Page 1 of 2 The rise of another Red army
By John Lee
Following the crackdown on Tibetan protesters in March, Chinese President Hu
Jintao issued a call for "greater security guarantees" against protesters and
other disruptive forces in the run up to the Summer Olympic Games to be held in
August.
At the same time, the official news bulletin of the People's Armed Police (PAP)
informed its troops that a "political mobilization order" had gone out
demanding that internal security and domestic order was paramount leading up to
and during the Games. According to the People's Armed Police News bulletin in
April, "The drums of war are sounding; a decisive battle is at hand. For the
sake of the Chinese nation's image and for the
honor of the PAP, let us never forget our duty."
The "duty" of the approximately 800,000 Chinese PAP troops, the majority
designated for "domestic security" roles, recently caught the attention of
China-watchers. Reports surfaced in prominent American and European press
outlets that the blue track-suited Olympic flame "attendants" were drawn from
the PAP - the same organization that led the crackdown of protesters in Tibet
[1].
In January 2006, two senior PAP generals published an article in the
influential magazine Qiushi (Seeking Truth) stating that the PAP should
"become an extremely combat-effective force to deal with sudden incidents".
Many China-watchers had previously focused most of their attention on the
People's Liberation Army (PLA), arguing that the process of the PLA becoming a
modern, professional army of the state rather than one dealing with domestic
problems and serving the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was evolving albeit
slowly.
Analysts knew that many PAP troops, possibly around half, were composed of
former PLA personnel drawn from fourteen divisions during the latter's
downsizing from the 1990s onwards. But even if the PAP received the unwanted
"dregs" of the PLA, as some experts quipped, little was known about this more
secretive entity.
In the short to medium term, domestic instability rather than external threats
constitute the greater threat to the regime. According to the latest official
figures, there were 87,000 instances of unrest (defined as involving 15 or more
people) in 2005. Under Article 22 of the National Defense Law, the PAP is
charged with "maintaining public order". Evidence is slowly emerging that
although funding, planning, and operational control over the PAP is complicated
- reflecting the struggle for influence by different institutions within the
Chinese system - the PAP is quickly becoming the primary domestic coercive
instrument of CCP rank and file officials.
Since the Tiananmen protests in 1989, the PLA has been reluctant to become the
main arm called upon to enforce domestic stability, preferring instead to
remold itself into a professional, externally-orientated force. Meanwhile, any
hopes that the PLA is evolving into a fiercely nationalistic and assertive but
apolitical "state army" must be tempered by the evolution of the PAP as the
"party's army".
PAP and the PLA
Even though the PLA and PAP are deemed to be legally separate entities, the PAP
is often seen as under the control of the PLA. This is due to the formal and
informal influence that the PLA exerts over the PAP.
First, hundreds of thousands of PAP personnel were drawn directly from
dismantled divisions within the PLA. Today's PAP is modeled after the army in
terms of ranks, structure and guiding concepts. Regulations that apply to the
PLA similarly apply to the PAP. Both implement the Military Service Law of the
country, and PAP troops enjoy the same benefits as PLA troops. Almost thirty
PAP officers have been promoted to the rank of major general. The culture
within the PAP is a distinctly "military".
Second, even though the PAP is responsible for internal security, its personnel
are frequently asked to cooperate with the PLA in military operations and
exercises [2]. The distinction between internal and external operations is
sometimes unclear.
Third, personnel management in the PAP is centralized rather than localized.
This means that as the leaders within China's messy but interlinked security
network of military, paramilitary and militia forces, senior PLA officers play
an enormous role in the appointment and even promotion of PAP personnel [3].
Becoming the 'party's army'
Officially, the PAP remains under the joint leadership of the Central Military
Commission (CMC) and State Council. The 1997 National Defense Law explicitly
states that the armed forces (which include the PLA, PAP, militia and reserves)
are subordinate to the "state". Only in one clause - Article 19 - does it
mention the party: "The armed forces of the People's Republic of China are
subject to leadership by the Communist Party, and CCP organizations in the
armed forces shall conduct activities in accordance with the CCP constitution."
This tension between loyalty to the state and loyalty to the party is nothing
new for China watchers. It is a tension that analysts looking at the PLA have
pointed to for decades. But even as China's leaders and its senior generals
eagerly brand the PLA as becoming more professional and "apolitical", the
evidence that the PAP primarily remains the party's organ is strong. The
culture, internal structure, and training of the PAP might mirror the PLA but
financial, structural, and operational realities are pushing the PAP closer
towards the party.
Funding the PAP
Financially, the salaries and operational expenses of PAP personnel are paid by
central and local government budgets rather than that of the military.
Centrally, funding is coordinated through the Ministry of Finance and Ministry
of Public Security.
Since the mid-1990s, the funding situation has become much more complex.
According to Ministry of Finance figures, local authorities are gradually
bearing more and more of the costs for expenditure by the PAP. In 1996, the
local share was only around 2.5%, rising to 10% in 2003 [4]. In 2006, it was
estimated to be around 15%.
In China today, central authorities only collect and dispense around one
quarter of all fiscal spending. Local governments account for the other three
quarters [5]. Due to the fact that local PAP officers tend to offer obedience
and favors to local officials in return for receiving extra funds officially
and unofficially, it is certain that the official Ministry of Finance figures
are overly conservative.
Controlling the PAP from the bottom-up
Many analysts focus on the statements of China's central leaders (for example
President Hu Jintao and Meng Jianzhu who heads the Ministry of Public Security)
to gauge developments in the country's armed and security forces. However, as
far as the PAP is concerned, the focus should be at the provincial and lower
levels. The greater financial burden borne by local budgets is significant. It
is symptomatic of a general shift toward decentralization of many of the
state's functions which actually enhance and entrench the role of local CCP
officials and their de facto control networks over state organs such as the
PAP.
There are three levels to the PAP leadership structure: general headquarters
(central), contingent (provincial levels), and detachment (county levels). In
terms of overall operations and capacity building, the general headquarters is
under the leadership of the Ministry of Public Security. There is a PAP command
office in every province and territory. At the provincial level, a garrison
command office is established that includes the leaders of local public
security officials as well as leaders of local PAP units. These garrisons are
obligated to follow the "directions" of the local PLA Garrison Command
Headquarters. However, the implementation of these "directions" are left to the
discretion of local PAP and local public security leaders.
If this "joint leadership" system sounds confusing, it is. Even though one
purpose of reform was to create a more vertical command structure such that CMC
control over local PAP units would be more effective, the chain of command is
seemingly as unclear now as it was before Tiananmen. Although there is very
little official material on how these reforms have worked in practice,
piecemeal and anecdotal local sources indicate that CCP officials continue to
exercise a great deal of influence when it
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