WRITE for ATol ADVERTISE MEDIA KIT GET ATol BY EMAIL ABOUT ATol CONTACT US
Asia Time Online - Daily News
             
Asia Times Chinese
AT Chinese



    Greater China
     Dec 15, 2007
Page 2 of 2
China leaves the US and India trailing

By M K Bhadrakumar

Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's strategic defiance of Washington would prove to be vacuous once the formidable American juggernaut got cracking down in earnest.

The Indian security community lives in absolute thrall of Israel's capability to stretch its long arm and squash Iran. It was only logical to wait for the morning after Ahmadinejad to do any serious business with Iran. Meanwhile, Delhi assumed that calibrating its Iran policy in terms of US-Israeli thinking was simply the right



thing to do.

Thus, almost across-the-board cooperation with Iran got mothballed. No one talked anymore about the "north-south transportation corridor" that the previous government in Delhi initiated as a means of gaining access to Afghanistan and the Central Asian region (and Russia). The strategic dialogue with Iran on regional security issues lost traction, even though the ascendancy of forces of religious militancy and the Taliban's resurgence demanded it.

The gas pipeline project from Iran via Pakistan to India languished while Delhi seized one pretext or the other for keeping it on the backburner. The 25-year mega LNG deal, which the previous government in Delhi negotiated, has become moribund. The latest banking restrictions imposed by Delhi will discourage even normal trade and investment.

Delhi toes US-Israel line
Without doubt, the imperatives of the on-going negotiations over the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the US left Delhi with hardly any leeway to withstand the combined American and Israeli pressure to curtail India's cooperation with Iran.

But that is only part of the story. On the broader issues of regional security in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Delhi also seemed to have moved with planning within the broad framework of India's rapidly expanding strategic partnership with the US.

Actually, Delhi's estimation wasn't altogether as illogical as it might seem today. It was an approach that fitted with the present Indian government's priorities of harmonizing India's regional policies with the US's global strategies. The thinking ran as follows: the core agenda of the Bush administration's Middle East policy lies in ensuring Israel's regional dominance, and the influence of the neo-conservatives on the Bush administration's foreign policy being what it is and given the challenge Iran poses to Israel's regional dominance, the Bush administration cannot be expected to sit back and allow Tehran to consolidate the strategic influence it gained during the period since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Besides, there was also a quid pro quo. American Congressmen known for their strong links with Israel stood up and constantly began reminding Delhi over the past couple of years that there is nothing like a free lunch. India has enjoyed excellent chemistry with the Jewish lobby and neo-conservative circles in the US in recent years, and they have enormous goodwill towards Delhi and time and again demonstrated their capacity to influence the US Congress, media and the White House over issues affecting Indian interests. (The Israeli lobby in Washington gave a big helping hand canvassing support for the nuclear deal on the Capitol Hill.) Delhi began feeling the heat when middle-level American politicians wantonly began mocking the Indian foreign minister and even addressing the Indian prime minister asking for explanations over Delhi's delay in signing the nuclear cooperation deal.

Furthermore, Indian thinking took into account Washington's sustained efforts in the recent period to bring together the pro-West Arab regimes and Israel in a grouping arrayed against Iran, Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. Delhi concluded that Iran's regional isolation was a foregone conclusion. The underlying assumption, of course, was that the conservative pro-West Arab regimes were in no mood to cohabit with the radical leadership in Tehran and were instead on practically alliance terms with Israel already.

Delhi needs course correction
In the recent period, therefore, India put a deliberate distance between it and what it saw as the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas lineup. But that didn't stop Delhi from voicing support for a two-state solution to the Palestinian problem. The rhetoric remains important for its resonance in Indian domestic politics, considering that India has a huge Muslim electorate which keenly follows developments in the Islamic world. The rhetoric is carefully crafted insofar as it sounds passionately supportive of the Palestinian cause and lends itself to free interpretation while it can cause no annoyance to Israel.

Indian diplomacy has a lot of catching up to do. In the short term, Delhi will have to pay a price for overlooking the geopolitical reality that Iran is the only really viable regional power in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Delhi's best hope is that true to their innate pragmatism, Iranians will let bygones be bygones. The pressure will begin to mount once full-fledged US engagement of Iran commences. Ahmadinejad has said, "It [NIE] is a positive step, a step forward … If they [Bush administration] take one or two more such steps, the issues will be totally changed and ... the way will be paved for the resolution of regional and bilateral issues."

Second, Delhi has no choice but to revisit its blind faith in the US capacity to influence the countries of the Persian Gulf region. The Indian delegation at last Sunday's regional security conference in Manama, Bahrain, saw first hand the derisive reaction by senior Arab officials to the speech by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. The Indian officials realized that contrary to what Delhi imagined, the Gulf Arab regimes have a complex attitude toward Iran.

When Gates maintained that Israel is a benign power while Iran is subverting its neighbors, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani retorted, "We can't really compare Iran with Israel. Iran is our neighbor, and we shouldn't really look at it as an enemy. I think Israel through 50 years has taken land, kicking out the Palestinians, and it interferes under the cover of security." He called on the US to hold direct talks with Iran. Other Arab officials referred to the US's "double standards".

Again, Delhi would have noted that Iran was invited to a Gulf Cooperation Council summit for the first time in Doha on December 2. And it transpired on Tuesday that for the first time ever, Saudi King Abdullah has extended an invitation to the Iranian president to make the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. Equally, there are indications that the Saudis are disappointed with the Annapolis meeting in the US on November 27 to discuss a solution to the Palestinian problem.

Saudi-owned al-Hayat newspaper published from London reported on Sunday that a revival of the Saudi-sponsored Mecca Agreement of February (involving Hamas and Fatah) could be in the works. Hamas' website also reported that Hamas chief Khaled Mishaal, who is based in Damascus, traveled to Riyadh "to discuss means of restoring Palestinian national dialogue". Even thoughtful Israelis like the former spy chief Efraim Halevy feel it's time to negotiate with Hamas' leaders - "the same men his former agency and his nation have targeted for assassination" (to quote The Wall Street Journal).

Clearly, Delhi's simplistic, one-dimensional view of the Persian Gulf lineup, imbued with the vision of the US neo-conservatives - that pro-West Arab regimes plus the US and Israel are fighting an epochal war with Iran - is untenable. The underlying flaws in India's Middle East policy, however, are difficult to jettison as long as the policy remains dovetailed to the US regional agenda. The specter of a Chinese arc of encirclement in the Persian Gulf may just be the stimulus needed for Delhi to seriously introspect where and how its policy floundered in figuring out the Persian puzzle.

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

1 2 Back

 

 

 

 
 



All material on this website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2007 Asia Times Online (Holdings), Ltd.
Head Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East, Central, Hong Kong
Thailand Bureau: 11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110