MONTEREY, California - The Democratic
Progressive Party's (DPP) rejection at the ballot
box over the weekend reflects Taiwanese voters'
disillusionment with an ineffectual ruling party
that has failed to deliver on promises in its
almost eight years in office in the executive
branch.
The island's unimpressive economic
performance, partisan gridlock and government
corruption, including President Chen Shui-bian's
family members, further undermined the
electability of DPP candidates, who in effect
became the casualties of his presidency.
But what is most significant, perhaps, is
that Chen's Taiwan
identity card failed to win
DPP votes. On the contrary, voters were concerned
that Chen's provocative policy, in particular his
United Nations bid under the name of Taiwan, could
severely strain Taipei's ties with Washington,
even as it provokes the mainland. Beijing views
Chen's move as another step toward declaring
independence and vows to respond resolutely.
Saturday's election results raise hope
that the March 22 presidential elections are
Kuomintang (KMT)candidate Ma Ying-jeou's to lose.
However, if the US presidential primaries tell us
anything, not to mention the many surprises in
Taiwan's previous presidential elections, it would
be a mistake to predict that Ma will now cruise to
victory.
First, the dynamic of
presidential elections is quite different from
that of legislative ones, and second, while the
DPP only claimed 27 seats, it received close to
38% of the votes cast.
Whatever the
outcome of the March 22 elections, several
scenarios can be predicted, and they have
different implications for cross-strait relations.
A win for Ma would usher in a period of relative
stability, with the possibility of expanded
economic, social and even political contacts. It
would be easier for the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) and the KMT, as a returning ruling party
that controls both the legislative and executive
branches, to enter into negotiations based on the
"92 Consensus" on the so-called one-China
principle, a sticking point between the mainland
and the Chen administration over the past eight
years.
It is not unlikely, although it
still requires courage and wisdom in both Beijing
and Taipei, to come to terms on ending the
hostility across the strait, and exploring
possible mechanisms to manage political exchanges
between the two sides. At the minimum, tension
could be significantly reduced,
confidence-building measures introduced and mutual
assurance of the status quo accepted.
What
would benefit the two sides most could be direct
trade, transport and postal ties - the so-called
"three links" that could further strengthen
economic ties and people-to-people exchanges
between the mainland and Taiwan. This is crucial
for Taiwan's businesses, which increasingly depend
on the mainland as manufacturing bases and
outposts for exports to third destinations. Taiwan
has already invested over US$100 billion in China,
with 1 million Taiwanese living and working there.
This scenario would also be conducive to
US foreign policy interests. Indeed, Washington
has become increasingly worried and even
frustrated with Chen's provocation. Ma's election
would allow the US to concentrate on its top
national priorities without distraction. A stable
and peaceful Taiwan Strait, along with the
resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue,
could also give East Asia the peace and stability
essential for the region's economic growth and
prosperity.
Should new DPP chairman Frank
Hsieh retain the presidency for the DPP - which
appears even more remote given Saturday's election
results, but not impossible, pragmatism rather
than provocation would likely prevail. Facing an
even more formidable opposition in the
legislature, Hsieh would have no choice but to
work with the KMT-controlled Legislative Yuan to
further his domestic agenda. And his mainland
policy could also be greatly constrained.
Saturday's elections were closely watched
by Beijing, as will be the more important March 22
presidential elections. China has so far remained
low key, reflective of the new approach to Taiwan
it has adopted since Hu Jintao assumed China's top
leadership position in 2002. Beijing has shifted
from reactive behavior to clear postulation of
bottom-line positions, with the near-term focus on
deterring Taiwan's attempt for permanent
separation or de jure independence.
The
Anti-Secession Law of 2005, while controversial at
the time of its deliberation and passage,
nonetheless served as a legal basis for the
mainland to resort to non-peaceful means in
response to Taipei's move toward independence. At
the same time, Beijing also seeks to retain the
maximum flexibility in its interpretation to avoid
self-entrapment in the use of force.
Meanwhile, following the policy of
entrusting confidence in the Taiwan people,
Beijing has encouraged greater cross-strait
economic, social and cultural and in general
people-to-people contacts, continued to isolate
the few elements in Taiwan's polity that are
considered determined independence-seekers and
"trouble makers". Thus it has extended an olive
branch to the CCP's erstwhile nemesis, the KMT,
and to the post-Chen Shui-bian Taiwan, as Hu's
latest report to the 17th Party Congress
indicated. Greater economic interdependence and
indeed Taiwan's growing dependence on the mainland
for labor and market serves to dissuade and disarm
the Taiwanese business community from supporting
the pan-Green (DPP)movement.
Hu's
ostensibly conciliatory and more confident
approach to the Taiwan issue reflects China's
confidence in its growing power and influence in
both regional and global affairs. Beijing
recognizes the role that the US can play in
reining in Taiwanese independence, even as it
continues its military preparation to deter and
respond to such scenarios.
With the KMT's
victory on Saturday and possibly Ma's in March,
Hu's policy seems to be vindicated and paying off.
After 60 years of hostility and alienation, a new
era of reconciliation and rapprochement between
the mainland and Taiwan may be in the offing.
Dr Jing-dong Yuan is director of
East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the James
Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies and an
associate professor of International Policy
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International
Studies.
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