No
one anticipated the dynamics triggered by the
riots in Tibet on March 14. The focus of attention
has shifted from the rioters battling armed police
on the streets of Lhasa, to activists harassing
Olympic torch bearers in London, Paris, and San
Francisco and finally to average Chinese anger
towards those who, from a Chinese perspective,
"hurt the feelings of the Chinese people". Fairly
or not, the list of "bad guys" (from a Chinese
perspective) includes "the Dalai clique", CNN and
Carrefour, a French supermarket chain, among
others.
New wave of Chinese
nationalism This is at least the fourth
outbreak of Chinese patriotism or nationalism in
the last decade: previous triggers include the
bombing of the Chinese
Embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, the EP-3 US
electronic surveillance plane incident in 2001,
and protests against the Japanese prime minister's
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2005.
The
latest wave of nationalism has new
characteristics. First, from a Chinese
perspective, it was not triggered by an isolated
incident like the EP-3 case, when the US Navy spy
plane crashed on Hainan island. Tibetan
organizations in exile prepared carefully to use
the Beijing Summer Olympic Games to draw
international attention; Western human-rights
activists began politicizing the Olympics with
issues like Darfur several years ago. Second, it
is not a conflict with a single country. Chinese
feel that they face a choir of the entire West.
Third, the "chorus" is not made up of just Western
governments, but includes Western media and civil
society.
All this has made many Chinese
feel that they face, for the first time in many
years, Western ideology. Thus, this situation has
greater implications than previous waves of
nationalism. This confrontation should not be
oversimplified as mere right versus wrong, as
occurred during the US-Soviet ideological conflict
in the Cold War. Rather, it is about the pride of
China and the prejudice of the West.
In
response, younger Chinese mobilized on the
Internet with an unprecedented speed and scale.
And for the first time in 10 years, overseas
Chinese played a major role. Overseas Chinese held
demonstrations and rallies to support China in
Paris, London, Los Angeles and other cities. Their
speed was dramatic. On April 16, in one day, more
than 2 million Chinese MSN messenger users (mainly
young white-collar professionals in major cities)
adopted a red heart with the word "China" (which
means "love China") as their MSN signature. This
"hearting China" movement was organized by
netizens and soon spread nation-wide.
Short term: A lose-lose-lose
situation As the sound and fury have
diminished, we can examine the gains and losses of
the Dalai Lama, China, and Western countries.
Obviously, the Dalai Lama and his
supporters have successfully drawn international
attention to the Tibet issue. But winning
international attention is not the only way to get
a solution in their favor. A permanent solution of
the Tibet issue that satisfies all concerned
parties can only be achieved with the support of
ordinary Chinese. However, the riots and the
agitation around the Olympic torch relay pushed
the Dalai Lama, his government-in-exile, and
organizations like the Tibetan Youth Congress,
away from the majority of Chinese.
For
human-rights activists and sympathizers of the
Dalai Lama in Western countries, their actions can
be called a failure. The controversy surrounding
the Olympic torch relay changed the focus from the
Tibet issue to the cleavage of ideologies. Their
only achievement was humiliating the Chinese
government. At the same time, they disappointed
the majority of Chinese because extinguishing the
Olympic torch, which embodies the hopes and
goodwill of the Chinese people, humiliated and
offended ordinary Chinese.
It is a big
loss for Beijing. The Chinese government did not
expect the Olympic Games to be politicized to this
extent. It also damaged severely the image of
China's "peaceful development" and its "harmonious
society".
Tibet and nation-building in
China The key to understanding the common
Chinese response to these dynamics is to view the
Tibet issue from the lens of China's
nation-building process.
Ancient East Asia
was basically a "small world" defined by Chinese
as Tian Xia or "All under Heaven".
Different political and ethnic authorities
interact with each other in the sphere of Tian
Xia: it is oversimplified to use modern
European concepts of the nation-state and
international relations to describe relations
among those authorities.
This system began
its transformation into a Westphalian-style nation
state when the Qing Dynasty was defeated by the
Europeans in the mid-19th century. Intellectuals
and revolutionaries redefined the word Zhong
Guo and used it as the name of the new nation
state. Similarly reconceptualized was the "Chinese
nation" (Zhong Hua Min Zu), by which Dr Sun
Yat-sen referred to all major ethnic groups in
China. All these creations were based on the
political and territorial facts of the late 19th
century when Tibet was a part of the community
that later developed into modern China.
The importance of the Tibet issue reflects
Tibet's role in the concept of China as a
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nation state. This
nation-building process is the product of the
collective efforts of Chinese - including Tibetan
Chinese - for generations. Thus, the Tibet issue
is a litmus test and proving ground for the nation
state of China.
Could crisis become
opportunity? There are reasons for hope,
however. The Dalai Lama, the Chinese government,
and the West can have win-win-win interactions
when all sides think and act under a shared
acknowledgement that China is a multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural, and integrated nation state.
The founding theory of both Sun Yat-sen's
Republic of China (PRC) and the current People's
Republic of China goes beyond "one ethnic group,
one state" thinking. The PRC has gone further by
establishing three levels of autonomous regions
and practicing the policies of "ethnic regional
autonomy". Obviously, a lot remains to be done.
On one hand, the Chinese government needs
more efficient governance on the local level. This
policy could include protecting and expanding
human rights, and adopting new affirmative action
in areas like employment that are designed to
adjust to the developing market economy in Tibet.
The Chinese government also needs to
strengthen the status of Tibetan and other ethnic
minorities in the official political discourse of
the country. For example, research and education
into ethnic history are needed. Quite simply, if
Tibetans feel proud to be part of China, the
independence movement will lose its bedrock.
As for the Olympics, ordinary Chinese need
to better understand that Americans and Europeans
are not out to deliberately hurt them. When
different cultures meet and people do not have a
deep understanding of the other, conflict is
inevitable. The urgent task for Chinese
intellectuals and the younger generation is to
find and elaborate an ideology that fits China. In
particular, they have to identify convergent and
divergent values between the ideology of China and
that of the West. What kind of ideas can China
contribute to the world?
If the Dalai Lama
is genuine when he said he does not seek Tibet
independence, he and people around him ought to
realize that requests for a "greater Tibet" or
"peaceful zone" are neither workable nor helpful
for building a multi-ethnic nation state. These
requests will have but one effect: making other
Chinese feel that they are a springboard for
future independence. If the Dalai Lama really
cares about Tibet's religious and cultural
heritage, he could talk more about those policies
rather than China's administration and
jurisdiction. If he genuinely thinks that Tibet is
part of China, then it would be better for him to
leave historical issues to historians and stop
arguing that Tibet was not part of China in the
past.
Americans and Europeans should not
be scared of Chinese nationalist sentiment.
Nationalism is not a negative value. All nation
states including the US and European countries
were founded by nationalist movements. Of course,
it would be better if Western countries had a more
profound and sophisticated understanding of China;
but it will be helpful for Western observers to
keep the following three points in mind:
Was Tibet part of China? There is no easy
answer to this question since there was no nation
state as we call "China" in history. People with
different suppositions can find evidence to
support their views. But it is undeniable that
Tibet has close historical links with other parts
of China. So, to argue that Tibet was not part of
China is not only against all Western (and not
just Western) government positions, but also lacks
intellectual depth.
There is a human rights problem in Tibet, as
in other areas in China and other parts of the
world. But the human rights problem in Tibet is
mainly a problem of governance, not that of
ethnicity or culture. Neither communism nor any
other ideology has anything to do with that.
The concept of China covers the whole of
China; the concept of Chinese covers all ethnic
groups in China. So, please stop using the
dichotomy of Tibet versus China and Tibetan versus
Chinese. Tibetan Chinese are Chinese just as
African Americans are Americans.
Da
Wei (daweicicir@gmail.com) is an
associate research professor of China Institutes
of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).
He is currently a visiting associate at the School
of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns
Hopkins University. The views expressed in this
essay are the author's personal views and do not
reflect those of any organization with which he is
affiliated.
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