Page 2 of
2 China intensifies war against
splittism By Willy
Lam
Olympic torch during the Paris
leg of its global relay - as well as pro-Tibetan
statements made by several French officials and
parliamentarians. Carrefour was chosen as the
target not only because it is the most visible
French company in China but also due to rumors
that surfaced on Chinese blogs and message boards
that its owners had made donations to the Dalai
Lama's cause. The anti-French rallies constitute
the largest manifestation of nationalism since the
month-long anti-Japanese protests in the spring of
2005.
Equally striking has been the
high-decibel PR campaign launched by the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) against CNN and
a host of other Western media. Partly in support
of Beijing's
fulminations, several
thousand ethnic Chinese last Saturday staged
protests outside CNN offices in Atlanta and Los
Angeles. While the immediate cause of the
confrontation were remarks made by CNN commentator
Jack Cafferty that the Chinese were "goons and
thugs" - Cafferty insisted that he was referring
to the Beijing government, not the Chinese people
- both MOFA and overseas Chinese groups close to
Chinese embassies and consulates in different
cities had since early April savaged Western media
for demonizing the Chinese government,
particularly its treatment of Tibetans and
Uyghurs.
The Beijing-based Foreign
Correspondents Club of China has protested against
the CCP administration's targeting of the foreign
media - as well as denying access to reporters
representing news organizations that had
apparently been blacklisted by MOFA. Individual
Beijing-based journalists have also complained
about receiving hate-mail. Yet from Beijing's
perspective, protests against Western media in
different US and European cities have put pressure
on "China bashers" among the foreign media. More
importantly, much of Western criticism of China's
human rights record has become discredited in the
eyes of ordinary Chinese. The vendetta against
so-called hostile Western press will thus go some
way toward serving the CCP's goal of insulating
the populace from stories about the seamier sides
of the Chinese reality, which are only available
in the international media.
There are
signs that the CCP leadership has started to try
reining in the excesses of the nationalists,
particularly what the domestic press has labeled
"angry youths". Major media ranging from People's
Daily to Liberation Daily have carried editorials
and commentaries on the same theme: that
"patriots" - especially young people among them -
should concentrate on helping Beijing host a
"perfect Olympics" rather than venting their ire
through "irrational" actions such as boycotting
the goods of a certain country.
Xinhua
urged fellow citizens to "focus their energy on
doing well [in] their [own] jobs; building up the
economy, and holding a successful Olympics". China
Youth Daily asked young nationalists to "channel
their patriotism to actions for [national]
development", adding that boycotting Carrefour
would only hurt the Chinese themselves. There were
also reports that dozens of universities had
barred students from leaving campus to join
Carrefour-related protests.
It is
significant, however, that no ministerial-level
cadre has yet made any comments on the possible
abuse of patriotic imperative. By contrast, major
incidents such as the anti-American protests in
1999 and 2001 and the anti-Japanese demonstrations
in 2005 were stopped after senior cadres had made
public appeals in the media.
For instance,
a televised speech on May 9, 1999 by then vice
president Hu Jintao effectively halted
demonstrations by students and other "patriots"
over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade a few
days earlier. The weeks-long anti-Japanese rallies
and riots in 2005 only came to an end on May 17
after officials including then foreign minister Li
Zhaoxing and trade minister Bo Xilai had made
remarks condemning "irrational nationalism" and
urging an end to the campaign to boycott Japanese
products.
That no senior cadres have yet
spoken out could be an indication that the CCP
leadership thinks it still stands to benefit if
nationalism can be shepherded along officially
designated courses.
For Hu, who was party
secretary of Tibet from 1988 to 1992 - the events
unfolding in Tibet now are probably reminiscent of
the 1987 protests which brought Hu to Tibet - the
nationalistic fervor enveloping the nation could
serve the additional purpose of diverting
attention away from whether senior cadres at both
the central and regional levels need to take
responsibility for the unexpectedly serious unrest
in Tibet and Xinjiang.
Several top
officials running western China, including the
party secretaries of Tibet and Xinjiang - Zhang
Qingli and Wang Lequan, respectively - are
long-standing proteges of the president. Despite
the fact that vigilance over the "splittist
conspiracies" had been heightened since last
winter, regional cadres seemed to have been caught
off-guard by the protests in Tibet as well as in
four neighboring provinces.
Indeed, Hu,
deemed a hardliner on issues affecting national
sovereignty and the CCP's prestige, is convinced
that the party has no other option than revving up
a "people's war" against separatists - and to
ensure that China earn its global spotlight
through hosting a Olympics that is free of either
protests or quasi-terrorist incidents.
During an inspection trip to PLA units in
Hainan Island this month, Hu, also
commander-in-chief, asked officers and the rank
and file to work harder in maintaining the
integrity of Chinese sovereignty and to get ready
for a "military struggle" against unnamed enemies.
Apart from combating "splittists" in western
China, PLA and PAP units will turn out in force to
thwart possible "terrorist" attacks during the
Beijing Olympics.
Hu indicated that
China's defense forces must "never slacken in
pushing forward preparations for a military
struggle" against domestic and foreign foes. "We
must ceaselessly boost our ability to tackle
different types of threats to our security," added
the supremo. Given that nationalistic and
pro-government voices are set to dominate China's
universe of discourse until at least the Olympics,
the Hu team seems assured of ironclad support from
the great majority of Han Chinese in waging
ever-tougher versions of "people's warfare", which
includes rounding up more "conspirators" in Tibet
and Xinjiang, and heavy-handed ideological
education for Han Chinese about the imperative of
fighting "splittists and traitors" among ethnic
minorities.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam is
a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He is
the author of five books on China, including the
recently published Chinese Politics in the Hu
Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges.
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