Page 2 of
3 A velvet divorce in
China By M K Bhadrakumar
international law, equity, mutual
respect, cooperation and progress toward
multipolarity."
However, by the time the
three countries met in New Delhi in February, this
had already undergone a dilution and had become a
"conviction that democratization of
international relations is the key to building an
increasingly multipolar world order based on
principles of equality of nations - big or small -
respect for
sovereignty and territorial
integrity of countries, international law and
mutual respect." (Emphasis added.)
The
Harbin communique now takes an altogether new
perspective when it says, "The development of
China, Russia and India is a major contribution to
peace and development of the region and the world
and is beneficial to the process of global
multipolarity. The three countries have chosen
their respective development paths in accordance
with their domestic situation and past experience
... With their continuous development and growing
role in international affairs, China, Russia and
India will further contribute to world peace,
security, stability and prosperity."
That
is to say, the three countries have opted to make
their respective independent choices in
international life in terms of their unique
circumstances, while it is hoped that their role
in world affairs will increase. But what happens
to their "common approach", which they underscored
in Vladivostock as their leitmotif?
Asian security perceptions The
Harbin meet brings out that on the vital issues of
Asian security, Russia and China share common
perceptions, while India finds itself standing at
some distance from its two partners. The first
issue concerns the deployment of the US's missile
defense systems in Asia. On the eve of the Harbin
meet, in a media interview, Lavrov stressed
Russia's shared concerns with China over Japan's
cooperation with the US over the missile defense
program.
He said, "We are opposed to the
construction of missile defense systems aimed at
securing military superiority. Deploying this kind
of system may spur an arms race on a regional and
global scale. The foundations of strategic
stability are thus undermined, leading to a growth
of unpredictability in this hugely important
sphere of maintaining global equilibrium."
Lavrov put a question mark about the "real
aim" of Japan and the US and he went on to point
out, "Many experts suggest that such a missile
defense system, being an element of the American
global missile shield, could as well be used
against Russian and Chinese strategic arms."
Later, at a joint press conference with
his Russian and Indian counterparts, Yang
similarly criticized the US plans for deployment
of the missile defense system in Central Europe,
saying this would not only not ease global
security concerns, but would undermine the global
strategic balance. In contrast, Indian Foreign
Minister Pranab Mukherjee simply maintained that
India had no plans for cooperation with the US
missile defense system. He stonewalled. He
wouldn't be drawn into any criticism of the US
plans.
The problem for Russia and China is
that the Indian position remains ambivalent. To be
sure, there is as of now no cooperation as such on
the part of India with the US's missile defense
system, which is still under development. But the
Indian government continues to discuss with the US
the scope of such cooperation. In statements in
the Indian Parliament, the government has
acknowledged that such discussions are going on
with the Pentagon. A visiting senior official from
the US Department of Defense plainly stated in New
Delhi recently that India should go for the US
missile defense system as it would give India the
capability to effectively counter the Chinese
missile threat.
Second, from the Chinese
and Russian point of view, an equally serious
issue is Japan's growing militarization within the
framework of the US-Japan military alliance. On
the eve of his arrival in Harbin, Lavrov took
particular exception to the joint decision by
Washington and Tokyo to broaden the scope of their
military alliance to cover regional and global
security.
He said that for security
cooperation to be viable, it should work in
collaboration with "other regional structures and
leading regional players" and it should be
"synchronized with collective efforts to maintain
security in the region". Lavrov warned that
Japan's militarization may "entail adverse
consequences for regional stability" and would
evoke an appropriate Russian response.
Third, Lavrov also spoke out on the
rationale of the new "military-political triangle"
in the Asia-Pacific region involving the US, Japan
and Australia. Lavrov left out any direct
reference to India, though the import of what he
stated couldn't be lost on New Delhi. India has
been participating in a "strategic dialogue" with
these three countries in the Asia-Pacific. India
recently held a large-scale naval exercise with
them in the Bay of Bengal - India's first-ever
military exercise in a multilateral format,
involving US aircraft carriers and submarines.
Lavrov criticized that such a "closed
format" in the Asia-Pacific (Indian strategic
analysts whimsically label it as a "quadripartite
alliance" or an "Asian NATO") cannot be conducive
to regional stability. He said, "A closed format
for military and political alliances raises
questions among neighboring countries not party to
them as to what these alliances are actually being
created for and against whom."
Russian-Indian disharmony
Lavrov virtually echoed the Chinese
diplomatic demarche a few months ago aimed at
Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and New Delhi about
the raison d'etre of their strategic dialogue. He
went on to rubbish the new alliance format in the
Asia-Pacific as "a counterproductive approach
which will not be able to increase trust in the
region, and most likely will bring about results
that are opposite to the expectations of the
participants in such schemes".
Lavrov
further echoed Beijing's thinking when he roundly
criticized Japan for its concept of an "arc of
freedom and prosperity" in Asia-Pacific (an idea
that former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe
robustly expounded while addressing the Indian
Parliament in August). Lavrov advised Tokyo to
properly assimilate what happened in Iraq, and
"take a rest from ideology and concentrate instead
on understandable, real-life interests". He warned
that Japan's pursuit of relations with the
countries of the so-called arc should not
"encroach upon the interests of others" in the
region.
It is extremely significant that
Lavrov hit out on these lines even as the US,
Japan, Australia and India were reportedly getting
together for a fourth round of their newfound
strategic dialogue. According to the Japanese,
there is even a move to raise the format to the
ministerial level.
Never before, perhaps,
in the saga of India-Russia relations has such a
serious contradiction appeared in their respective
perceptions over Asian security. Moscow has
virtually implied that it squarely places itself
on the side of Beijing in any US-sponsored
"containment" strategy toward China. From the
tenor of Lavrov's exhaustive comments, it is clear
that New Delhi has a lot of homework to do by way
of carefully reassessing the pros and cons of
getting deeper into its format involving the US,
Japan and Australia.
What must be
understood is that at the root of the potential
India-Russia discord lies the two countries'
respective perceptions of
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