Musharraf bolsters China-Pakistan
bond By Pallavi Aiyar
BEIJING - The timing of Pakistan President
Pervez Musharraf's six-day visit to China this
month imbued the interactions between the leaders
of the "all-weather" friends with added
significance.
This was Musharraf's first
official visit abroad after parliamentary
elections in February saw a coalition of parties
opposed to him come to power in Islamabad, leaving
the president in a delicate political situation.
The visit moreover came at a time when China faces
increasing international censure over its handling
of the Tibet protests last month.
Musharraf's repeated strong and
unequivocal statements in support of Beijing's
position on every front, from Tibet to the Summer
Olympic Games in Beijing and human rights, were thus
a welcome respite from
Western criticism for China and received much play
in the domestic media.
The Pakistan
president held two rounds of meetings with his
Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao, who emphasized that
Pakistan is a priority for China's foreign policy
and that this "principle will not change, no
matter what happens in international or domestic
situations". Hu went on to up the rhetorical ante
when he stated, "China considers Pakistan as a
close neighbor, a good friend, a partner, and more
importantly as a good brother."
The visit
thus gave Musharraf's credibility a shot in the
arm while simultaneously establishing some
international support for China at a time when the
country is under attack.
Yet, despite the
many two-way declarations of enduring friendship
made over the course of the visit, not that much
was achieved of concrete substance. Both prior to
and during the trip, Musharraf made several public
announcements regarding his desire for Chinese
assistance in building three more nuclear power
plants, a cross-border oil and gas pipeline as
well as a railroad along the Karakoram highway
connecting Gwadar port in Balochistan province to
western China.
However, none of these
proposals met with an official Chinese response.
In the conspicuous absence of big-ticket deals on
energy, trade or defense, the two sides instead
signed a series of memoranda of understanding in
fields such as the management of water resources,
town planning, television production, sports and
culture and science and technology.
A
joint statement announced that both sides "pledged
to take steps to upgrade transportation and
communication networks", to accelerate economic
cooperation and to work together in several areas,
including the energy, mineral and mining sectors.
Beyond these broad-stroke agreements, however, the
Chinese did not tie themselves down to any of
Musharraf's specific requests.
There is no
single explanation for China's caution. It is
instead the result of an amalgam of concerns and
shifting circumstances that, when taken together,
point to a Sino-Pakistan relationship the texture
of which has subtly altered over the past decade,
despite the declarations of immutability that both
sides say mark their friendship.
Perhaps
most worrying of all for Beijing are the
repercussions that Pakistan's recent internal
political instability have for China's own
national security, given the long border the
country shares with the western province of
Xinjiang. Xinjiang is a vast area comprising
one-sixth of China's land mass and has been long
settled by a Muslim population of Turkic origin
called Uyghurs. Pro-independence Uyghur groups
have been staging a low-grade secessionist
movement in the region for decades.
While
a less high-profile cause than Tibet outside of
China, separatist activity in Xinjiang is a major
worry for Beijing. Since last month, the Chinese
authorities have revealed a number of plots by
groups in Xinjiang they say are terrorist
organizations.
Beijing is concerned that
Uyghur militants have forged links with Islamist
fighters across the border in Pakistan. There have
for example been unconfirmed reports that a foiled
attack on a Chinese domestic flight in early March
involved people carrying Pakistani passports.
In addition to the worry that Pakistan has
become a convenient hideout and training ground
for Uyghur separatists, the past few years have
also seen a series of Chinese civilians working in
Pakistan kidnapped and killed by Islamic
militants. China responded to these incidents by
demanding better protection of its citizens within
Pakistan in usually forceful language.
Furthermore, since Pakistan's role as a
large-scale nuclear proliferator was brought into
the global spotlight with the Abdul Qadeer Khan
expose of 2004, lending open nuclear assistance to
Islamabad is increasingly embarrassing for
Beijing.
Finally, the evolving
Sino-Pakistan relationship needs also to be
understood in the context of Beijing's new
engagement with New Delhi, which has brought India
and China closer together than at any point after
their 1962 border war. China no longer
automatically panders to Pakistan's position on
Kashmir, referring to it as a bilateral matter
instead. Again, even while refusing Musharraf's
calls for more nuclear assistance, China has
signed joint documents with India that specify
cooperation in civilian nuclear energy as a goal.
For all the infrastructure linkages and
political closeness between China and Pakistan,
their bilateral trade is currently only at about
the US$7 billion mark, whereas despite some major
unresolved problems with New Delhi, Sino-Indian
trade is already close to the $40 billion mark.
While China and Pakistan aim at increasing trade
to $15 billion by 2010, India and China have a $60
billion target for the same year.
China
has had to delicately recalibrate its relationship
with Pakistan over the past few years, taking care
not to undermine its traditional friendship with
Islamabad while simultaneously developing stronger
ties with India.
Nonetheless, although
China-Pakistan relations may no longer be as
straightforward as they once were, nor should they
be assumed to be on the wane. While the
containment of India alone may not provide the
sole basis for their engagement, the geostrategic
logic for a continuing long-term alliance between
the two neighbors is strong.
Not only is
Pakistan the corridor for China's access to the
Indian Ocean and thus to alternative energy-supply
routes through Gwadar port, Beijing also needs
Islamabad's support to ensure the stability and
security of its restive Xinjiang province. It is
no coincidence that Musharraf's last stop on his
China visit was in Urumqi, the capital of
Xinjiang. In the past, the Pakistan president has
appealed to Xinjiang Muslims to cooperate with
China for peace and progress and to eschew
extremism. On this trip as well he came out in
strong support of Chinese efforts to combat
separatism, a reference not only to Tibet but also
to the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
The chaos an
unstable Pakistan could unleash across the Chinese
border is a potential nightmare for Beijing,
necessitating the bolstering of a strong
government in Islamabad.
In addition,
although China's relations with India are
improving, Beijing is acutely aware that New Delhi
is far from the unequivocal supporter of its
policies that Pakistan is. "The contrast between
President Musharraf's statements on Tibet and the
attitude we see in the Indian media to the issue
is very noticeable to us," says Professor Rong
Ying, a South Asia expert at the China Institute
for International Relations.
China has in
fact proven to be Pakistan's only constantly
reliable ally, providing it with the financing for
several major infrastructure projects in addition
to being its largest supplier of arms. Only a few
days before Musharraf's visit, the first of four
F-22P frigates ordered by the Pakistani navy from
China under a $600 million deal signed in April
2005 was launched from Shanghai. In addition,
Beijing has signed on to assist Pakistan in a
range of strategic defense projects, including the
production and purchase of JF-17 aircraft and the
al-Khalid tank. The Pakistan Air Force also plans
to buy new Chinese-made J-10 fighters in large
numbers.
So, despite Musharraf having
returned home from China without much tangible
gain by way of eye-catching deals, his visit not
only went some way in buoying the beleaguered
president's personal standing, but also
underscored the fact that despite a few speed
bumps, the road to Sino-Pakistan relations remains
an all-weather one.
Pallavi
Aiyar is the author of the forthcoming
book, Smoke and Mirrors: China Through Indian
Eyes, (Harper Collins, April 2008.)
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