China's army looks beyond its shores By Drew Thompson
Since 2004, Asian natural disasters have become an opportunity for regional
militaries to deploy in a disaster relief role, demonstrating their value as
more than a deterrent to war or transnational threats. By employing their
instruments of hard power to deliver aid to the victims of natural disasters,
the United States, India and even Japan have softened regional perceptions of
their might by making humanitarian assistance a central role for their military
forces in the region.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has carefully observed the international
response to recent disasters, their positive effect on
public opinion and the resulting evolution of military thought. Well versed in
responding to domestic disasters, such as annual floods and the recent
earthquake in Sichuan Province, the PLA is carefully and cautiously assessing
the future potential for international disaster relief and humanitarian
assistance missions [1].
Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar's largest city, Yangon, and the surrounding
Irrawaddy Delta on May 2 and 3, bringing high winds and a storm surge that
resulted in an immediate estimate of 22,500 dead, tens of thousands missing and
1 million without food, shelter and water. Over the following days, the extent
of the devastation was increasingly revealed, prompting the otherwise
xenophobic military government of the isolated country to issue reluctant
appeals to the international community for assistance.
The pariah state, however, has been slow to allow international aid agencies
and governments to send experts to assess the damage and coordinate on the
ground delivery of aid, making it unlikely that regional militaries will play a
significant role in delivering aid directly to affected people, and compounded
the humanitarian disaster with the death poll possibly exceeding 200,000.
While Thailand and the United States have delivered aid to Yangon by military
aircraft, their militaries have not been able to deploy ships or helicopters
that could deliver aid directly to affected areas. The Indian military
anticipated the cyclone, pre-positioning ships in the nearby Andaman Islands,
including a destroyer and a corvette that arrived with supplies in Yangon soon
after the storm passed. These Indian warships, however, were not able to repeat
the impressive demonstration of capabilities displayed by the amphibious
assault ships, helicopters and hovercraft of several countries that deployed
during the 2004 tsunami. The Chinese military was largely an observer to the
tsunami response, choosing not to deploy abroad, delivering donated supplies by
civilian charter aircraft and sending only a handful of military and civilian
personnel to aid in relief efforts.
China will not take the lead in Myanmar disaster
Thus far, China has pledged US$1 million worth of aid, including relief
materials worth $500,000 to Myanmar. In contrast to the Indian navy, the PLA
did not react rapidly to this natural disaster, despite apparent aspirations to
play a greater role in the region politically, economically and militarily.
Sensitive to the political whims of the ruling junta, it is likely that China
quickly recognized that the Myanmar junta would not welcome foreign militaries
operating in its territory and therefore opted instead to make modest
donations. This turned out to be fortuitous, as the Sichuan earthquake struck
10 days after the Myanmar cyclone, creating an urgent demand for Chinese
disaster recovery resources at home.
Despite the positive outcomes noted by the US and other militaries from their
tsunami disaster missions, it was expected that the PLA would prepare more
robust responses to future disasters, should they strike the region. Other than
donations of food and supplies, however, the Chinese military did not respond
to the Bangladesh cyclone in late 2007, indicating that little progress had
been made in building up or demonstrating a crisis management response
mechanism or an international, military sea or airlift capacity since the
tsunami.
Unlike the US military, which has increasingly embraced the international
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief role, including conducting health
diplomacy missions in the absence of disasters, the PLA has been much more
circumspect. Other than deployments on UN Peacekeeping Operations, the PLA has
been reluctant to stretch its legs to perform international disaster relief or
humanitarian assistance missions. There are four potential explanations for
this cautious approach: the PLA is reluctant; there is existing need at home;
concern an overseas deployment would expose weakness; concern about how a PLA
deployment might be received internationally.
Firstly, reluctance within the PLA could stem from internal debate about
whether humanitarian missions could detract from the core war fighting missions
- particularly Taiwan scenarios - or possibly divert scarce military resources.
Likewise, declaring willingness to respond to international disasters in the
Pacific might raise expectations abroad that the PLA would deploy to any and
all natural disasters, potentially disappointing countries that do not receive
assistance. It is also possible that there is reluctance on the part of PLA
medical units to embrace the disaster relief mission. Medical units are
attached to hospitals that not only serve PLA soldiers and their families, but
paying civilians as well, similar to the market-oriented civilian hospital
system. In addition to the significant costs of international relief missions,
overseas deployments would not offer any financial benefits to the military
hospitals or individual doctors who are dependent on civilian, fee-paying
patients.
Secondly, domestic disasters are a regular occurrence in such a large country,
raising significant political risks if specialist units are deployed abroad and
unable to respond to a domestic crisis in a timely fashion. Thirdly, even more
disconcerting to PLA leaders, poor performance in a humanitarian relief mission
could reveal deficiencies and weaknesses to a potential future adversary.
Similarly, US military capability is so overwhelming that the PLA could be
concerned that a modest demonstration would be an embarrassment compared to the
United States or other, wealthier nations such as Japan. Lastly, Chinese
leaders are uncertain how the international deployment of PLA forces might be
perceived by neighboring countries. If the PLA demonstrates its ability to
project power far from its own shores, neighboring countries, including India
and the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries, might question
China's aspirations and self-professed "peaceful rise".
There is some question whether senior civilian and PLA leadership crisis
management processes are up to the task of responding promptly and
appropriately to a natural disaster overseas. While China has come under
criticism for slow responses to emerging crises at home, such as the snow
storms during the Spring Festival rush this year, there are other examples of
rapid reactions to domestic natural disasters.
The "China International Rescue Medical Team" attached to the People's Armed
Police (PAP) general hospital responded to the Sichuan earthquake within hours
and was airlifted by military aircraft to the hardest-hit region. That unit is
likely China's most experienced medical rescue team, having deployed abroad
several times, including the tsunami and earthquakes in Iran, Pakistan and
Algeria.
Why is the humanitarian mission attractive to China?
The Chinese government recognizes the value of humanitarian assistance, medical
diplomacy and national responses to international natural disasters. Providing
medical assistance to needy countries, particularly in response to natural
disasters, improves international image through people-to-people diplomacy as
well as effective communications campaigns. Chinese media widely broadcast the
PAP general hospital rescue unit's efforts in Indonesia following the 2004
tsunami crisis, complete with images of Chinese doctors distributing Chinese
medicine and Indonesians gratefully exclaiming, "China good!"
In addition to positive public relations, international deployments offer a
real-world test of military medical response capabilities, including the
opportunity to gain experience in the field, fine-tune logistics and test new
equipment. Furthermore, the deployments present the opportunity to practice
satellite tele-medicine consultations with doctors in the rear. In large-scale
relief efforts, deployment could include exposure to other units and the
opportunity to learn new techniques and technologies. These deployments can
help China's military medical system become more agile and adaptable, as well
as provide valuable lessons about intelligence collection, information sharing
and situational awareness.
While the Chinese military currently dedicates few resources to international
humanitarian relief and disaster response missions, it is likely that as
China's military continues to modernize, its response will become more robust.
Larger units and platforms will likely take on the role, building on the
experiences of smaller medical units and yiliaodui (medical teams) with
experience in Africa or support of UN peacekeeping missions.
The Chinese navy recently launched a new "Type 920" hospital ship, weighing
20,000 tons and purpose-built, joining a handful of existing hospital ships
which are converted transports serving with each of the PLA navy fleets. China
is also improving its amphibious warfare capabilities, including commissioning
new landing ships with helicopter and hovercraft capabilities. While China's
"gator navy" (amphibious forces) is primarily focused on a Taiwan scenario,
disaster relief operations on China's periphery are a conceivable future
mission. Lastly, China's future aircraft carrier will likely also be tasked
with disaster relief and humanitarian assistance missions, both for the
operational experience that real-world relief missions bring, but also to
reassure neighbors that China seeks to be a responsible neighbor and peaceful
regional power [2].
A modernizing PLA, PLA navy and air force that espouses humanitarian and
disaster relief mission objectives presents opportunities for the United
States, the dominant naval power in the Pacific. The United States should
encourage the PLA to take a role in these missions and consider various
opportunities to cooperate. Exchange of personnel, joint missions and more
extensive communication and collaboration between the two militaries will build
trust and demystify the other, increase individual and institutional linkages,
which will reduce the possibility of future misunderstanding or miscalculation.
Most importantly, the efforts of both militaries to assist victims of disaster
or poverty increases security in the region, benefiting not only China but the
United States and its allies as well.
Notes
1. The author is grateful to Admiral Eric McVadon for his insights which
contributed to some concepts presented here. Any errors are the responsibility
of the author alone.
2. Author's interview with Chinese experts in January 2008.
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