China and Taiwan off to a flying start
By Richard Bush
So far, events have proven the optimists to be correct. The dialogue between
Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the China's Association for
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) has resumed. As the basis, the
Taiwan side only pledged adherence to the "1992 consensus", and Beijing did not
object to President Ma Ying-jeou's formulation of this phrase, even though the
resulting association with "one China" is vague.
SEF chairman Chiang Pin-kung held meetings in Beijing on June 12 and 13 with
his counterpart Chen Yunlin, chairman of ARATS. The two signed agreements
concerning weekend charter flights and mainland tourists. The first round of
cross-strait flights is scheduled for July 4-7. Each of mainland and Taiwan
airlines will
be allowed to handle up to 18 roundtrip flights from Friday to Monday.
True, the previous Democratic Progressive Party government did most of the work
on both agreements, but it was not until the political climate had changed with
Ma's presidential victory this year that drafts could be turned into signed
texts.
The two sides are off to a good start, but it is only a start. At this early
stage, the two sides should be pleased with their initial achievements, but
they should remember that they have embarked on a long and complicated process
of re-engagement. Expectations are high and pitfalls exist. The recent
experience of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak demonstrates what happens
when a leader ignores pitfalls and cannot meet expectations. Lee's popularity
has plummeted since he took office in February and he faces strong domestic
opposition over the import of United States beef into South Korea and a trade
pact with the US.
By its nature, the re-engagement process across the strait must be gradual and
interactive. Over the past 15 years, mutual trust and shared understanding
between the two sides have declined seriously. There was a downward spiral of
mutual insecurity as each side believed increasingly that the other threatened
its fundamental interests. Each adopted policies based on those fears.
China built up its military to deter what it believed were Taiwan's separatist
schemes. Taiwan leaders intensified claims of sovereignty as a defense against,
as they saw it, looming domination by Beijing. Each side's moves intensified
the other's defense mechanisms.
Now that Ma has taken the stage and dialogue has resumed with good initial
results, the atmosphere is certainly better. But it does not mean that the
mistrust of the past 15 years has disappeared with the Chiang-Chen meeting.
People's Liberation Army Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian recently warned that
"secessionist forces for 'Taiwan Independence' will continue with separation
movements" and asserted that "the mission of opposing and curbing secessionist
activities remains strenuous".
Taiwan lives under the cloud of China's growing military capabilities,
particularly ballistic missiles. If the two sides are to reduce mistrust and
increase mutual understanding, it will occur not through some "grand bargain"
but as a result of a gradual, step-by-step process where each side's
initiatives do not entail substantial risk and the other's positive response
encourages momentum.
The current interactive process will also succeed if Beijing and Taipei agree,
at least informally, on what its goal is. Having an objective gives the two
sides focus and a sense of purpose. On democratic Taiwan, the existence of a
goal gives the public a benchmark with which to evaluate the performance of the
Ma administration. Every time the two sides successfully take a step toward
that objective, they gain more confidence that more can be achieved.
Clearly, the goal is not unification: Ma has made clear that is not on the
agenda during the period of his administration. And that makes substantive and
political sense. The obstacles to resolving the fundamental cross-strait
dispute are too profound to address any time soon. Moreover, the Taiwan public
is not ready to forge consensus on them.
But it appears the two sides have identified another goal worth striving for.
My own term for this goal is "stabilization", that is, creation of an
environment for cross-strait relations that allows the two sides to coexist
without mutual fear. Stabilization begins with each side's declaratory
reassurance that it does not intend to challenge the fundamental interests of
the other. Stabilization requires reliable channels of communication and
dialogue, such as the SEF-ARATS channel that has resumed (and it is proper that
SEF-ARATS be the primary channel).
Stabilization takes substantive form through broadening and deepening of
cooperation in a variety of fields. This will occur most obviously and quickly
in the economic field, but it must also expand into the arenas of international
space and security if it is to be convincing and enduring. If fully realized
through an incremental process, stabilization will make cross-strait relations
more predictable and will significantly reduce mutual fear. Leaders will be far
less likely to suspect that the other side is preparing to change the status
quo. They would therefore see less need to pursue the hedging and deterrence
policies which so far have fed the insecurity spiral.
Obviously, bringing about stabilization is an extremely challenging task,
particularly at the beginning. The balance of rewards must be equitable. Even
as each side tries to reassure, the other still has doubts (which is why
building trust must be incremental). Each side has interests that it must
protect.
Taiwan will seek to preserve the claim that the Republic of China is a
sovereign state, even as it refrains from doing so in a provocative way.
Indeed, the sovereignty issue will become a practical obstacle to broadening
and deepening cooperation if the two sides do not find ways to keep it from
becoming so.
How to translate the decline in mutual fear into less threatening military
arsenals is a complex question, particularly for Beijing. Leaders on each side
will have to ensure that key political constituencies tolerate their respective
policy courses. Ma must maintain the support of independents and cannot totally
alienate pan-green voters. President Hu Jintao will have to keep military
leaders on board.
Balancing all these factors will not be an easy task for either leader. This is
a new challenge for each. Beijing may not yet realize how much Ma Ying-jeou is
depending on its positive moves to help him ensure sustained political support
within Taiwan for his policy agenda. Yet the two sides have learned something
from the experience of the past 15 years. They have stared into the abyss of
mutual fear. They appear to understand what can be gained from seizing today's
strategic opportunity. For all the difficulties that lie ahead, they are off to
a good start.
Richard Bush (RBUSH@brookings.edu) is director of the Center for
Northeast Asian Policy Studies (http://www.brookings.edu/cnaps.aspx) at
the Brookings Institution in Washington DC.
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