BOOK REVIEW
Asia's awesome threesome Rivals by Bill Emmott
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
For the first time in history, three great powers - China, India, and Japan -
coexist uneasily in Asia. Lacking natural compatibility, all three are beefing
up their militaries with consciousness of one another as a prime motive. Just
as Pakistan is not the main concern for Indian strategists, China's rising
defense expenditures can no longer be explained in the traditional straitjacket
of Taiwan.
While Asian sovereign wealth funds are attempting to acquire Western assets,
financial capture of a Japanese or Indian company by a Chinese state-owned firm
is inconceivable. This is because the three regional powers are prone to
suspicions and
jealousies in a highly competitive strategic environment.
In his new book Rivals, Bill Emmott, a former editor of The Economist,
argues that friendship among Asia's awesome threesome is "only skin-deep" and
examines the consequences of their rivalry for the world. Emmott's thesis is
that internal changes like the experience of economic growth, awareness of
increased strength and pressures of public opinion will affect how India,
China, and Japan size up each other and the West in a "new power game" (p 9).
Sadly, this preoccupation with domestic issues leads to lengthy assessments of
each country's internal affairs that are not fully relevant to the book's theme
of inter-state rivalry. Trapped in the shopworn modernization paradigm of
"disruptive transformation" inside each society, Emmott misses slices of the
larger geopolitical canvas on which Asia's power struggles are being played
out.
The book begins with the accelerating commercial links that are integrating
Asia like never before. In the immediate post-war and post-colonial decades,
economic exchanges from Japan in the east to India in the west barely existed.
Yet, today, the Asia that never had a single dominant culture has "a unifying
religion: money and the ambition of economic development" (p 33). Multinational
corporations now treat the region as a single economic space and as a "tightly
connected pan-national supply chain" (p 42). In the security realm, though,
Asia is not quite a collective entity, as shown by the absence of unifying
regional institutions.
Emmott's survey of China's strengths and weaknesses leads to the inference that
it will be an "awkward neighbor" for India and Japan. Beijing's "smile
diplomacy" to assure that its rise should not be feared has few takers in New
Delhi due to the former's provocative behavior on the bilateral border dispute.
Chinese naval encroachments in the Indian Ocean to secure the "safety of sea
lanes" is seen by Indian strategic elites as a strategy of "concirclement".
China's military spending is more than double that of India's and roughly the
same as that of Japan, which is a far richer country. Emmott portrays China and
India as participants in a "strategic insurance policy race" (p 256) that is
based on enhancement of respective military capabilities.
At present, the Chinese state does not tax farmers or urban households heavily.
However, as expectations for a substantial social security system increase, the
Communist Party will need to broaden the tax base and risk demands for
democratic representation. Emmott predicts that a serious protracted economic
downturn could cause a drop in corporate tax revenues and force the party to
introduce "some form of electoral democracy, while ensuring that its substance
remains suppressed" (p 85).
The author does not tackle the matter of how domestic regime change in China
might go on to impact relations with India and Japan. He assumes that a more
open China will be less threatening to the other two Asian powerhouses,
although the historical evidence suggests that even if the Kuomintang had won
the Chinese civil war and established democracy in the mainland, China would
have posed the same strategic threats to India and Japan. Emmott fails to
properly evaluate Chinese hyper-nationalism, which shows no sign of abating,
even if democracy arrived.
Moving to Japan, Emmott warns against writing it off as a spent force. Five
years of continuous economic growth and a new assertiveness in international
relations have brought Japan back into the reckoning. The bottlenecks it faces
are an aging and shrinking population and ensuing extra-budgetary burdens.
Mounting labor costs will be a difficult proposition for the Japanese economy
to cope with. Emmott is still hopeful that scarce labor will "provide a new
source of discipline to Japanese companies to become more efficient and
profitable" (p 115).
Japanese willingness to face up to China underscores Tokyo's "anxiety to
involve India in regional affairs" (p 96). A Japan in relative decline, with
expected annual gross domestic product (GDP)growth rates of only 1.4% for the
next five years, will have "little chance of standing tall and strong alongside
China" (p 106). It is in this context that Tokyo and New Delhi are growing
closer through "economic partnership agreements" and joint military exercises,
which Emmott labels "sensible precautions" against Chinese ascent (p 120).
On India, Emmott credits the momentum that has built up thanks to consistent
public policy, regardless of which political party is in power. All Indian
governments of the past 15 years have continued economic reforms, moved closer
to the United States and deepened engagement in East and Southeast Asia. As
India attains global standards of economic growth, it can no longer be
overlooked or treated with contempt, as China did in the past. Emmott sees
promise in the sharp rise in India's levels of savings (32% of GDP), investment
(34% of GDP) and manufacturing sector performance.
On infrastructure, India pales in comparison to China but is improving
nevertheless. India ranks well below even its South Asian neighbors on the ease
with which business can be transacted and contracts enforced. Except for
English language proficiency and an advanced service sector, "India comes up
short on almost every measure in comparison with China" (p 149).
Yet, in spite of the frustrations with India's wobbly progress, "more is being
done than in the past and things are still getting better" (p 145). For India
to march ahead, Emmott advocates meaningful free trade agreements with ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) or all members of the East Asia
Summit, and faster cross-border trade liberalization with South Asian neighbors
that is spearheaded by provincial governments rather than the central
government in Delhi.
Emmott devotes one chapter to the environmental degradation facing rapidly
industrializing China and India. He presents Japan as a role model to emulate
for cleaning up the smoggy and muddied Chinese and Indian skies and waters. A
combination of popular protests and the "oil shock"-induced switch away from
heavy industry to electronics and high-tech gadgetry helped Japan become a more
salubrious country in the 1970s.
China's lack of democracy and independent judiciary, however, leave
environmental improvement entirely in the hands of a central government that is
beholden to business interests. In a system where promotions and careers of
local officials depend on economic growth quotas, environmental law enforcement
has a dubious future.
The only way local bureaucrats will change their priorities is if a post-Kyoto
deal on global warming is signed by China and applied as external pressure on
the mandarins. As to India, New Delhi could be persuaded to join a post-Kyoto
treaty if Japan provides financial compensation and discounted technological
assistance on pollution control. Such an offer would also present Tokyo "yet
another way to balance China's rise" (p 182).
The later chapters of Emmott's book highlight old animosities among China,
Japan and India, which are worsening in spite of the continent's economic
integration. Heavily politicized interpretations of history endlessly muddle
Sino-Japanese relations. As Chinese and Japanese great power ambitions "well up
all over the region", flashpoints that look resolvable on paper simmer on (p
213). The biggest risk lies in the East China Sea, where Chinese "gunboat
diplomacy" over disputed islands and marine resources has raised Japanese
hackles. Chinese claims over parts of North Korea (the "Koguryo Kingdom") ring
alarms in Japan, which does not want a Chinese dagger pointing in its direction
from the Korean Peninsula.
Sino-Indian quarrels over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh have stabilized with
time, but risk re-ignition should unrest break out in Tibet during a period of
weak Chinese central government. The absence of strategic communication lines
among China, India, and Japan holds prospects of misunderstandings and
miscalculations in crises. Emmott recommends conversion of the East Asia Summit
into "Asia's principal political and economic forum", through which regular
dialogue among all three major powers is institutionalized (p 272).
Emmott's final chapter is a hodgepodge of unsubstantiated remarks and
scenarios. He argues against factual reality that a rapid rise in oil prices
would not hurt economic growth in rich, consuming countries. He claims that
terrorism and political tension have remained distant from the main arenas of
Asian growth, trade and investment between 2003 and 2007, notwithstanding the
massive economic costs India has endured from jihadi terrorism. Emmott seems to
want readers to believe that India escaped terrorism and that this enabled it
to grow economically. He could have done better by offering an explanation of
how India managed to grow despite being buffeted with terrorism.
Apart from the general deficiency of reading like a collection of Economist
Intelligence Unit country reports, Emmott's book sits on the flawed premise
that China, India and Japan are all "grinding up against each other and each is
suspicious of the others' moves" (p 253). How can India and Japan be rivals in
any sense? Asia is actually beset by two dyadic rivalries, that is, China
versus India and China versus Japan. Emmott's concept of a triangular contest
is imaginary and illogical. Occasionally, he does broach the possibility of
Japan and India "ganging up together against China" (p 263), but fails to
unravel the mystery of why such an alignment is taking so long to germinate.
Emmott's yen for futurology yields interesting speculations on what might
happen after the deaths of Kim Jong-il in North Korea or the exiled Tibetan
spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, but he bypasses the impact of
Russian-American tensions on how Asia's "Big Three" relate to each other.
The author's Western lenses, trained to accept the US as the sole stabilizer in
Asia, are blind to the meaning of Russian renaissance for Asia's power balance.
His faith in the US and the European Union to bring about peaceful change in
Asia overlooks two vital puzzles: How will the emerging Russian-Chinese entente
affect traditionally strong Russian-Indian ties and and how does the Moscow
card impinge on the cagey Sino-Indian relationship?
By the end of the book, one is left wondering whether geopolitics matters at
all or if the "new Asian drama" can largely be explained by rating the economic
growth prospects of its protagonists. A consultancy style comparative
stocktaking of the Indian, Chinese and Japanese economies and polities differs
from a study of the diplomatic maneuvering among the three states along with
two other players - the United States and Russia. Emmott's disappointing fare
tries to do a bit of both and falls short.
Rivals. How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan will Shape our
Next Decade by Bill Emmott, Allen Lane, London, 2008. ISBN:
9781846140099. Price: US$26, 314 pages.
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Sadly, this preoccupation with domestic issues leads to lengthy assessments of
each country's internal affairs that are not fully relevant to the book's theme
of inter-state rivalry. Trapped in the shopworn modernization paradigm of
"disruptive transformation" inside each society, Emmott misses slices of the
larger geopolitical canvas on which Asia's power struggles are being played
out.
