Page 1 of 2 SPEAKING FREELY The peacekeeping dragon is on safari
By Yin He
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Last November 24, a 140-person advance detachment of a 350-person Chinese
peacekeeping engineering force arrived in Niyala, capital of the South Darfur
state of Sudan, as part of the first batch of United Nations peacekeeping force
deployed in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
(UNAMID).
China's contribution to UNAMID is a positive contribution to the
situation in Darfur in line with efforts by the UN to create a 26,000-strong
peacekeeping force for the ambitious hybrid mission authorized by the Security
Council resolution 1769 on July 31, 2007.
China's growing profile
Currently, China has a total of 1,975 People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops and
civilian police officers in 13 out of the 17 UN peacekeeping operations
(UNPKO). It has overtaken France to rank number 11 among the 119 troop
contributing countries (TCC) and is the top contributor among the United
Nations Security Council's permanent five members (P-5).
Most notably, 74% of Chinese peacekeepers are deployed in eight UNPKO in
war-torn and poverty-stricken Africa, more than twice as many as those by the
top 32 industrialized countries combined. Since its first dispatch of five
military observers to the United Nations' Truce Supervision Organization
(UNTSO) in 1990, China has contributed about 9,000 peacekeepers to 22 UNPKO,
more than the rest of the P-5 combined.
Also, while Beijing's contribution of 2.67% of the general UN budget and
peacekeeping budget is less than that of most of the P-5 members, it represents
a 168% increase in Chinese contribution since 2000, and the contribution seems
likely to increase in the coming years.
China currently adopts a relatively active policy with regards to UN
peacekeeping, especially when compared with its past history. In the 1970s,
China avoided participating in any peacekeeping-related affairs due to its
persistent normative concerns regarding state sovereignty and nonintervention,
as well as its disagreement with the two superpowers' international behavior.
In the 1980s, due to its need for a favorable international environment for the
sake of its economic development-oriented reform and opening up strategy, China
quickly adjusted its attitude towards UN peacekeeping by providing financial
support for UNPKO and by participating in UNSC voting; although it chose to
abstain altogether most of the time. During this period, China still refrained
from contributing any peacekeepers.
In the 1990s, due to the urgent need to break through the international
isolation following the 1989 Tiananmen event, and as a means to restore a
favorable international environment for its modernization strategy, China
further adjusted its conservative attitude towards UN peacekeeping by
selectively dispatching military observes to UNPKO and once even provided two
PLA engineering units to the United Nations' Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC). However, taking into consideration the surge of UNPKO in the post Cold
War era, Beijing's total contribution of 437 military observers and 800
engineering troops to five UNPKO in the whole period of 1990s can be regarded
as being merely symbolic and means it was far from an active peacekeeper.
China's deployment of a civilian police contingent to the United Nations'
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in early 2000 marked a new
era for its participation in UNPKO. Chinese police officers were authorized by
the UN to carry pistols and patrol the community of a foreign country. With
this deployment, China for the first time signaled that a UNPKO with an
enforcement-featured mandate could be politically acceptable. One year later,
China sent five police officers to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNMIBH).
In March 2003, 218 logistical troops, including a 175-person engineering
company and a 43-person medical unit, were sent to the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). This was
the first time China sent military units to UNPKO after 1992. Despite the fact
that the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was attacked by US missiles during the
NATO-led Kosovo intervention in 1998, China dispatched a 12-person police
contingent to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in April 2004.
After this, Beijing also sent logistical troops to UNPKO in Liberia, Sudan and
Lebanon. On September 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced in Beijing
that China would like to increase its peacekeeping presence of 182 troops in
Lebanon to 1,000 even though one Chinese military observer was killed and three
others injured a few weeks before in the Israel-Lebanon conflict.
China's growing flexibility in its long-held position on the use of force by
peacekeepers was further proved by its high-profile participation in the United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In 2004, following the
outbreak of violence in Haiti, Beijing not only pushed for the establishment of
the mission, but also dispatched a 125-person formed police unit (FPU) to
MINUSTAH. Armed with advanced riot control equipment ranging from batons to
armored personnel carriers (APC), the China FPU assisted the Haitian National
Police (HNP) launching numerous operations fighting the anti-government armed
rebels entrenched in the most volatile places such as Cit Soleil.
China's increasing commitment to UNPKO can be also witnessed through its
deliberate efforts to improve its training capabilities and its increased
participation in international cooperation and exchange activities. Both the
military and police have set up their own state-of-the-art training facilities.
Chinese officials in charge of peacekeeping affairs are increasingly seen in
international security seminars and conferences voicing their thoughts and
networking.
Chinese peacekeeping trainers are also participating in peacekeeping training
courses abroad and have been traveling to mission areas as UN peacekeepers
themselves and to conduct facts-finding missions in the field. The Chinese
peacekeepers also receive training assistance from the UN and other countries,
in particular the Western countries with rich peacekeeping experience such as
Britain, France, Norway and Sweden.
A new diplomatic strategy
While examining China's reasons for its changing policy on UNPKO in today's
context, many observers tend to focus on factors such as the Taiwan Issue or
China's quest for natural resources like oil. One cannot deny that China's
support for UNPKO in some war-torn countries such as Sudan and Liberia may
yield favorable access to raw materials or improved diplomatic relations to
counter Taiwan's checkbook diplomacy to gain international recognition.
However, China's policy on UNPKO should be put in a broader Chinese diplomatic
context of globalization, China's growing international profile, as well as its
changing internal and external environment.
Take Haiti for example, China does hope for Haiti to shift its diplomatic
recognition from Taipei to Beijing. However, considering Haiti's long-held
pro-Taiwan policy, including its consistent support for Taiwan to become a
member state in the UN, China could have in response, snubbed Haiti by
recalling its FPU or terminate MINUSTAH by vetoing the UNSC resolution on the
extension of the Haiti mission, just like it did to Macedonia in early 1999
when Macedonia pledged allegiance to Taiwan. However, as a reflection of
China's growing diplomatic sophistication compared to a few years ago, it no
longer uses this heavy-handed approach in its dealings with Haiti. China has
decided to prioritize its grand diplomatic strategy regarding UNPKO, which has
been formulated from the late 1990s.
In all, the major incentives for China's shift of policy on UNPKO can be mainly
attributed to its strategic agenda such as its desire to shoulder a great
power's due responsibility for international order, its intention to advocate
multilateralism by supporting the UN, and its desire to help create world peace
and security, which serves as one of the key prerequisites for its own peaceful
rise and development.
It should also be pointed out that China has been experiencing an annual gross
domestic product (GDP) growth of 9.6% and maintained a generally stable social
and political environment for the past three decades. Such development has in
turn contributed
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