Sino-Russian split at regional
summit By John C K Daly
On November 2, the sixth annual meeting of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
council of heads of government began in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan. The six member states include
Kazakhastan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan. India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan
attended as observers and Afghanistan as a guest
of the host country Uzbekistan.
Xinhua
News Agency, the mouthpiece of the Chinese
government, breathlessly reported: "In a friendly,
pragmatic, and constructive
atmosphere, delegations of
the member states held in-depth discussions on a
host of pressing issues, including deepening
economic trade and cultural cooperation within the
SCO as well as safeguarding the region's peace,
stability and security."
Behind all the
camaraderie, two underlying issues permeated the
discussions: joint military cooperation and trade,
most notably in energy. It is on these two issues
that Russian and Chinese priorities diverge, with
the Central Asian SCO members watching from the
sidelines.
Despite a 20-point declaration
that was subsequently issued on strengthening
cooperation among SCO member states in the
economic, investment, innovation, science,
educational and cultural fields, perhaps the most
telling point was the seventh item, which stated
"that the SCO member states should cooperate
closely to map out a common position on energy
issues". Significantly, none of the items
specifically mentioned deepening military
cooperation, only a general commitment to
deepening regional security.
Russia is
most keenly interested in military cooperation,
envisaging the SCO as an embryonic Eurasian
counterweight to NATO and US "hegemony". Russia
successfully linked the SCO to the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) through the
signing of a memorandum that focuses on broadening
cooperation on issues such as security, crime and
drug trafficking. China is more interested in the
SCO developing into a nascent trading organization
loosely based on a European Union model.
Both interpretations can claim successes
and failures. Russia has had remnants of the 201st
Motorized Rifle Division based in Tajikistan since
the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. In October
2003, the Russian Federation established an
airbase at Kant, near Bishkek, ostensibly to
provide immediate air support for CSTO ground
units. The Kant airbase was Russia's first foreign
military facility established since 1991, and it
is less than 30 miles away from the US aerial
facility at Manas. The US facility was established
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001,
attacks in December 2001, along with another
airbase at Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan. In
contrast, China currently has no foreign military
bases.
Both China and Russia have been
opposed to the US military presence in Central
Asia. Following Washington's ambivalent response
to the May 13, 2005, tragic events in Andijan, the
Uzbek government on July 29 told the Pentagon to
evacuate the bases within six months, which it did
in November 2005. The SCO saw the dispute as a
heaven-sent opportunity, in stark contrast to
Washington characterizing Andijan as a terrorist
plot that subsequently lead to a resolution in
July 2005. At a summit in Almaty, the SCO called
for nations to deny asylum to Uzbek refugees who
had fled from Andijan to Kyrgyzstan as well as for
setting a timetable for the withdrawal of US bases
in the region.
From August 8-17, the SCO
staged "Peace Mission 2007", an anti-terrorism
exercise that was the SCO's largest joint exercise
in its six-year history, with nearly 6,500 troops
and 80 aircraft participating. The exercise was
held in two areas, first at the Russian Army's
34th Motorized Rifle Division facility in the
Volga-Urals Military District. Then at Chinese
insistence, the exercise later shifted to Urumqi,
capital of China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region.
The one point of commonality
between all six SCO members is the need to fight
terrorism. In stark contrast to US diplomatic
fumbling in Central Asia, Russia, pressing forward
wherever it might gain a military advantage, has
convinced CSTO's secretariat and joint
headquarters to finalize a draft agreement to form
a single collective Central Asian air defense
system.
While Moscow and Beijing can
concur about the need to diminish or even end US
military presence in Central Asia, their views on
economic issues diverge sharply. Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao used the occasion to network with
delegates and forcefully promote bilateral energy
schemes with the attendees. Wen held talks with
Iranian First Vice President Parviz Davudi on a
host of issues, including energy. Iran gained a
powerful ally in Wen over its nuclear dispute with
the West, with Wen concluding: "China respects
Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy ...
The Chinese side holds the view that peaceful
resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue through
negotiation is the best option."
As China
is a member of the UN Security Council and thus
able to block further sanctions proposed by the
United States, it is likely that Tehran will
return this favor and show its appreciation by
allowing increased Chinese access to the country's
vast energy resources.
Wen followed up the
SCO meeting with an official state visit to
Uzbekistan on November 3; it was the first visit
to Uzbekistan by a Chinese premier in 13 years
(former premier Li Peng first visited in 1994).
Wen met with Uzbek President Islam Karimov, Prime
Minister Shavkat Mirziyaev and leaders of the Oly
Majlis legislature. For the first eight months of
2007, total Sino-Uzbek trade reached US$750
million and China is now Uzbekistan's
fourth-largest trading partner.
Wen then
hurried to Ashgabat, meeting on November 3-4 with
Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov,
where the prime topic of conversation was the
construction of a Turkmenistan-China natural gas
pipeline. More than any other Chinese Central
Asian initiative, this is the one that rattles
Moscow's cage the most, as it currently has a
lucrative export monopoly via its Transneft
pipelines, buying Turkmen gas for $100 per 1,000
cubic meters while shipping its own natural gas to
European consumers for $260 per 1,000 cubic
meters.
Loss of Turkmen gas would force
Russia's Gazprom to dig deep into Russia's
indigenous resources while depriving it of the
added cash flow, should the 4,350 mile-long
natural gas pipeline to China with a 30 billion
cubic meters annual capacity, agreed upon in April
2006 by the late Turkmen President Saparmurat
Niyazov, ever come to fruition.
While in
Belarus, Wen signed a basket of agreements with
Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka totaling
$530 million, and announced that China approves
Belarusian acceptance into the World Trade
Organization. As Belarus is energy-poor, it seems
likely that the agreements paralleled those signed
in Moscow for machinery imports.
During
Wen's November 5-6 visit to Russia to follow up on
the SCO forum, Wen put forward a four-point
proposal in Moscow at the second high-level
Sino-Russian economic forum to boost bilateral
economic and trade cooperation. During the visit,
the two sides were set to conclude 15 agreements
worth $1.3 billion. According to Russian
Ambassador to China Sergei Razov, in 2007
Russian-Chinese bilateral trade will exceed $40
billion, a growth over 2006's rate of $33 billion.
Russia, however, realized that it suddenly
joined a host of nations in developing a trade
deficit with China in 2007 for the first time.
Moscow officials believe that the shortfall can be
made up by increasing exports of timber, oil and
machinery to China. Currently oil and oil products
account for nearly 54%; in 2006, nearly 6 million
tons of oil were exported to China, a 25% increase
over 2005 exports. China is also Russia's
second-largest arms export market, only exceeded
by India.
The most interesting item on the
Sino-Russian economic forum agenda for discussion
between Zubkov and Wen was undoubtedly the
agreement that the pair was expected to sign for
constructing an oil pipeline from Skovorodino,
Russia, to the Chinese frontier. While the
interest might be there, Russia is insisting that
the deal incorporates long-term import quota
guarantees with pricing policy assurances. The
pipeline would replace Russia's current oil
shipments by railway, which is believed in Beijing
to be grossly inefficient.
By any
yardstick Wen's visit can only be judged a grand
success, but it also revealed the underlying rifts
between China and its largest SCO partner, Russia.
Moscow did not see off the American military from
Central Asia only to see them replaced with
multitudes of Chinese businessmen. Behind all the
recent smiles, Beijing and Moscow's shadow
struggle for primacy in Central Asia continues
unabated.
John C K Daly received
his PhD in Russian and Middle Eastern studies from
the University of London and is an adjunct scholar
at the Middle East Institute in Washington,
DC.
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