Page 3 of 3 Tibet a defining issue for China By Francesco Sisci
govern all of China proper, let alone other claims. After 1949, the communists
had the muscle to enforce all claims - that made the difference.
On the Tibetan side, things are not much clearer. While claiming their
independence, the Tibetans provided scant historical evidence, in contrast to
the massive amount of documents produced by the Chinese side. The crux of the
Tibetan case for independence rests on the special Central Asian relation of
priest-patron: the Tibetans were the priests and the Chinese were the patrons.
The precise political content of the priest-patron relation can vary with time
and circumstances, but it is in theory a relationship
between equals. This relationship could be politically consistent with one of
vassalage, one of independence or some form of dependence. In fact, the Tibetan
definition is more alien to present political circumstances than even the
vaguest Chinese historical descriptions. The Tibetans downplay the Chinese
historical argument by countering it with an argument establishing ties between
a religious figure and a layman, a relationship which in turn is not recognized
by China. It then becomes a dialogue between parties who are deaf to each
other.
The stronger political case for Tibetan independence comes from the first half
of last century when, because of China's weakness, Tibet was de facto
independent. But so were many Chinese provinces. No country recognized Tibetan
independence or provincial independence.
In these circumstances, the geopolitical reasons for sending troops to Tibet in
1949 could be more than enough to justify the present integration of Tibet into
modern China. However, the 5,000-year scale - which has become standard
knowledge for China - imposes a need for a proportionate stretching of all
territorial claims. If 5,000 years is the standard, then Tibet has to be
Chinese for at least 20% of its total history. Thus, we have the idea that
Tibet was Chinese since the Yuan Dynasty, almost 1,000 years ago.
Presently, the situation has dramatically changed since the times of Sun
Yat-sen's humiliated China and the early days of communist rule. The idea of
5,000 years of history does not make sense now. Then, it boosted morale among a
depressed people, now it can make the Chinese overly arrogant. The Chinese, who
will become a First World economy within a few years or decades, now need
humility and a low profile if they want to continue developing peacefully. Its
present territory is what Beijing claims; no government in the world wants to
change it.
In fact, present China is both new and old, like Israel or the US. It is new
because its present status was established and finalized in the 1950s, and it
is old because modern China has roots stretching back thousands of years.
Israel was similarly established around the same time but can claim heritage
back to Moses and the Egyptian times. The US is young, established in 1776, but
has a tradition that came from Europe, with its thousands of years of history.
A new historical timeline would also aid the political justification and
legitimization of China's territorial claims: a shorter timeline means fewer
loopholes to explain in this very permeable cultural environment.
This brings to the fore the delicate political element of the role of the Dalai
Lama. Even the Communist Party, with Mao and after Mao, propped the Dalai and
the Panchen above all other Tibetan lamas, and their prestige in the cultural
and religious life of Tibet is immense.
This Dalai Lama, with his legendary status and world-wide fame, commands
immense respect among Tibetans and even among Chinese. To a great extent, the
Dalai Lama means much more to Tibetans than the pope does to Catholics. First,
the pope "represents" God, he is not God. He is elected, although through the
intervention of the Holy Spirit, and holds his position for 20 or 30 years at
the most. The Dalai Lama is almost a living god, and holds his position for
life, two or three times longer than any pope. Secondly, the Dalai Lama also
embodies a national and cultural identity, elements that the pope willingly
ignores.
Therefore, if Beijing officials encourage monks and common people to denounce
the Dalai Lama - possibly to pave the way for a stronger recognition of the
young Panchen Lama, who is loyal to Beijing - they may shoot themselves in the
foot. It is very hard for a monk to renounce both his god-priest and his
identity. It would mean to deny his faith and his being Tibetan, something that
he cannot do. If he were to do so, why would he have chosen to be a monk in the
first place? And being born Tibetan, how can he possibly give up being a
Tibetan? It would be like asking a Chinese Christian to renounce his belief in
Christ and his Chinese identity. Conversely, when pressured in this direction,
it is much easier for a Tibetan monk to pretend to give in and wait for an
occasion to express hate against the oppressor.
It could become a time-game. If the Dalai Lama dies soon and the Tibetan
protests are kept under control so they do not escalate, then Beijing can think
of promoting "its own" Panchen Lama, who will by then have more prestige than
other exiled living Buddhas. Even if the case arises of having two chosen
reincarnations of the Dalai, one controlled by Beijing and one controlled by
the Tibetan exiles, Beijing might have some 20 years to keep a firm hold on the
situation. By then the exiled Dalai might be out of all Tibetan games, fully
replaced by the Panchen and the Beijing Dalai.
This would be the ideal situation for Beijing: it would have time and a chance
to "Sinicize" Tibet fully. This, in turn, would set apart Chinese and exiled
Tibetans in more than one way. The Tibetans in China could be "culturally
killed' or at least "culturally maimed".
In fact, the Dalai Lama accused China of carrying out a cultural genocide in
Tibet, destroying or thwarting all cultural legacies. However, this is an issue
to which the Chinese are largely deaf. In the past 60 years, Chinese rulers
have committed a "cultural genocide" on their own culture: they saw it as a
necessary measure in the process of modernization and becoming an advanced
nation. This brutal process is partly due to globalization, where local
cultures disappear in one global melting pot.
Chinese can feel that they saved more of the Tibetan culture than they did of
their own culture, and this could be the general feeling in the future. After
all, China was a historical melting pot that managed to digest the Manchurian
Qing, the Mongolic Yuan and the Turkic Tang, so why not the Tibetans?
However, if the Dalai Lama lives on for a few years and protests escalate and
international attention on China does not end with the Olympics, Beijing must
open a dialogue with the Dalai Lama or it will be heading for trouble. He could
be the only one who can help appease the situation as he commands respect from
Tibetans in and out of Tibet.
Moreover, if protests carry on, and Beijing drags its feet on talks with the
Dalai Lama, then China may look very callous to the international community.
The international community recognizes the Dalai Lama as a prestigious
religious figure. Not talking to him for a long time will not help the
perception of China abroad in a time when the world is growing more concerned
about China's future intentions. The maiming of traditional Tibetan culture
could be interpreted as a warning for other cultures, near and far.
In more than one way, the future history of China and Tibet will be determined
by the events of the next decade and the Chinese handling of the present Dalai
Lama.
Histories and nationalism
In this way, China should perhaps take a hard look at the role of history in
Imperial China and in the Roman Empire.
In China, history was the domain of the emperor: he made it and wrote it. In
ancient Rome, conversely, most historians sided with the senate and against the
emperor. Because of this, we know that Caligula appointed his horse senator and
Nero set Rome on fire. These emperors sound like madmen, although this cannot
be entirely true since they maintained and expanded the empire in a crucial
time. But the structure of the Roman state allowed a particular role for
historians, who were quite independent-minded. Because of this, we also know
that Hannibal, one of the fiercest enemies of Rome, was a great and noble
general and that the Germans were a great warring people.
These stories about Rome's enemies and its shortcomings did not belittle Rome.
Instead, they made it even bigger: it was an empire that managed to overcome
and triumph over great difficulties and setbacks. In a way, the same tradition
is preserved in present American journalism and contemporary history, where
writers go to great lengths to detail American problems and to ultimately show
the triumph of the "good American empire". This history is more convincing,
especially in a culturally permeable world, because it does not rule out
competing visions, and therefore it sounds real. Furthermore, with the final
Roman victory, it proves the ultimate greatness of Rome because it was able to
overcome all its troubles.
The same did not happen in China, where the official history covers all but
convinces few. Presently, it could be said that there is no need for China to
stretch history, to make up white or less-candid lies - even regarding its
claims on Tibet. Devoid of the old ideological socialist mould, and forfeiting
the idea of liberating people, the geopolitical reasons to control Tibet are
more than enough to avert any theoretical challenge to China's rule. The cold
geopolitical reasoning, however, has its complications, too. It may lead to
dangerous calculations based solely on power, which may ruffle many feathers in
the world. Geopolitics also has to be tempered with less harsh concepts that
are fully in line with the official Chinese idea of social harmony. In other
words, there must be good governance that gains the support of the people in
and out of China.
The fact that Chinese government departments are working at adapting history to
present political ends reveals to the outside world a general fear. With these
stories, Beijing tells the world that the Chinese themselves first and foremost
think they should not rule Tibet. This is perhaps the greatest and most real
trouble for China.
On the other hand, history is such because the conditions are historical. The
dissolution of the Soviet Union was historical: it is not a rule that can be
simply applied everywhere, every time. Now historically, there seems to be a
trend toward the Balkanization of the world, with more than 100
pro-independence organizations active around the globe. If they were all
successful, we would have more than 100 new states [11] .
And if the rule of self-determination is carelessly applied, even more
pro-independence movements could spring up. But then the newly independent
states, in order to survive and prosper, would have to be integrated in larger
international trade communities by "ceding" part of their territorial power to
international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the United
Nations or the European Union, etc. So, what is really the point of secession
in the first place? The ambitions of a minority group? Freedom from oppression
by the present ruling elites of the people of one community? The political will
to weaken a country by breaking it up? A mix of all of the above?
These seem to be the real questions, and the real solution should be trying to
achieve good governance, not independence.
But pro-independence movements have become what communism was in the last
century: a revolutionary, messianic answer to many mundane problems. Then,
rational arguments are often nothing against emotional ones. This may be the
scary part that lurks behind the pseudo-rational historical arguments for
independence and which can spark fires of uncontrollable nationalism.
Notes
1. See China.org.cn March 21, 2008. Please note the date of the last draft: a
week after the Lhasa riot.
2. Ibidem.
3. See Frederick W Mote Imperial China, 900-1900, Harvard 1999, p.877.
4. See Peter C Perdue China marches West, Harvard 2005, pp 241-243.
5. This is already the most bloated figure available for officials.
6. See Elliot Sperling, Policy Studies 7, 2004, "The Tibet-China Conflict:
History and Polemics", East-West Center Washington.
7. See Xie Bin "Xizang wenti" Shanghai 1926, pp 20-21.
8. See Wang Qinyu "Xizang wenti", Shanghai 1929, p 13.
9. See Elliot Sperling op. cit p 27. 10. See Wu Fengpei "Liangyu zhuzang
zougao" Lhasa 1979, p 88.
11. Thanks to Fabio Mini for this concept.
Francesco Sisci is editor of La Stampa in Beijing.
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