During the past several years, an
increasing number of differences have arisen in
the strategic partnership forged between China and
the European Union. Among the many critical issues
clouding the mutual agenda are differing policy
approaches towards Africa.
While China's
business-first approach is undermining EU efforts
to boost sustainability and governance standards,
its investments have benefited African economies.
China has increasingly regarded Africa as an
opportunity, while Europe has long regarded the
continent as a burden. In truth, both external
development
approaches are lacking, and
neither can competently deal with rising issues on
the continent alone.
Initially, China was
reluctant to put Africa on the agenda of the 2006
Helsinki EU-China summit. One year later, however,
policy-makers seemed more comfortable with the
issue, and at the 2007 EU-China summit in Beijing,
both sides agreed to ramp up cooperation in the
continent. Although China was invited to observe
the EU-Africa summit, there is still no indication
that EU representatives will be invited to future
meetings of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC).
Today, the presence of Chinese
enterprises in Africa is unmistakable in many
economic sectors. Alongside extractive industries
and Chinese construction firms, an increasing
migration of small entrepreneurs and laborers to
Africa has set in. Chinese engagement has become a
chance, and a challenge, for African economies.
China's growing demand for resources has
benefited African economic growth. At the same
time, local industries, businesses and aspects of
the labor market are now confronted with
competition of an unprecedented scale. An estimate
by China's state-run Xinhua News Agency in August
indicated that 750,000 long-term Chinese migrants
were working and living in Africa.
According to the African Development Bank
(AfDB), in 2006 Chinese investment in Africa
amounted to US$11.7 billion. In the same year
bilateral trade reached $55.5 billion, an increase
of 40% from 2005. In October 2007, trade volume
soared 30%. One third of China's crude oil exports
are now coming from Africa, with Angola as the
largest single exporting country since early 2006.
China has engaged in non-bureaucratic
cooperation: enhancing infrastructure, offering
cheaper goods than Europe, inexpensive loans and a
zero-tariffs policy. The EU has had difficulty
matching these points
During this month's
EU-Africa summit in Lisbon, European nations faced
the fact that Chinese influence and investment are
increasing and that booming trade is just one
example of Beijing's eagerness to re-establish its
Africa strategy. In 2006, Europe, with a turnover
of $315.2 billion, was Africa's biggest trading
partner, with trade volume led by France ($30
billion) and Germany ($23 billion).
During
the summit, European and African leaders failed to
break the deadlock on regional trade deals or sign
the Economic Partnership Agreement, a pact
designed to replace a Preferential Trade Agreement
ruled illegal by the World Trade Organization. The
new agreement would impose lower tariffs on
African agricultural products but is likely to
make European markets inaccessible for exporters
of industrial processed goods. Overall, the
agreement would be another roadblock to nations
transitioning from export to processing economies.
Until recently, competition with China
over resources and influence in Africa wasn't a
pivotal issue in the EU. In the past, debate on
Africa centered on differing development models
and concerns over sustainability, governance and
the environment. The EU is gradually moving
towards a policy designed to avoid dependencies
induced by aid and export-oriented economies. The
EU Commission's 2005 Africa strategy paper
supported Africa's regional integration and
launched initiatives to boost development and
provide aid for potential natural disasters.
Meanwhile, China's external development is
closely linked to its own development model and
has been primarily commercially oriented.
Officially, external development is coordinated by
the Ministry of Commerce, which combines
commercial interests with soft power initiatives.
Industrial and social infrastructure projects are
usually carried out by Chinese construction firms,
and the links between the Ministry of Commerce and
state-owned and private enterprises - particularly
in the energy sector - are not transparent.
Because it lacks a specific external
development policy, Beijing has made a virtue of
necessity. As a latecomer to global resource
markets, and one that must sustain its own
development and serve the needs of an
international manufacturing base, China has
portrayed its commercial policies as "win-win",
and beneficial for African economies. Already in
2006, reports by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World
Bank have confirmed the success of this approach.
China has reconfirmed the principles of
engagement with Arab and African countries
formulated in the early 1960s by former premier
and foreign minister Zhou Enlai. The baseline of
China's non-interference policy, combined with a
neo-liberal, one-size fits-all economically based
foreign policy approach, has earned China a
reputation as a neo-colonial powerhouse. China has
repeated European post-colonial strategies of
asserting influence and shackling countries into
dependency.
Looking ahead, however,
diplomatic pressure and public image problems in
the West and Africa, might prevail upon China to
inch towards a proactive development approach.
Case in point: the international backlash on
China's relationship with Sudan and stance on the
Darfur crisis have proved a massive headache for
Beijing. After all, state-run oil company
PetroChina is the second-biggest shareholder in
the Sudanese oil-consortium Petrodar after
Malaysia's Petronas.
China responded at
the 2006 FOCAC summit by issuing critical
statements to Khartoum and pledging support for
the African Union and the New Partnership for
African Development. Additionally, China is a
stakeholder in the AfDB and involved in at least
three other high-profile international aid and
development groups. Beijing is also a signatory of
the 2006 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
The most pressing task of the EU and
China, along with other players such as India and
the US, is to ensure that Africa does not become
victimized by global competition or the
conflicting strategies of rising and established
powers.
As part of its security policy,
the EU has defined effective multilateralism as
the key to deal with global issues. To achieve
this goal, closer cooperation and rapprochement on
bilateral levels is necessary. This will, in the
long run, help improve cooperation in the larger
UN framework. In the case of Sino-European
development cooperation, the next step is to
nurture diplomatic channels in and with Africa.
Neither China nor the EU can tackle their
challenges and common interests on the continent
alone. Both sides have a shared economic interest
in Africa's stability and security. Shared goals
for energy and environmental security must be
based on initiatives such as the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative, the Action
Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and
Trade and the Kimberly Process, which aims to stem
the flow of conflict diamonds.
Effective
networks for any development agreements between
China, the EU and Africa can only evolve out of
practical cooperation. This will eventually lead
to understanding, trust and rapprochement. Most
importantly, China needs to consider the political
dimensions of development. Focusing only on trade
relations and government support can stand in the
way of sustainable development, especially if
governments remain ineffective and unwilling to
reform. The EU, for its part, must revise its
trade relations with Africa (including its own
agricultural subsidies) and consider their crucial
impact on locally owned development.
Finally, the first step towards effective
cooperation can be taken at the OECD'S Development
Assistance Committee, as agreed on at the G8
summit in June. So far, however, China has been
skeptical about joining such a mechanism because
its strategic role as a south-south partner would
be at risk. In the end, Beijing is in a perplexing
position: integration in the group would be at
odds with its own agenda, but at the same time it
would suit China's role as a rising power ready
assumes global responsibilities.
Bernt Berger is a research
fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and
Security Policy, Hamburg (IFSH).
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