Page 2 of
2 India
could yet play the 'China'
hand By M D
Nalapat
northern prong. Small wonder that
Chinese President Hu Jintao, has given a much
higher priority toward better relations with India
than his predecessor Jiang Zemin.
While
Beijing tries to woo New Delhi away from an
embrace with Washington, the Chinese leadership
has tried to ensure that India does not gain
significantly from any China concession. The
reality is that the relationship between India and
China is more competitive than complementary.
While China needs to overcome
India's current advantage in
computer software and in other fields of the
knowledge economy, India will have to become a
manufacturing platform that can rival China if the
country is to ensure a high level of blue-collar
employment.
In short, both will ultimately
poach on the other's turf as they are competing
for the same markets and sources of technology.
Thus, there is a limit to the distance China will
go in seeking to convince New Delhi that it has
morphed into a close friend. There will need to be
much more atmospherics than substance, and the CCP
leadership will be hoping that India takes such
intangible "gains" or, as some Chinese experts
call it, "sweet water".
In the World Trade
Organization (WTO)as well as in talks on climate
change, any linkage with China would prove
self-defeating for India, and the fact that these
exist at all is testimony to the influence of the
Communist partners of the present United
Progressive Alliance government, and to their
devotion to the interests of China. In the case of
the WTO, while India is moving away from a
manufacturing to a service-based economy, and thus
has a different basket of needs from China, in the
case of the talks on climate change, for example
at Bali, the now-automatic linkage of India with
China disguises the very different contributions
of both towards affecting the climate.
While China is fast catching up with the
United States as the polluter par excellence,
India is far behind in the quantum of emissions
that is spewed out of its territory. Should the
government ever become independent of its
Communist parties - as may take place after the
next general election - there is little doubt that
New Delhi would seek to distance itself from China
in matters where the two no longer share a common
interest. Today, subservience in official policy
to a perceived ideal such as Third World
solidarity will eventually give way to a more
rational approach that places the country's
interests first, and then it may be evident that
very few of these follow the same trajectory as
those of China.
Opposition from the
Pakistani army, which would be the loser in case
India and China came together, will most likely
derail any early settlement of the border, even
one as obvious as the alignment of Indian and
Chinese maps across the Line of Actual Control
between the two. As for the military cooperation,
the reality is that China has much less to offer
India than the United States.
According to
sources within the Indian strategic establishment,
some have begun discussing a possible transfer of
the USS Kitty Hawk to India after the ship is
decommissioned from the US Navy in less than a
year's time. The induction of this ship would mean
the opening of the substantial Indian market for
military aircraft since the carrier would need a
complement of US aircraft to give it strike
capability. Such an induction may open the door
for US aircraft such as the F-18 to be
commissioned into the Indian Air Force, to replace
the French and Russian aircraft that the Indian
Air Force is using.
In contrast to the
one-off military exercises with China, those
between the services within the Indian military
and their US counterparts are expanding in scope
and number, with India to join NATO forces in the
upcoming Red Flag exercises. Should the United
States free itself of its earlier policy of
relying on Pakistan to the exclusion of India,
ground realities and mutual needs would together
work to ensure a warming of military-to-military
ties.
China's dilemma is not only that it
is not in its interest to offer India any
substantive concessions. The reality is that it
has few to give, except the negative ones of - for
example - stopping assistance to Pakistan in its
nuclear and missile programs, a situation that
seems unlikely at best. In contrast, the United
States comes with a much more attractive dowry.
The odds are that in the contest for the
strategic affections of India, it is the United
States that will emerge as the preferred choice,
rather than China. In brief, even as economic ties
deepen between India and China and thereby its
strategic partnership, India may within the next
decade "do a China" on China, by linking up with
Washington the way Beijing did with the world's
most powerful country in the 1970s.
Notes 1. See, India, China relations getting
better and better by Sheela Bhatt on
Professor Ma Jiali. 2. Between 1965 and 1968,
Beijing provided extensive assistance to Hanoi in
weapons, equipment as well as support troops. See,
"China's Attitude Toward Vietnam Peace Talks,
1965-1968" by Qiang Zhai, Auburn University,
Montgomery. 3. This assertion is backed by
facts such as (a) continued US reluctance to enter
Pakistani territory (even the "lawless" parts
where "central writ does not run") to pursue and
eliminate jihadi nests and (b) the reliance on
information from Pakistan sources for identifying
just which "former Taliban" elements are now
friendly.
Professor M D Nalapat
is director of the School of Geopolitics of the
Manipal Academy of Higher Education, India.
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