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2 China's balancing act: guns vs
rice By Michael S Chase
incidents” rose from about 8,700 in
1993 to more than 58,000 in 2003 [10]. The
increase in such incidents apparently reflects
growing dissatisfaction with problems associated
with economic reforms and the behavior of local
officials, including excessive tax burdens,
layoffs, failure to pay wages and pensions,
property rights disputes arising from land
seizures, corruption, environmental degradation
and rising income inequality. Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao in a late
2005 speech highlighted illegal land seizures as a
particularly severe threat to social stability,
especially in rural areas. "Some places are
unlawfully occupying farmers' land and not
offering reasonable economic compensation and
arrangements for livelihoods, and this is sparking
mass incidents in the countryside,” Wen said (BBC,
January 21, 2006).
Tanner argues that the
growing number of protests probably does not pose
a direct threat to the CCP's survival, so long as
the incidents remain relatively small, poorly
organized and isolated from each other, but he
also points to evidence that suggests the protests
are becoming more difficult to control. In
particular, the growing size of protests,
improvements in organization and tactics and
employment of communications technology are
factors that pose serious challenges for Chinese
police. Even sustained high rates of economic
growth will not slow rising unrest unless Beijing
reforms China's political and legal institutions,
creates effective channels for citizens to seek
redress for their grievances, improves governance
and accountability and reduces widespread
corruption [11].
These social, political
and economic challenges have the potential to
impose constraints on further increases in
military spending. Under the leadership of
President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, China
is shifting from an economic strategy that
emphasized rapid GDP growth above all else to an
approach that devotes more attention to reducing
income inequality and ensuring sustainable
development. Hu and Wen are likely to have their
hands full, since local officials historically
have been evaluated and promoted on the basis of
metrics associated with the rapid growth strategy
and may resist the new balanced and sustainable
development approach. Nonetheless, as part of this
new approach, Chinese leaders emphasize that the
country's economic policies must promote the
development of a "harmonious society" [12].
Accordingly, China's 11th Five-Year Program is
intended to promote balanced growth and
sustainable economic development.
These
ambitious plans and the pressing requirements
could eventually reduce the resources available
for defense spending. China's Minister of National
Defense Cao Gangchuan highlighted these
constraints during an October 2005 press
conference with US Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld. According to Cao: "The top priority of
the Chinese government today is to develop the
country's economy and improve the livelihood of
its people ... given the duties and obligations of
the government, it is simply impossible for us to
massively increase the investment into defense
capabilities building." [13] Although Cao's
comments were likely intended to defuse US
concerns about the growth of the Chinese defense
budget and the potential implications of Chinese
military modernization for regional security, they
probably also reflected a fairly realistic
appraisal of Beijing's policy priorities and the
limitations domestic challenges may begin to
impose on further dramatic increases in military
spending in the future. Especially if growth slows
or Beijing is forced to confront some of the
unintended consequences of its longstanding policy
of promoting rapid economic development no matter
what the social and environmental costs.
Conclusion Rapid economic growth
has allowed Beijing to dramatically increase
defense spending since the late 1990s without
compelling Chinese leaders to choose between
military modernization and China's other policy
priorities. In the not too distant future,
however, the Chinese government is likely to face
growing pressure to devote a larger share of
government spending to coping with serious
domestic problems such as income inequality, the
collapse of the health care system and
environmental degradation, all of which contribute
to rising social unrest. As these domestic
problems become more pressing, Beijing may have to
begin to face some of the budgetary tradeoffs it
has previously managed to avoid, even if economic
growth continues at a fairly impressive rate.
Moreover, in the event of an economic
downturn, the challenges of balancing these
competing budgetary priorities would become much
more acute for China's leaders. At the same time,
however, it is important to keep in mind that
Beijing clearly attaches a great deal of
importance to military modernization and that even
if the need to deal with mounting domestic
problems prevents defense spending from continuing
to grow at a double digit pace indefinitely, China
will remain dedicated to increasing the PLA's
professionalism and enhancing its operational
capabilities.
Notes 1. See, for
example, Dwight Perkins, China's Economic Growth:
Implications for the Defense Budget, in Ashley J
Tellis and Michael Wills, ed, Strategic Asia
2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of
Uncertainty, Seattle, Washington: National Bureau
of Asian Research, 2006, pp. 363-386. 2.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report
to Congress, Military Power of the People's
Republic of China 2005, pp. 21-22. 3. Keith
Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan Medeiros, James Mulvenon,
and William Overholt, Modernizing China's
Military: Opportunities and Constraints, Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2005. 4. Wang Shaoguang and
Hu Angang, The Political Economy of Uneven
Development: The Case of China, Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe, 1999. 5. For more on this issue, see
Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The
Environmental Challenge to China's Future, Ithaca:
NY, Cornell, 2004. 6. Rural Development,
Natural Resources and Environment Management Unit,
East Asia and Pacific Region, The World Bank and
PRC State Environmental Protection Administration,
Cost of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of
Physical Damages, Washington, DC: The World Bank, February
2007. 7. Melinda Liu, China 2.0: Beijing Shifts to New Economic
Model, Newsweek International, January
30, 2006. 8. State Environmental Protection
Administration, People's Republic of China,
Environmental Protection in China, 1996-2005,
Beijing, China: State Council Information
Office, June 2006. 9. Murray Scot
Tanner, Chinese Government Responses to
Rising Social Unrest, Testimony
presented to the US-China Economic and Security
Review Commission on April 14, 2005. 10.
Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. For a detailed
explanation of this approach, see Communique of the Sixth
Plenum of the 16th CPC Central Committee, People's
Daily, October 12, 2006. 13. US Department of
Defense, News Transcript: Joint
Media Availability with Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
and General Cao Gangchuan, October 19, 2005.
Dr Michael S Chase is an
assistant professor in the Strategy and Policy
Department at the Naval War College in Newport,
Rhode Island. The views presented in this article
are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Naval War College,
Department of the Navy or Department of
Defense.
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