China's unprecedented industrial growth
over the last two decades has raised the question
of whether it now poses a threat to the security
of the United States economically, militarily, or
both. Economically, the extent to which China
truly threatens the US depends at least in part on
the chauvinistic assumption that any potential
challenge to absolute US global economic dominance
is threatening.
On the military question,
the answer is much clearer. China is not a
military threat to the US. Only those who believe
that Fu Manchu is alive and well in the Middle
Kingdom and fulfilling his dreams of world
domination through a large and aggressive army,
air force, and navy still subscribe to a notion
that China poses a
global military threat.
Several recent books on the Chinese military
perpetuate this myth. Their titles reveal
everything: Imagined Enemies: China Prepares
for Uncertain War, by John Wilson Lewis and
Xue Litai for instance, or Showdown: Why China
Wants War with the United States by by Jed
Babbin and Edward Timperlake.
These and numerous similar
narratives share an alarmist tone combined with a
dearth of relevant facts in support of their
claims. These books suffer from such flaws for
good reason. The facts belie the claims,
especially when placed in comparative perspective.
When it comes to the putative Chinese military
threat, the numbers simply don't add up.
Crunching the numbers Much has been made
of the double-digit increase in Chinese defense
spending over the last three years. China has
indeed increased its spending. But much of the
additional expenditures have been devoted to
upgrading information, weapons, and communications
systems. At the same time, China has cut troop
strength to almost half of what it was in 1990.
Moreover, the estimate of military expenditures
for 2006 is $35 billion. That is about 7% of the
US defense budget, once the costs of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan are factored in. Even before
including these latter expenditures the US
military budget is now larger than the defense
budgets of all other nations combined. Almost
surely China's actual military expenditures are
larger than the 2006 estimate. But even if the
military budget is twice as large, $70 billion is
still less than 15% of the US total and less than
what was spent in Iraq and Afghanistan last year
alone.
In terms of ground forces, the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has an active duty
component of 2.3 million personnel. That's a lot
of soldiers, but the US has 1.4 million, with less
than one-fourth of the population. True, the
Chinese have reserve forces of another million
plus. But they are responsible, among other
things, for patrolling more than 8,000 miles of
borders with India and Russia - not always the
friendliest of neighbors in the past - functions
the US military does not perform at the Canadian
and Mexican borders. Moreover, despite the supply
breakdown scandal in Iraq, the 1.4 million US
troops are much better equipped overall than their
Chinese counterparts, few of whom have
state-of-the-art support materiel or personal
safety equipment.
The PLA's air force
capabilities, meanwhile, are no match in quality
for the US either defensively or offensively. Many
of China's aircraft models are over 40 years old.
Certainly the mainland forces pose a threat to
Taiwan, but Taiwan's own modern air force should
not be underestimated. And with the recent
electoral defeat of Chen Shui-bian’s Democratic
Progressive Party by the pro-mainland Kuomintang,
political and military tensions are likely to
decrease markedly. Beijing can be very patient in
waiting for a rapprochement with Taiwan.
At sea China’s weakest link is
naval. It has no blue ocean navy, and it is
difficult to imagine how it could dream of
building one. Of the 21 large aircraft carriers
operational in the world right now, 12 are
American, with a total landing space of 75 acres.
The carriers belonging to the rest of the world
have 15 acres altogether. None of the other
aircraft carriers belongs to China. So, the score
is rather lopsided on the naval front: the United
States 12, China 0.
The picture is similar
for submarines. In a 2005 Atlantic Monthly article
Robert Kaplan issued the dire warning that "The
Middle East is just a blip. The American military
contest with China in the Pacific will define the
21st century. And China will be a more formidable
adversary than Russia ever was." Kaplan cites as
one important piece of "evidence" supporting his
doom and gloom scenarios the fact that "The
Chinese are investing in both diesel-powered and
nuclear-powered submarines - a clear signal that
they intend not only to protect their coasts but
also to expand their influence far out into the
Pacific."
In the first place, the Chinese
might have a hard time "expanding their influence
far out into the Pacific" because so many US
soldiers, sailors, marines, and air force
personnel are already stationed in the region.
There are 18,000 troops stationed in Alaska,
60,000 in Hawaii, 37,000 in Japan, 5,000 on Guam,
and 30,000 in South Korea. Again, the Chinese
number is zero. The United States has over 700
military installations outside its borders
overall, while the Chinese have none at present.
Kaplan's supposedly "clear signal" of
expansion rests on the fact that the Chinese
already have 55 submarines, and have a few more
under construction. But 50 of these are
diesel-powered and hence must surface or
near-surface every few days to take in oxygen.
This makes them more vulnerable to detection and
destruction (by US reconnaissance satellites and
missile launchers) than nuclear submarines.
Although formidable vessels, these diesel
submarines are in the end not even a secure
defense against the highly sophisticated
technology of the world's sole superpower, let
alone a military threat to it. Strictly in terms
of deterrence, then, it is unsurprising that the
Chinese would like more nuclear-powered submarines
than the five that are currently operational for
protecting their shores.
On the other
hand, the US currently has 72 submarines, all of
which are nuclear-powered. And more are on the
way, including the Virginia-class attack
submarine, not a vessel designed for defense.
Perhaps most frightening for the Chinese are the
US underwater capabilities in the Pacific, where
the Navy maintains two-thirds of its strategic
submarine forces. "At least two of these
submarines are kept on 'hard alert' in the Pacific
at all times, meaning they’re ready to fire within
15 minutes of a launch order," write Keir Lieber
and Daryl Press. "Since each submarine carries 24
nuclear-tipped missiles with an average of six
warheads per missile, commanders have almost 300
warheads ready for immediate use. This is more
than enough to assign multiple warheads to each of
the 18 silos in which the Chinese have nuclear
missiles capable of reaching the US. Chinese
leaders would have little or no warning of the
attack."
Finally, China has 100-400
nuclear weapons. But only the 18 silos mentioned
above are capable of striking the western
continental United States and these cannot be
launched quickly. Unless fired as a first-strike
weapon, they could easily be destroyed. The United
States, on the other hand, has almost 10,000
nuclear warheads and sufficient delivery
capabilities to obliterate every Chinese city with
a population of a half-million or more, and still
have more than enough of a stockpile to hold the
rest of the world at bay.
Who fears
whom? It should thus be clear that the
Chinese have much better grounds for fearing the
United States than the other way around, and this
holds true not only in terms of actual military
capabilities, but also in the readiness and
willingness to use them. Unlike the US, which has
well over a quarter of a million troops stationed
overseas with attendant army, naval, and air force
weapons and delivery systems equal to the rest of
the world together, the entire Chinese army, navy,
and air force are based within its own borders,
and shooting at no one.
Absent future US
provocation, the Chinese will not likely try to
match the US militarily as the former Soviet Union
did. First, the costs would be prohibitive.
Building a blue-ocean navy, for example, would
require not only the construction and deployment
of aircraft carriers, but escorts and supply ships
for them, and other ships for other purposes. This
new navy would have to be very large, as active in
the Indian Ocean as in the Pacific in order to
keep sea lanes secure for oil deliveries necessary
for the economy. It would necessitate increasing
significantly the number of airplanes built and
deployed, fighters and bombers alike. And it would
require large expenditures for standard operations
at sea, and of course maintenance, plus the
salaries and benefits of the much larger
complement of personnel that such a build-up would
require.
Even if the Chinese economy could
absorb the costs of building and maintaining such
an expanded navy, however, it would be fairly
ineffective without many overseas bases to refuel
and resupply the fleet(s), and the Chinese
government would be extremely reluctant to seek
such bases. In terms of physical size,
demographics, and industrial output China dwarfs
the Southeast Asian countries on or near its
borders. It has been actively engaged since the
beginning of the century in forming trade and
other agreements with ASEAN not only to play down
its Goliath image but also to develop markets
closer to home in order to avoid dependency on the
US market, cut transportation costs, and reduce
military expenditures. It is in the Middle
Kingdom's best interest to form closer ties with
South Korea and Japan as well. This will clearly
be easier if its military forces continue to be
seen as fundamentally defensive in nature, with no
bases abroad. The same applies to China's
relations with India. The two countries share a
long border and have an equally strong interest in
keeping the Indian Ocean open to the commerce
necessary for both Asian giants to continue their
economic development, as Prime Minister Singh's
recent state visit to Beijing underscored.
Head to head? A significant
number of people profit greatly from the present
US defense budget. Since even people with little
knowledge of military tactics realize that
aircraft carriers and nuclear attack submarines
are worthless for deterring ideologically driven
young people from strapping IEDs to their waists,
a more compelling threat must be conjured up to
justify increased Pentagon spending. Since the end
of the Cold War, China has become the candidate of
choice among illusionist hawks.
Confrontation with China is not, however,
inevitable. Perhaps the best reason for China not
to seek a blue-ocean navy comes from an initially
most unlikely source: The US Navy. Its former
head, Admiral Michael Mullen proposed a "Thousand
Ship Navy" (TSN) that would mark "a new chapter in
cooperation as it emphasizes the management of
shared security interests of all maritime
nations". China could become a significant
component of this TSN, and thus keep its shipping
lanes secure at relatively little cost beyond
present expenditures. Given the fact that 90% of
all world trade and almost 70% of all petroleum is
transported by sea, it clearly behooves both
countries to cooperate closely to keep the
maritime commons free of pirates, terrorists, and
drug traffickers. Cooperation at sea is equally
needed for missions of humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief.
Unfortunately, the highly
invasive foreign policies of the US, combined with
its overwhelming military superiority, provide the
Chinese with very good reasons to continue
distrusting US motives (including the TSN). It is
therefore the responsibility of the US to take
meaningful initiatives to build support for closer
cooperation with the soon-to-be world's second
largest economic power. Some of those initiatives
would deal directly with China, such as providing
materiel and advanced training for the Chinese
military to conduct search-and-rescue missions.
The US could also foster far greater trust
and cooperation specifically with the Chinese by
clarifying the US's position toward Taiwan. Taipei
should understand that the US will come to its
immediate aid in case of attack. But should Taipei
seek independence and a seat at the UN, Washington
will use all its diplomatic strength to insure
that other nations do not recognize these claims.
The US could also signal to China that it
is willing to be a more cooperative international
player. For instance, the US could significantly
reduce its nuclear stockpile and renounce the
first-strike use of nuclear weapons, as China did
long ago. It should also sign and ratify the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea as 155 nations
have done (including China) since it was
promulgated in 1982. Ending the brutal occupation
of Iraq is another global measure, as would
placing US troops in Afghanistan under UN
administration and signing a peace treaty with
North Korea (55 years after the cease-fire).
Holding out an olive branch to Iran, and stopping
the one-sided US support of the Israelis would
also provide clear signals to the Chinese and the
rest of the world of a major shift in US foreign
policy.
A reduction of US threats to the
world - from nuclear weapons, regional wars such
as Iraq and Afghanistan, and potential conflicts
with Iran and North Korea - would decrease the
likelihood of confrontation with China as well as
undercut any rationale for China's own increased
military spending. Such a shift in US national
security strategy would not only increase the
security of China and the US but the world as
well.
Henry Rosemont, Jr, a
contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, is
distinguished professor emeritus at St Mary's
College of Maryland and a visiting scholar in the
Religious Studies department at Brown University.
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