India's vision blurs over
China By Zorawar Daulet Singh
NEW DELHI - On concluding his recent visit
to China, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
remarked, "President Hu [Jintao] recognized the
problems in Pakistan and agreed that a strong,
stable, moderate Pakistan is in India's interests
and in the interests of Asia," and it was
"necessary for both India and China to consult
each other more frequently".
Earlier, a
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, on the
Hu-Manmohan talks, noted, "The two leaders agreed
to strengthen their consultation and communication
for the peace and stability in the South Asia
region so as to make joint efforts for the
stability there."
If one takes the long
view of the many geopolitical futures for
South Asia, the above
comments reflect a strategic opportunity for New
Delhi to consider – namely, the possibility for
the two giant neighbors to discuss and perhaps
even collaborate to stabilize a piece of strategic
real estate that if it spirals out of control will
influence both states adversely. But that's not
all. The prospect of an accelerating US presence
in close proximity to India's western frontiers,
and to China's southern periphery, further suggest
that it is in both nations' interests to ensure
that the US does not entrench itself in a "common"
neighborhood, and leverage that position to play
geopolitical arbiter in the southern rim of
Eurasia and beyond.
Prospects for such
"strategic cooperation", however distant or
preposterous, are further reinforced by the fact
that, for both India and China, sustaining their
internal socio-economic rejuvenation is likely to
constitute the central goal of their grand
strategies for the next few decades. Thus, very
simply, neither can afford instability or "great
games" on their peripheries.
The Eagle
returns The primary factor that demands a
re-evaluation of entrenched Indian attitudes
regarding China's view of Pakistan stems from the
new situation that arose since America's dramatic
reentry into South Asian affairs since late 2001.
The two seemingly enduring triangles in South
Asian international relations - India-Pakistan-US
(IPA) and India-Pakistan-China (IPC) - have come
together to infuse a new geopolitical dynamic in
the subcontinent.
Now while the Indian
strategic community exclusively focuses on the
sinister record of the latter triangle, namely the
China-Pakistan entente, the former triangle has
assumed far greater strategic significance for
India since 2001, when Washington re-activated its
Cold War alliance with Islamabad, ostensibly to
prosecute the "war on terror" in Afghanistan in
the aftermath of September 11.
In sum, the
burden of Pakistan's security has largely shifted
from one external guarantor, China, to another,
the US. Ironically, New Delhi, unwilling or unable
to wholly confront this geopolitical great power
exchange, and by persisting with its focus on the
China-Pakistan linkage, is completely unprepared
for the emerging South Asian balance of power.
Insofar as US re-engagement with South
Asia since September 11 and its resumption of
playing a pivotal role in Pakistani affairs lends
legitimacy to China's own engagement with
Pakistan, the IPC triangle is kept alive by
Beijing with little costs in its bilateral
relationship with New Delhi. Noted China scholar,
John Garver has made this point when he opined
that Beijing has in fact benefited from American
intervention in Pakistani affairs after September
11, since it reduced China's burden of preserving
the regime in Islamabad and sustaining the
Pakistani state.
To be sure, China since
the early 1990s, prior to Washington's much
acclaimed South Asian de-hyphenation, has
transmitted subtle signals (ie taking a detached
position on the Kashmir dispute) that suggested an
envisaged de-hyphenation of Beijing's relationship
with India and Pakistan (ie pro-Pakistan to
neutrality in Indo-Pakistani relations). The same
was reiterated most recently during Hu Jintao's
visit to India in November 2006, where the premier
stated that China does not seek "selfish gains"in
South Asia. In fact, this nuanced stance was to
signal to Pakistan (and other smaller South Asian
states) that an anti-India policy will not receive
support from Beijing and for New Delhi that it
would not use its influence with South Asian
states in anti-India activities.
In
essence, it was a type of reassurance strategy
that aspired to alleviate Indian threat
perceptions and to prevent China's entrapment in
intra-South Asian disputes. The declaration of a
"strategic partnership" with India during the
Wen-Manmohan summit in April 2005 was another
signal of Chinese disengagement from a
Pakistan-centric South Asia policy. Of course, to
the dismay of most Indian analysts, Beijing has
been unwilling to abandon its
"multidimensional"relationship with Islamabad
altogether. And, it is unlikely to do so in the
foreseeable future.
However, even here, it
is vital to appreciate that Sino-Pakistani
relations have more variables, at least for China,
than simply an anti-India hedge: First, China
seeks to balance US influence and vice-versa; a
typical great power response. Second, Pakistan
serves as a potential geoeconomic "bridgehead" to
China's West Asian energy interests and access to
the sea. Third, Pakistan also plays an
intermediary role in China's engagement in the
Greater Middle East. Fourth, an unstable Pakistan
will adversely affect Xinjiang province with its
60% non-Han population.
Nonetheless, the
IPA triangle has come to the fore as the dominant
variable in the Indo-Pakistani relationship. It is
now fairly evident that the US, like to China, is
unwilling to abandon Pakistan for a deeper
bilateral equation with India. In fact, the
fundamental premise of US's South Asia policy is
preserving the strategic gains that emerged from
the post-September 11 window of opportunity to
dehyphenate its relationship with India and
Pakistan.
Insofar as a convergence of
interests with the US's "war on terror" in
Afghanistan is perceived by the security
establishment in New Delhi, this has further
ensured that New Delhi has been willing to conform
to US's regional agenda, and has consequently been
unable or unwilling to forge an independent policy
vis-a-vis Islamabad. In fact, popular opinion in
New Delhi has been prepared to take a benign or
even favorable perspective on US policy vis-a-vis
Pakistan and its implications for the trajectory
on Indo-Pakistani relations, thereby greatly
easing any contradictions for Washington's much
valued de-hyphenation.
Pertinent facts,
such as, the bulk of US military aid to Pakistan
over the past five years has been used to acquire
American conventional military systems more useful
vis-a-vis India, and evidence on US's role in
aiding and abetting Pakistan's road to nuclear
weapons (almost in parallel track to Beijing's
covert support), are either dismissed without
serious reflection or ignored altogether.
Quite clearly, New Delhi's belief that the
US would serve Indian interests in Afghanistan,
and the hope that Washington would or could roll
back the Pakistani military's irredentist
aspirations has been tragically misplaced. An
important cause for Indian delusion regarding US's
role in South Asia is largely because New Delhi
itself is seeking to deepen its links with the
Washington, and is thus willing to overlook US's
policies in the region and their implications for
longer-term Indian interests.
India in
a multipolar South Asia In an age of "open
regionalism", the aura of India's geopolitical
primacy over South Asia has been shattered.
Indeed, New Delhi's inability to shape its
periphery, a result of political and bureaucratic
obduracy, has accommodated the presence of outside
powers in South Asia. We are now in an age where
pluralism or multipolarity is the dominant
structure in regional (and global) security
affairs. If this is indeed the structural reality
in South Asia, and one adopts the timeless maxim
that there are "no permanent enemies"in
international politics, then New Delhi must be
unsentimental in its pursuit of restoring a
modicum of stability and influence in the
subcontinent. And since two major actors - US and
China - are engaged at varying degrees in the
affairs of almost all states on India's periphery,
it would be impulsive for New Delhi to take a
biased perspective on this great power
competition.
The latest Hu-Manmohan joint
vision statement notes: "The two sides take a
positive view on each other's participation in
sub-regional multilateral cooperation processes
between like-minded countries, including South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Bay of
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation and Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. The two sides hold that this does
not affect either country's existing friendly
relations or cooperation with other countries."
In sum, both states have acknowledged each
other's participation in sub-regional theatres and
on a multivector basis.
The statement goes
on to note, "The two sides positively view each
others' participation in regional processes and
agree to strengthen their coordination and
consultation within regional cooperation
mechanisms ... to explore together and with other
countries a new architecture for closer regional
cooperation in Asia, and to make joint efforts for
further regional integration of Asia."
The
above vision could lay the foundation for the
initiation of a new India-China strategic
dialogue, though not exclusively, over Pakistan.
Now any collaboration between India and China
would naturally imply a convergence of interests,
albeit tactical. An important shared perspective
might be keeping the South Asian neighborhood free
from an overbearing great power presence. That US
strategic presence in close proximity to India's
western frontiers has not brought about the
geopolitical benefits originally envisaged by New
Delhi is gradually being recognized. American
obstruction into the evolution of normal
inter-state relations between Tehran and New
Delhi, especially in the vital sphere of energy
security is a case in point.
Beijing's
grand strategy lays a strong emphasis on
preserving stability on its southern and western
periphery, given the undiminished security
calculus over Tibet and Xinjiang, Chinese
provinces populated by restive minorities.
Beijing's policies in Central Asia and its
cooperation with Russia to stabilize the region
after September 11, 2001, was driven largely by a
desire to counterbalance the prospect of a
sustained American military presence on China's
vulnerable western frontiers.
In a similar
vein, it is arguably in Beijing's interest to see
that India's foreign policy autonomy is preserved,
for internal discord in India's polity make it an
attractive target for external penetrations in
multidimensional - political, economic, military -
spheres. Thus, paradoxically, China would not wish
to see India lose control over its periphery
(which partially overlaps with China's), for any
vacuum when filled by a great power will create a
formidable challenge for Beijing's security
planners.
Finally, there are tangential
geopolitical benefits that could accrue to New
Delhi by issue-based cooperation with China.
First, India-China cooperation may provide India
with much needed leverage vis-a-vis Washington,
both on the latter's greatly exposed Pakistan
policy and in moving forward with constructive
geoeconomic links with Iran. Second, it could
provide a signal to Pakistan that it should wisely
appraise the evolution of its alliance with the
US, and that other options for economic
development and security are available to
Islamabad.
Third, a strategic dialogue has
the potential to become a mechanism for bilateral
confidence-building between Beijing and New Delhi
itself, and, alleviating "threat perceptions" on
both sides of the Himalayas. A periodic dialogue
would help both states in gauging each other's
intentions, which for too long have been filtered
through the tainted prism of Cold Warriors.
Arguably, it could be an important step toward
alleviating the intractable "security dilemma"
between India and China.
Is this not the
essence of "cooperative security"?
Zorawar Daulet Singh, who holds
a master's degree in international relations from
the School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University, is an international
relations analyst based in New Delhi
zorawar.dauletsingh@gmail.com.
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