Page 1 of 3 Tibet a defining issue for China
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - Even looking at history with the best intentions, there is no history
proving - or disproving, from the Tibetan side - the present relationship
between Tibet and Beijing. The reality is that history, which has been used as
ideology for centuries in China, can no longer work for present China to
justify its territory.
In fact, China doesn't need to look to history to validate its present
territory. Geopolitics provides a good enough motive. However, doing away with
history when considering Tibet creates an empty space in modern Chinese
ideology, and replacing history with simple geopolitics could be very
dangerous: there must be policies building consensus in and out of China as
well. At the end of the day, the source of the problems with Tibet is bad
governance - including the fact that Beijing can't forget that many
Tibetans are loyal to the Dalai Lama.
For centuries, history - its management and manipulation - has been the compass
to create the necessary ideological paradigm to rule China. It's possible that
the fascination with Marxism at the beginning of the last century was due to
its historical materialism, which resonated with key aspects of the Chinese
cultural character: a passion for history and a very practical nature. The two
elements, history and practice, seemed to have gone hand-in-hand for centuries.
However, the present Tibet crisis, occurring in an open world, challenges this
compass in an unprecedented manner, and it could force China to look for a
different compass. Practice and practical reasons no longer seem consistent
with history and its manipulation, which are challenged to the point of being
untenable. Geopolitical reasons, tempered with a sense of measure and harmony,
could arguably provide China with a better paradigm to look at both modern and
ancient history.
In fact, the March 14 uprising in Lhasa and the ensuing demonstrations in areas
of China populated by ethnic Tibetans created a series of issues for the future
of the country. These challenges go beyond the simple scope of the protests and
far beyond the pressing issue of assuring the peaceful completion of the
Beijing Summer Olympic Games in August. The issues are radical - those of
history, geography and the role of China in the world.
Histories
China officially claims that Tibet has belonged to China since the Yuan Dynasty
or earlier. The brief official history of Tibet says:
Tubo leader
Songtsan Gambo welded together more than 10 separate tribes and established the
Tubo Kingdom covering a large part of what later became known as Tibet. He
twice sent ministers to the Tang court requesting a member of the imperial
family be given to him in marriage, and in 641, Princess Wencheng, a member of
Emperor Taizong's family, was chosen for this role. [1]
This
relationship became systemic some centuries later, according to the official
history.
In 1271, the Mongolian conquerors took Yuan as the name of
their dynasty. In 1279, they finally unified the whole of China. The newly
united central authorities continued control over Tibet, including it as a
directly governed administrative unit. Taking into account the concrete
characteristics of the local historical traditions, social situation, natural
environment, ethnic group and religion, the Yuan authorities adopted special
measures in the administration of Tibet that differed from the policies applied
to the other ten administrative areas.
First, in 1270, Yuan Emperor Kublai Khan conferred the official title of
Imperial Tutor on Pagba, a leading Tibetan lama of the Sagya Sect. This was the
highest official post of a monk official in the Chinese history. From then on,
Imperial Tutor became a high-ranking official in the central authorities
directly appointed by the emperor, taking charge of Buddhist affairs in the
whole country, and local affairs in Tibet.
Second, shortly after the Yuan Dynasty was founded, the Zongzhi Yuan was set up
to be responsible for the nation's Buddhist affairs and Tibet's military and
government affairs. In 1288, it was renamed Xuanzheng Yuan. The Prime Minister
usually acted as the executive president of the Xuanzheng Yuan, concurrently,
while a monk nominated by the Imperial Tutor held the post of vice president.
This marked the first time in Chinese history that a central organ was set up
specially taking charge of Tibetan affairs.
Third, Tibet was divided into different administrative areas, and officials
with different ranks were appointed to consolidate administrative management,
with the Imperial Tutor assuming overall responsibility. [2]
However,
the claim for an actual incorporation in the Chinese state is weak for two
reasons. It is controversial that what is defined as the Yuan Dynasty is part
of the "Chinese" tradition. The rulers then were Mongols, the official court
language was Mongol or Farsi, and ethnic Chinese were second-class citizens.
Moreover, it is debatable whether the Mongols exercised any real power and
administration within Tibet. They did intervene to support various factions in
Tibetan power struggles, but it is contentious whether this amounted to actual
rule of Tibet. Even in Ming times, the region was officially treated as out of
the traditional provinces of "China proper". In fact, Thomas Bartlett
summarizes the issue as such: "The Mongol Yuan Dynasty exerted control on Tibet
only through Tibetan religious leaders. The Mongols did not conquer Tibet or
occupy it or rule it."
Things certainly changed with the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), when Tibet was an
integral part of a large game played between the Manchu, the Zunghar Mongols
and the Russians. For decades, the Manchu and Zunghars competed over control of
Tibet.
It was essential to Manchu policy to prevent any alliance between the spiritual
leaders in Tibet and leaders of Mongol steppe military power. In ceremonial
exchanges, the Kangxi emperor compared himself with a reincarnation of Khubilai
Khan (1260-1294) in relation to his Tibetan Buddhist preceptor, Phagspa, who
was seen as reincarnate in the Yellow Sect's Living Buddhas resident at the
Qing court.
The comparison was not apt: Khubilai Khan was genuinely moved by his religious
convictions, while the Manchu emperor's motives were purely political. It seems
clear that he connived in the murder of the Sixth Dalai Lama in 1706; he had
the motive and the means. When the Sixth Dalai Lama was reincarnated in 1708 as
the Seventh, he was found in the Khams region (Chinese, Xikang; at present
Litang in far western Sichuan, where Manchu garrisons were then in control).
That well suited Manchu designs. The Kangxi emperor became the child's sponsor,
supervised his early upbringing, and had him escorted to Lhasa in 1720 to
assume his position there.
In some Qing accounts, Qing annexation of Tibet is dated to that moment, but
that is an artful exaggeration. The Manchus clearly tried to make puppets of
the Dalai Lamas; in a decree issued by the Kangxi emperor in 1721, he falsely
claimed that Tibet had been under Manchu suzerainty for 80 years, and now
attempted to clarify that relationship in stricter terms. The Tibetans
"persisted in envisaging it in terms of the traditional concept of 'patron and
priest'." That is, they did not conceive the emperor's claimed relationship to
the Dalai Lama in political terms. In that immediate situation, as also in the
long range, the Manchus were no more successful than their predecessors on the
throne of China. Tibet remained wholly independent of Qing China in all aspects
of its domestic governing, and its lama rulers had no political interests
beyond that. [3]
Mote reinforces the point by stressing that Tibetan issues were handled by the
Lifan Yuan, which also handled Mongolian and Russian affairs. Mongolia was part
of the Qing Empire or it was with the Zunghars, a rival in Central Asia; Russia
was the encroaching power from central and northeast Asia.
However, things might be murkier. Perdue writes:
New internal conflict
[in Tibet] quickly drew the emperor [Yongzhen], despite his intentions, into
condoning a second substantial military intervention in Tibet. In 1720 the Qing
invasion force had initially installed a military government in Lhasa, which
was welcomed by Tibetans happy to see the brutal Zunghar forces driven out. The
Great Potala Palace of the Dalai Lama, looted by the Zunghars, was restored and
even improved with imperial support. The office of regent was abolished while
the new Seventh Dalai Lama, a 12-year-old boy, served as figurehead for rule by
leading Tibetan nobles. The two most powerful were Sonam Stobgyal, the chief of
Polha in western Tibet known as Polhanas, and Kancennas. Both had organized
popular resistance to the Zunghars. Three Manchu officials, the Asaham Amba,
supervised the administration with a garrison of three thousand men. But the
local government remained unstable in the hands of regional rulers who could
not create a functioning central council.
The Chinese occupation army was a heavy burden for the Tibetans. The price of
grain was rising in local markets, even as the Qing was spending a large amount
to transport grain thousands kilometers from the interior. General Nian Gengyao
and Yanxin had agreed with Kangxi that troops in Lhasa should be reduced as
soon as possible. But Yongzhen ordered a rapid and complete withdrawal to
support his retrenchment drive, based on maintaining peace with the Zhunghars
and relieving burdens on the civilian population. Kancennas urged the emperor
to reconsider as the troops marched away. [4]
This account
does not negate Mote's. It leaves room to debate the effective role of the
Manchu in Tibetan domestic affairs, as it emphasizes the role of the local
nobles. It shows that Yongzhen's intentions were to appease the Zunghars, and
therefore he wanted to withdraw from total control of Tibet. Total control of
Tibet could ignite further conflicts with the belligerent Mongol neighbors, who
were in a complicated phase of attrition, and also with the Russians, who were
moving east. This situation shows that then there were two reasons for the
Chinese withdrawal from Tibet: Tibet was too poor to feed large Chinese
detachments, and the logistics of the time made it very hard and expensive to
maintain troops from neighboring provinces.
Present geopolitics
Now, China could claim that the situation has changed. The logistics are in
place, and China is so rich that in can keep up a garrison in Lhasa and other
Tibetan centers. Moreover, it does not have to appease the Zunghars or other
local rivals, and it does not face advancing foreign powers, like Russia in the
18th century. Therefore, China can do now what it could not afford then - fully
control Tibet. However, the political relationship between Tibet and China
might be described as unchanged.
Another issue to consider is Britain's recognition of the Chinese "suzerainty"
over Tibet during the time of Emperor Qianlong. The concept of suzerainty might
be weak and too undifferentiated as it
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