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2 Latin America in step with
China By Cynthia Watson
region. Chavez governs a state with
a virtual monoculture export economy of a
commodity Beijing covets: petroleum. The desire
for enhanced military ties clearly appeals to both
Venezuela and China.
Venezuela's president
wants to achieve autonomy from Washington much as
China did in the mid-20th century, and delights in
taking highly visible steps to call attention to
any ties
with
a foreign military that is likely to upset
Washington [4]. Beijing wants to open better
relations with militaries throughout Latin America
with Venezuela currently the easiest to engage.
Chavez has also done everything possible
to cut his nation's ties with the US military,
including shutting off both PME opportunities and
weapons sales; rejecting any guidelines that might
allow US assistance; and other overt actions that
make Beijing necessary to his military's
well-being. At the same time, the United States
has become increasingly critical of Chavez's
motives and actions. In the Venezuelan case, PLA
involvement in the region is as much a result of
Chavez's actions as those of Beijing. Instead of
China having to assert greater PLA military
diplomacy, which risks it being perceived
aggressive, it is taking advantage of a set of
conditions simply handed to it by the United
States and by the Venezuelan leader.
Similarly, Chavez wants to acquire PLA
weapons because he refuses to buy from Washington.
The weapons purchased by prior regimes in Caracas
require replenishment and refurbishment that
Washington no longer allows, nor will Chavez
request, thus Beijing becomes a logical vendor for
Venezuela's needs.
Crucial to evaluating
the underlying forces driving Venezuelan-Chinese
military ties is understanding that they are much
more driven by Venezuelan than Chinese interests.
This is an important distinction because it
indicates that Beijing is attentive to the Monroe
Doctrine in this region. It also testifies to the
Chinese awareness of Chavez's unpredictable
nature. In the Chinese calculus, Chavez is simply
not worth what could become a high cost if PLA
involvement became sufficient to arouse
Washington's suspicions above a tolerable level.
PLA military diplomacy Latin
America is not the place that China is most
interested in today - Beijing's ties and economic
stakes in both Africa and Southeast Asia are much
more important. Both the continent and the region
are closer geographically, more advanced
historically and likely to engender greater result
for less cost. Latin America does offer a new
arena for the PLA and new opportunities for
expanded links as Washington remains absorbed in
wars in Central and Southeast Asia.
As
China seeks to engage Latin America in a
multiple-pronged approach, the military
instrument's utility is becoming increasingly
important for Beijing. Military-to-military ties
represent a zero-sum situation from the view of
some Latin American militaries, yet if they are
involved with the PLA, they need not deal with the
traditionally frustrating judgmentalism
characterizing long-term links with the US
military.
Latin Americans have long
memories of inconsistent US policies during the
past two centuries. For instance, they have never
forgotten the Carter administration's prohibition
on military sales to Chile over human rights
questions. Few indications exist that Beijing
would exercise such judgmentalism except over the
Taiwan issue, a matter increasingly going in
China's favor as more states choose to shift
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, as
Costa Rica did in mid-2007.
Additionally,
as the PLA becomes a modern force, its
capabilities will be increasingly able to execute
the strategy of forward presence globally, and in
a more limited sense with Latin American states.
PLA Navy (PLAN) fleet visits, although
insignificant relative to those of the US Navy,
are increasingly occurring around the world. These
drills demonstrate a modernizing fleet's ability
to show the flag in a way that was not previously
possible.
China's leadership thus garners
both increased diplomatic links with states far
away and improves PLAN capabilities. As China and
the PLA take a more public role in the world,
these are increasingly crucial goals for a state
seeking respect as a world power.
China's
increasingly effective military diplomacy in Latin
America also points to a more disconcerting issue,
the United States' lack of recognition of the
changes occurring while US prestige is waning on
the global stage. The traditional US military
links with sister armed forces in the region have
deteriorated over the past six years, making room
for PLA's involvement more visible and effective.
PLA diplomacy in Latin America may not in fact be
an absolute zero-sum equation for the United
States, but reveals the deteriorating US
understanding of fundamental global shifts that
appear growing systematically.
Notes 1. The region is
those states south of the Rio Grande and unlike
many other analyses, does include the three
European enclaves of Suriname, French Guiana and
British Guiana. 2. This phrase is commonly used
to denote the period from approximately 1839-1949,
when China was subjected to imperialist assault by
Western powers and Japan. 3. US PME seats are
allocated by invitation, not strictly speaking a
competition. The United States, along with other
countries, seeks to invite officers from states
with whom it wants to enhance overall relations as
does China, India, or any other state inviting
officers to attend schooling. 4. In the late
1990s, Chavez toured Baghdad next to Saddam
Hussein in a highly visible visit that attracted
much criticism but accomplished his goal of
setting him in the camp opposing US criticisms of
the Iraqi dictator.
Cynthia
Watson is a professor at the National War
College. The views expressed in this article are
those of Cynthia Watson, not those of the National
War College, Institute for National Strategic
Studies or any US Government agency.
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