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3 A velvet divorce in
China By M K Bhadrakumar
Beijing thoughtfully chose a
sub-provincial city on the banks of the Songhua
River in the far northeast corner of China as the
setting for the third "stand alone" trilateral
meeting with Russia and India at the foreign
minister level, which China last week hosted for
the first time.
Harbin, nicknamed "Moscow
of the Orient", is a city with which Russia and
its culture has been long and intimately
associated. A foreigner traveling on the
Trans-Siberian railway in the late 1980s
would blink in disbelief when
on the sixth day of his departure from Moscow, he
would arrive in Harbin and be told he was in
China. The St Basil's church in the town center, a
replica of the ensemble on Moscow's Red Square;
Harbin's Russian cuisine; even the local dialect
laden with Russian words - all these would remind
the traveler of the White Russian emigre community
that flocked to the city, fleeing from the fury of
the Bolshevik revolution in 1917.
Beijing
made a subtle point about the unprecedented
closeness that today characterizes Sino-Russian
relations. On the sidelines of the trilateral
meet, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi took time out
with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov to
inaugurate a new memorial to the Soviet soldiers
who fell in northeastern China in World War II in
1945, fighting "militarist Japan's attack on China
... as the occupiers were being driven out from
Chinese territory".
Lest the political
symbolism be lost on anyone, Lavrov said at the
ceremony, "There are figures in some countries who
are trying to rewrite history." The dig at Japan
was obvious - a country that is increasingly
bonding with India on issues of Asian security.
There is also a flip side to it. The fact is, in
the curious tango - involving the bear, the dragon
and the elephant - New Delhi finds itself
distinctly apart of late from Moscow and Beijing
on issues of Asian and global security and
stability.
The Russia-China-India
trilateral format might have been in the first
instance Moscow's idea, but the Kremlin no more
ascribes for itself the role as a catalyst
fostering Sino-Indian understanding. What emerges
is that Russia has been far more successful in
coming to terms with China's rise than India has
been. The Harbin meet brought out that the
trilateral format finds itself more than ever a
coolly pragmatic arrangement, though the Russian
Foreign Ministry spokesman made a valid point that
"the platform for dialogue in this format in
itself [becomes] an important factor of political
processes in the contemporary world".
Iran sanctions divisive The
trilateral strategic dialogue was put to the
litmus test, in fact, within 48 hours of the
Harbin meet. And it promptly failed the test.
Hardly had the three foreign ministers got back to
their respective capitals than the George W Bush
administration announced a regime of unprecedented
sanctions against Iran, branding Iranian security
bodies as sponsors of international terrorism and
virtually making Iran an enemy country under US
law.
It was precisely the sort of
"unilateralist" move in the conduct of
international affairs that the trilateral
Russia-China-India format apparently strives to
condemn. The Harbin meet's joint communique had
just emphasized that "globalization has brought
about closer interrelation and interdependence
among all nations, and that multilateralism and
collective action should be promoted in addressing
urgent issues and meeting new challenges and
threats."
More important, the three
foreign ministers had just underlined that "the
United Nations is the most representative and
authoritative international organization" to deal
with problems and challenges facing the world
community. It ought to be crystal clear that the
Bush administration once again sidestepped the UN.
Unsurprisingly, Russia and China were
quick off the mark in criticizing the US move. But
India kept mum. There is delightful irony here.
The Chinese and Russian foreign ministers at
Harbin had just reiterated that they attach
"importance to the status of India in
international affairs and understand and support
India's aspirations to play a greater role in the
United Nations". Either the two foreign ministers
didn't quite understand their Indian counterpart's
"aspirations" properly, or New Delhi has developed
cold feet in raising its voice against the Bush
administration. The latter seems to be the case.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
recently described Bush as the "friendliest" US
president that India ever came across. Delhi is
understandably nervous that the negotiations over
India's nuclear deal with the US are at a delicate
stage. Delhi wouldn't want to annoy the powerful
Israeli lobby in the US, which is clamoring for
regime change in Iran. On the balance sheet,
therefore, Delhi shrewdly estimates that relations
with Tehran are inconsequential for the present in
comparison with what the nuclear deal has to
offer.
Both Beijing and Moscow pointed out
that Bush's latest move against the regime in
Tehran would only complicate the resolution of the
Iran nuclear issue. While Beijing expressed its
disapproval of the US move, Moscow vociferously
condemned it. The Russian Foreign Ministry
statement pointed a finger at US unilateralism and
warned, "We either work together and make joint
decisions, or else this interaction [within the
framework of the 'Five plus One' - permanent UN
Security Council members plus Germany] will be
devoid of any sense."
Commenting on the
issue during a visit to Portugal, Russian
President Vladimir Putin was even sharper: "Why
exacerbate the situation now, pushing it towards
deadlock and threatening sanctions and military
actions? I do not think that running round like a
madman with a razor, brandishing it in all
directions, is the best way to resolve problems of
this kind."
Trilateral format unravels
Disharmony over the Iran nuclear issue -
or, rather, the varying priorities of relationship
with the US - vividly brings out the limits of the
Russia-China-India trilateral format. The Harbin
communique had a quaint little phrase capturing
the essence of the moment. The trilateral
cooperation, the communique said, "Seeks to
broaden common ground amidst divergent interests."
(The chaste English makes one suspect it was an
Indian formulation.)
But how this is
achievable - being strategic partners while
pursuing "divergent interests" - remains unclear.
Yet, it lies at the root of the dilemma facing the
three countries. This is an altogether new
formulation that didn't figure in the two "stand
alone" meetings at the foreign minister level in
the trilateral format - in June 2005 in
Vladivostock and in February 2007 in New Delhi.
On closer examination, it becomes clear
that in the period since the Vladivostock meet,
the Russia-China-India trilateral format has
undergone a qualitative change of steady erosion.
Contrary to the usual tendency for such
multilateral processes to gain traction with the
passage of time, the opposite seems to be
happening. At Harbin, the process visibly slumped.
The Vladivostock communique said, "India,
Russia and China share a common approach to key
global developments in the 21st century and favor
a democratization of international relations aimed
at building a just world order based on the
observance of
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