Sinophile Rudd loses Asian friends
By Purnendra Jain
ADELAIDE - Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has proposed an Asia-Pacific
community by 2020 that would include among others the United States, China,
Japan and India and be capable of canvassing security, political and economic
matters. He unveiled his brand new idea in a speech last week that he gave to
the Asia Society AustralAsia Center in Sydney.
Cobbled together hastily before his departure this week to Japan and Indonesia,
Rudd's proposal is unlikely to go very far. It is his personal vision as prime
minister of Australia and worthy as it might be, any progress will entirely
depend on how key and powerful leaders in the region react to it. His proposal
is at best premature and at worst presumptuous. Rudd is a new kid on the Asian
diplomatic block who has yet to build trust and credibility in
larger Asia beyond China. He has had no serious consultations on his proposal
with major players in the region.
Furthermore, there is little new in his proposal that distinguishes it from the
existing regional processes already in place except the proposed timeline for
realizing a "community" in the next 12 years. Indeed it has the potential to
undermine or even kill some of them.
China obsession
Even before Rudd became prime minister there were apprehensions in the region
that his Asia foreign policy would revolve around China. Rudd studied China at
university and speaks fluent Mandarin and spent considerable time in the Middle
Kingdom both as student and later as Australia's diplomat before he turned to
politics.
On assuming office, Rudd visited China during his first foreign tour that also
included the US and Europe but not Japan, which was long Australia's largest
trading partner and remains its largest export destination and has served as
the most reliable and all-weather friend in Asia. Australia and Japan are the
two key allies of the US in the Pacific and the three together have met
regularly for the past several years in a trilateral setting. Last year,
Australia and Japan signed an agreement on security cooperation, a first for
Japan outside its security treaty with the United States.
Not only did Rudd snub Japan by excluding Tokyo on his itinerary, but he and
his ministers have mounted an unusual political campaign to name and shame
Tokyo in their wish to stop Japan from "scientific whaling". Instead of the
preferred tool of diplomacy to persuade Japan, the Rudd government chose to
take a hardline political approach mainly due to pressure from the
environmental lobby groups and whale watchers in Australia.
However, the results thus far have been disastrous. Instead of achieving any
positive outcome, Rudd's threatening approach has indeed hardened Tokyo's
stance on whaling. As a result, the clock of the bilateral free trade agreement
process that had moved forward under the previous government has stopped and
may go backwards.
So disappointed was the leadership in Tokyo towards Canberra that Prime
Minister Yasuo Fukuda barely mentioned Australia in his recent major speech
outlining his own vision of Asia-Pacific sub-titled Five Pledges to a Future
Asia that "Acts Together". This deliberate omission of Australia in Fukuda's
major speech sends a clear signal of the prevailing thinking of officials and
political leaders in Japan.
Such a turn in Japan's attitude is of Rudd's making. He has managed to annoy a
trusted friend, a friend that has been a great partner of Australia in
establishing the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) and in the Cambodian peace process as well as East Timor.
Tokyo successfully argued Australia's case for membership in the East Asian
Summit. Japan has also invited Rudd as an observer to attend the annual Group
of Eight (G8)summit to be held in Hokkaido next month.
Rudd also downgraded Indonesia considerably in his Asian diplomatic hierarchy
by not visiting Jakarta during his first long foreign trip. Indonesia is the
most-populated country in Southeast Asia and has the world's largest Muslim
population and a nation of great political and strategic significance virtually
on Australia's doorstep. It also commands considerable respect in the region,
especially among Southeast Asian nations.
Rudd's obsession with China and the hope that by jumping in bed with Beijing he
could both serve as a bridge between China and the West and secure diplomatic
leverage in Asia has produced nothing but contempt for him in the region.
To a question as to what public intellectuals and others thought about Rudd's
visit to China, US and Europe and not to Japan and Indonesia, one eminent
commentator observed that "leaders in Southeast Asia did not care where Rudd
goes or does not go". Anger was obvious through the tone of this commentator.
Rudd has also managed to spoil Australia's budding relationship with India.
While the prime minister has included India in his Asia-Pacific community
vision and publicly acknowledged India's rising importance in Australian
foreign policy even before he came to power, he rubbed India up the wrong way
soon after assuming office. His government declared that Australia would not
support the Japan-sponsored quadrilateral process that included the US, Japan,
India and Australia. His government also refused to supply uranium to India.
The Rudd government is cynically opposed to the stance of the previous John
Howard government that cautiously favored the quadrilateral process and had
endorsed the sales of uranium to India.
Both these announcements were made in a great haste and were diplomatically
unsound.
The quad process was a low-key affair and the likelihood of its
institutionalization was in doubt in any case. But Foreign Minister Stephen
Smith announcing Australia's withdrawal in front of China's foreign minister
was clearly interpreted by commentators in India and elsewhere as an act of
pleasing Beijing.
While it makes little moral sense to sell uranium to authoritarian China and a
known proliferator of nuclear materials, and not to democratic and
non-proliferator India, the Rudd government insists that it would stand by its
party's long-standing policy of not supplying uranium to a country that has not
signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Unlike the US, Australia's Labor
government is unwilling to make any exception. If Rudd was diplomatic enough he
could have taken a wait-and-see approach until India and the US had ratified of
their bilateral civilian nuclear agreement and tested the diplomatic mood at
the level of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Rudd has already made far too many unforced diplomatic errors and it will take
a huge amount of time and effort to put the relationships with its major Asian
partners back on track. It was widely expected in Australia and in the region
that a Labor government would deal with Asia more sensibly and be prudent
diplomatically than the Howard government. But the Rudd government seems to
have taken backward steps.
The US factor
Rudd proposes to include the US in his Asia-Pacific community. Many regional
political leaders accept the central role of the US in the region and they all
want the US to remain engaged in the region. However, it becomes hugely
problematic when it comes to include the US in regional groupings.
The US was not included in APEC when it was launched in 1989. Later, its
inclusion and the first leaders' meeting hosted by former US president Bill
Clinton in Seattle created political tensions most clearly reflected in verbal
and diplomatic standoff between then-Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad
and his Australian counterpart Paul Keating. Mahathir had absented himself from
the meeting and Keating's "recalcitrant" remark was not taken kindly by
Mahathir and many others in the region.
Opposed to the idea of including the US in APEC, Mahathir became the chief
advocate of an "Asia only" grouping by proposing an East Asian Economic Caucus
(later East Asian Economic Group) consisting of member states of ASEAN plus
China, Japan and South Korea. Because of Japan's rejection, it did not get off
the ground then but later it reappeared in a different reincarnation as ASEAN
plus Three in 1999.
That many Asian nations wish to establish a process leading to a "community" is
obvious by the establishment of the East Asian Summit (EAS) process in 2005.
Here, too, the membership issue became highly controversial. Led by China, some
wanted the EAS to have the same membership as the ASEAN plus Three. But on
Japan's insistence and support from others like Singapore, India, Australia and
New Zealand were included. The United States was out and no nation proposed its
inclusion.
Europe as a model for Asia
Although Rudd did not mention the word "union" in his speech, some media
outlets ran headlines that suggested Rudd proposed an Asia-Pacific union based
on the European Union model. While Rudd acknowledged that the EU may not be an
appropriate model for the Asia-Pacific, he insisted there were lessons to be
learnt for an Asia-Pacific community. Critics were quick to write off Rudd's
proposal.
Former foreign minister Alexander Downer was scathing in his remarks by
dismissing it as "simplistic and meaningless" and even called it a "stunt".
Opposition foreign affairs spokesperson Andrew Robb accused Rudd of developing
policy on the run. According to him, "It's half-baked ... [there's] absolutely
zero detail in what he's put on the table other than to say it should be
something akin to the European Union."
It is not just the former and current opposition leaders who have criticized
Rudd for his undeveloped ideas but even his own senior party colleagues and
former prime ministers have cautioned Rudd and offered advice.
Former prime minister Bob Hawke, who launched the APEC in 1989, welcomed Rudd's
plan for greater cooperation in Asia, but expressed doubt whether a model based
on the EU could be suitable. Hawke's successor Keating commented that it will
be difficult and indeed inappropriate "to seek to superimpose some sort of
union across the disparate societies that make up the Asia-Pacific". Indeed
Keating is skeptical whether a new process is at all required.
Consensus, non-interference and informal processes are accepted norms of
institutionalization in Asia - be that the ASEAN, ARF or the EAS. To expect
that Asian nations would follow Europe's example and form a community by 2020
by relinquishing their sovereignty even partly seems nothing more than a
fantasy today. If anything, Asian nations are becoming more sovereignty-bound
as they seek influence and power and compete against each other, regionally and
extra-regionally.
Rudd on a steep learning curve
After his over-enthusiasm for China earned him criticisms from several
quarters, Rudd quickly amended his orientation. He rightly decided to visit
Japan and Indonesia and hold discussions with the leaders there. Rudd had
previously defended his plan not to visit Japan and Indonesia by saying that he
was scheduled to go to Japan in July for the G8 summit and that he had visited
Bali in December for the UN climate change summit.
In both Tokyo and Jakarta, the premier has a tough job ahead of repairing the
damage. Apart from discussing free trade agreements, security and defense
issues and climate change matters with both the countries, Rudd needs to listen
carefully to his interlocutors in both Tokyo and Jakarta about his Asia-Pacific
community proposal. Their voices matter in the region.
Rudd is undoubtedly an Asia enthusiast. He understands that Australia has
increasingly become peripheral in regional organizations. At its diplomatic
height Australia's then prime minister Hawke successfully launched the APEC
Forum in 1989. His successor Keating played a key role in organizing in 1993
the first APEC leaders' meeting. Rudd's "middle power" diplomacy in Asia aims
at playing a proactive role in the region, rather than simply reacting to
events.
For Rudd to play such a role, he needs to carve out a place for himself in the
region. He needs to convince the region that his Asia is more than China.
Regional leaders must express trust and confidence in him and his government.
That will take time and it will happen only through patience and by
establishing extensive diplomatic networks in the region.
Given that Rudd has been in the top job only for about six months and has
already made some diplomatic blunders, however well-meaning his Asia-Pacific
vision might be, it is unlikely that he will receive any enthusiastic
endorsement of his proposal in the region. The key is to build goodwill through
cultural sensitivities and through action. Words and policy pronouncements
alone will secure very few friends and supporters in Asia.
Purnendra Jain is professor and head of Asian Studies at Australia's
Adelaide University.
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