Page 1 of 2 China seeks an Afghan stepping-stone
By Tariq Mahmud Ashraf
The resurgence of great powers' interests in Central Asia in recent years is
reminiscent of the Great Game that ensued in the region in the 19th century
between Czarist Russia and Imperial Great Britain.
Afghanistan's geographic location has made it a much coveted strategic pivot in
the current Great Game. Notwithstanding the similarities between the two
periods, some stark differences stand out prominently: one, there are now
significantly more stakeholders in Afghanistan's security (United States,
Russia, Europe, Japan, India and China); two, while the first Great Game was
precipitated primarily by Russia's quest for access to the warm waters and the
creation of a buffer between British India and
Czarist Russia, the stakes now include oil, hydropower sources, strategic
metals, pipelines, transit routes and access to markets.
These significantly higher stakes have led to Central Asia assuming military,
geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic significance for two major blocs -
one led by the United States (North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO) and
the other by China (Shanghai Cooperation Organization - SCO) - vying for
influence in the region with seemingly dissimilar interests. "China needs them,
Russia wants to control their distribution, and Western powers want to ensure
they are not monopolized by Moscow or Beijing," as a USA Today report of
December 15, 2007, said.
Afghanistan's strategic location between Central and South Asia is of immense
geostrategic significance for the landlocked countries of Central Asia and its
prosperity is inextricably linked to the security situation in Central and
South Asia. Immense energy resources and strategic location on China's western
frontier have led to Central Asia being referred to as China's dingwei (Lebensraum)
[1].
China's interests in Afghanistan
The present regional order prevailing in Afghanistan and Central Asia is
similar in some ways to what transpired in Europe after the end of World War
II. The United States and Western European powers, under the NATO umbrella,
desire strengthening their presence in the region to counter the growing power
and regional influence of both China and Russia while China, like the erstwhile
Soviet Union, is aspiring to extend its security perimeter westward by
developing close links with the countries in the region and ensuring unhindered
access to the energy resources therein.
Some Indian analysts are convinced that China is engaged in a "creeping
encirclement" of their country [2]. They see Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran
forming the right or western pincer of this move, Bangladesh and Myanmar making
up the left or eastern pincer with Sri Lanka acting as the southern anchor and
completing the encirclement.
India's recent overtures toward Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia and the
development of close ties with these countries appear to be aimed at weakening
China's right pincer and denying Pakistan a secure western frontier.
Afghanistan figures prominently, therefore, in Chinese and Indian foreign
policies. In fact, the decision to establish the first-ever Indian military
outpost on foreign soil at the Farkhor air base in Tajikistan, just two
kilometers from the Tajik-Afghan border, could well be perceived as an attempt
to reduce the impact of the Chinese encirclement.
According to a Chinese military journal, India's forays into Afghanistan and
the Central Asian arena are "designed to achieve four objectives: contain
Pakistan; enhance energy security; combat terrorism; and pin down China's
development" [3]. As in the past, Afghanistan has once again emerged as the
"strategic knot" for the region's security.
Afghanistan's significance for China is also due to the latter's imperative of
ensuring Pakistan's security. Pakistan, which is China's foremost ally in South
Asia and has been instrumental in China's emergence on the global scene, has
been constrained by its lack of geographic depth. Often referred to as
Pakistan's lack of strategic depth, this has been touted as a major weakness in
Pakistan's military confrontation with India. Pakistan's military considers
that a friendly Afghanistan bestows additional strategic depth to the country -
this was one of the factors that led to Pakistan supporting the emergence of a
"friendly" Taliban regime in Kabul.
An adversarial regime in Afghanistan is perceived to be denuding Pakistan of
this strategic depth and could also impinge on Pakistan's security by making it
contend with two simultaneous threats. Since ensuring Pakistan's security is an
imperative for China, it would view any Indian ingress into the country with
wariness, concern and caution.
China, like Czarist Russia, yearns for access to the Indian Ocean and the plan
to build a major port in Gwadar on Pakistan's Mekran coast is a step in this
direction. This port would enable China to project its military presence in
proximity of the strategic global petroleum shipping routes as well as the
oil-rich Middle East. The economic feasibility of Gwadar as a shipping hub
would be significantly enhanced were it to be linked to Central Asia and China
by road and rail links. Once again, since all such transportation links between
Gwadar and Central Asia have to traverse through Afghanistan, the focal
importance of the latter cannot be understated. According to the US Energy
Information Administration, "Afghanistan's strategic location could make the
country an important pipeline transit route." [4]
The vast expanse of the Chinese province of Xinjiang, which is inhabited by the
Uyghur Muslim minority, poses a security predicament for China. Since the
Uyghurs have strong religious and ethnic traditional links with the natives of
Afghanistan and the neighboring Central Asian Republics (CARs), China is very
keen that the militant Islamic ideology of extremist elements such as the
Taliban be prevented from spilling over into Xinjiang.
Additionally, the presence of sizeable Western military forces in Afghanistan
is also a source of major concern for China [5]. China was a major actor in the
Afghan civil war and a key supplier of small arms to the insurgents in the
combined US-Pakistan effort to force a Soviet withdrawal from the country.
"Current Chinese interest in Afghanistan, given its continuing civil war and
virtual statelessness, is low and relations are weak." [6]
This interest, however, would certainly grow once the situation stabilizes
since China's security imperatives directly translate into its interest in a
stable and moderate Afghanistan that is also free of Western military presence.
In line with its earlier practices, China is exhibiting a policy of patience
toward Afghanistan and simultaneously making imperceptible inroads into the
country through growing economic relations and investment. These overtures
would place China in an influential position in Afghanistan once the Western
militaries eventually withdraw from the country.
In an indicator of China's growing involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf, during his visit last month to China, indicated a
desire for China, Russia and the SCO to play a more positive role in bringing
stability to Afghanistan, but without getting into a conflict with the United
States and NATO.
China's booming demand for energy and mineral resources, plus its growing
dependence on imported petroleum, has made Beijing increasingly concerned with
ensuring supplies of reserves and the uninterrupted flow of oil at reasonable
prices [7]. The resource-rich CARs, having estimated oil and gas reserves of 23
billion tons of oil and 3,000 billion cubic meters of gas respectively [8],
have great geo-economic significance for China as a source of fossil fuel.
While Afghanistan has no proven fuel deposits, it nevertheless offers the
easiest transportation route for the exploitation of the energy resources of
the CARs and is predicted to have substantial non-fuel mineral resources
essential for China's industrialization [9]. This geo-economic significance of
Afghanistan for China should not be understated considering the latter's
serious interest in the Caspian Sea hydrocarbon resources and the growing
Sino-Afghan trade which reached $317 million in 2005-06.
China has also evinced an interest in a pipeline to the Arabian Sea, with a
view to importing gas and oil by supertankers from Gwadar, but it should be
noted that the Gwadar port project is still severely debilitated by the absence
of links to access the hinterland from the port [10]. As another option, China
is considering transporting its energy shipments from Central Asia and the
Middle East via tanker to Gwadar and then by pipe or truck to western China
through the Karakoram Highway (KKH) [11].
Pakistan as a trade and energy corridor
The second option falls in line with what the Pakistani leadership has been
harping on for the past few years - their vision of exploiting Pakistan's
geography as a Trade and Energy Corridor (TEC) for China and other neighboring
countries including India.
Just last month, Musharraf told a student audience at Beijing's Tsinghua
University, "Pakistan is very much in favor of a pipeline between the Gulf and
China through Pakistan and I have been speaking with your leadership about
this. I am very sure in the future - it will happen." Musharraf further
elaborated that he envisioned improved road linkages between the two countries
as
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