play a key role.
Fully aware of this PLA perspective, the US Department of Defense is closely
following improvements in the Second Artillery Corps' capabilities, both
nuclear and conventional. In its most recent report to the US Congress on the
modernization efforts of the PLA, the Pentagon took note of several critical
developments. For example, the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile, which
achieved initial threat availability in 2006 and may have already achieved
operational status, represents a significant improvement in the Second
Artillery’s strategic strike capabilities.
The Department of Defense is also keeping an eye out for the attainment of
initial operating capability status by the DF-31A, a three-stage,
solid-propellant follow-on to the DF-31 that will be capable of striking all
targets within continental United States. The addition of these new missiles to
existing stores will provide China with a more survivable and flexible nuclear
force, which, some analysts contend, may impact China’s long-standing "no first
use" nuclear doctrine.
On the side of conventional missiles, the anti-satellite missile test in
January 2007 demonstrated the ability of the PLA to strike and destroy a
satellite using a medium range ballistic missile, a development that appears to
bring China's capabilities more into line with its doctrinal writings on the
merits of striking space-based communications systems. At the same time, the
approximately 900 DF-15 and DF-11 short-range ballistic missiles deployed in
Fujian province, increasing at a rate of roughly 100 per year by Pentagon
estimates, would certainly play a central role in any future Taiwan conflict.
As the quality and quantity of the PLA's missile cache grows, Jing Zhiyuan will
become an increasingly attractive partner for military-to-military talks
between the United States and China.
Still waiting
Nearly a year and a half after Hu accepted the invitation for Jing Zhiyuan to
visit the US Strategic Command, the general has yet to make the trip. The
reason behind the delay is unclear. Jing's tight schedule has been the stated
obstacle, according to a January 2007 People's Daily report. The paper pointed
out that, at that time, the upcoming Spring Festival season - a time for
Chinese to gather with their families - was inappropriate for a foreign
excursion, even for a high-ranking PLA general. Following the festivities, Jing
would be caught up in the preparations for the upcoming 17th Party Congress.
While scheduling issues remain the official excuse for Jing’s delayed visit, it
is unclear why the general was unable to arrange a trip during the 10 months in
between the April 2006 Bush-Hu summit and the onset of the Chinese holiday
season in February 2007. Stranger still, Jing found time for visits to Chile
and Argentina in early December 2006. Pentagon officials reportedly view the
delay as a sign that the PLA fears that discussions on its improving nuclear
capabilities will assist the US military in targeting Chinese nuclear weapons
in the event of a conflict.
Whatever the real reasons for the holdup, General Jing Zhiyuan will probably
not be making the trip until late this autumn at the earliest. For the Pentagon
this is a disappointment, but the United States nonetheless has strong
incentives to continue asking after him, with the hope of hosting the general
sooner rather than later. General Jing’s position, experience, and the critical
importance of missiles to China's military modernization all make him too
important a piece of the PLA puzzle for the Pentagon to ignore.
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