Page 2 of 4 CHINA'S MASSIVE WRENCH, Part 1 Change in the face of foreign devils By Francesco Sisci
emperor and dynasty, setting new standards for the old stability game.
In the 20th century, Chiang Kai-shek and communist leader Mao Zedong also
followed this pattern. Although they did not call themselves "emperors", they
were the ultimate embodiment of the interests of the state and the ones who set
the grand directions. Deng Xiaoping's rule (1978 to the early 1990s) was
softer, but he still commanded great respect. Jiang Zemin (president from 1993
to 2003), was something in between.
However, the real radical change occurred at the beginning of this century,
with the smooth transition of power from Jiang to Hu
Jintao, the current president. That transition confirmed that both men were not
emperors. They are Communist Party officials promoted because of merit to
become head of state, but they do not embody the ultimate interests of the
state. They cannot make the ultimate decisions alone - they have to reach a
consensus among top leaders.
And they cannot even choose their own successors: Hu's post was decided by Deng
(Jiang might have preferred Zeng Qinghong), and Hu's successor Xi Jinping was
not decided by Hu alone (who might have preferred Li Keqiang). Both Jiang and
Hu are top managers, but this raises a new question: who embodies the interests
of the state and of the people?
In democracies, those interests are represented by the electoral body, which
votes for the head of state and other representatives. In modern China, there
are no elections and the "legitimization" offered by the leaders is simple: we
are in power because we are in power. If nobody topples us, then we are
legitimized to stay. We can stay in power by granting economic growth and
development that spreads welfare to the whole population, although unequally.
However, legitimization is only part of the issue. The larger issue is: who
decides the broad direction for the country to take? What are the criteria and
standards to judge the performance of officials and top managing-rulers? Here,
there are two arenas that have a greater and lesser voice in deciding on
performance and setting goals.
The less powerful arena (whose voice is growing) is public opinion, which is
conveyed by a number of channels, such as local media, blogs on the web, social
surveys and local elections. This does not form a black and white picture, but
reveals in which direction general interests are moving, or not moving. For
instance, on the issue of environmental protection, 10 years ago people were
less responsive to it, now they are more receptive.
A more powerful arena influencing China's leaders is a pool of experts, old
party cadres called on to discuss different policies. The opinion of experts is
solicited when considering any given policy, and the opinion of retired cadres,
who now have no vested interests, is also tapped to consider the promotion of
party officials. Tens of thousands were consulted to set the program for the
Communist Party Congress in 2007, and 5,000 helped write the draft.
Even after retirement, officials have access to some levels of internal news
bulletins and maintain privileged channels of communication with the top
leadership. Therefore, they influence the broad decision-making process.
But the system is not transparent, opening many avenues for corruption. For
example, middle- and low-level party officials who are backed by companies can
try to climb up the official ladder by distributing presents and favors to
higher-ranking officials. Companies, especially if they are state ones, can try
to move policies by offering gifts and favors to officials.
It was to counter this that the party moved toward appealing to academic
experts, with no personal interest in the issues involved, and retired cadres,
also without personal interests.
The whole process is secretive and thus not open to wide interference. But even
this is not watertight, and the leaders know it. For this reason, they are now
pushing for some form of democratization, although they are concerned about the
shortcomings of that system as well.
The party faces a major dilemma over how to move forward, especially as, for
many people, the ultimate goal is to be "emperor".
A crowd of emperors
At the southern end of Tiananmen Square in the capital Beijing, next to
Zhengyang Men ("The Midday Gate") and about 200 meters from Mao's mausoleum,
there is a spot where people take pictures of their children dressed as little
Manchu emperors, sitting on a throne.
The place is symbolic: the ancient gate once opened on the nei cheng (inner
city) and the buildings of the imperial government. Every day, there is a line
of parents, mostly from the countryside, holding their children by the hand and
waiting to take pictures as a sign of good luck. Each parent wants his or her
only child to be successful - to become an emperor.
For centuries in ancient times there were only two ways to be successful. The
first was to lead a rebellion or follow one - to topple a dynasty and become
the emperor, or part of his circle. This was the method of Liu Bang (the
founder of the Han Dynasty, 206 BC-220 AD), Zhu Yuanzhang (founder of the Ming
Dynasty, 1368-1644 AD), and Mao Zedong ( founder of the "communist dynasty").
The path is extremely dangerous - one could easily lose his head - and the
possibilities of success are very slim.
Second, an ambitious young man could pursue a career as an imperial official.
He could take the challenging exams, and if he passed become even the top
official of the empire. This path had no risk - nobody would kill the youth who
did not pass his exam. And it was relatively easier. Although the official
bureaucracy was tiny compared to the population, hundreds of officials were
promoted every year, giving the average person a much better chance to succeed
this way than by rebelling against the system. For this reason, most people
first tried to become an official.
However, the exam system was not perfect, and many rebel leaders began as
students who had failed the imperial examinations, like the famous Hong
Xiuquan, who started the Taiping rebellion that in the middle of the 19th
century almost toppled the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911 AD). If these brilliant
people had earned a post, perhaps there would have been no rebellion, or a much
more modest one.
There is a less common path to try to make a fortune for oneself - clever
people could go into business. This path, however, was not as glorious as the
choice of being an official, the top of the social hierarchy. And although not
as risky as being a rebel, it was far from secure. Officials could easily
concoct all kinds of excuses to seize the property of rich merchants. Business,
concentrated in cities, was tolerated but not exalted, and businessmen had to
be careful not to eclipse the wealth of local officials, who had to remain
officially the richest in the area.
Businessmen could protect their assets in two ways: befriending officials or
having their son pass state examinations and become an official. The second
choice was safer and considered more socially respectable than the first. The
remainder of the people, the vast majority of the population, were peasants who
were bound to the land and had all types of constraints to leaving their place
and moving on.
Furthermore, officials and peasants were the stronghold of stable power, the
guarantors that nothing would change and the imperial power would be
unchallenged. Business, with its drive to accumulate wealth and invest in new
ventures, was a force for instability and change. This had to be tolerated for
several reasons, but the imperial power could not allow business and enterprise
to grow to threaten the emperor's stability.
This situation has changed in the past 30 years. Officials are still selected
through a complex party system, with courses and exams, but now business is
exalted for the first time in Chinese history. Business is central to the drive
for fast development, which is the paramount task for the nation to recover its
former might and glory. This has many consequences.
On a personal level, being a businessman is now as glorious as - or perhaps
even more than - being an official. When the best kids at university are chosen
to join the party and have an official career, they feel it is an honor that
they must accept. But this career is long, very difficult, full of traps and
rewarding only at the end - if, at about age 50, one has managed to survive the
political selection and become a senior official.
Most young people prefer to try to become businessmen. They can be successful
early in their lives, they are freer since they are not subject to strict party
discipline, and they can enjoy themselves with the money they make. A
businessman can have his own enterprise and decide what to do with minimal
official interference. In other words, each young person can become the little
emperor of a small empire, a possibility that did not exist in the imperial
past.
Besides, trying one's hand in business is easier and far less risky than trying
to start a revolution to become emperor.
On a social level, the changes brought by business and enterprises must be
"digested" at every level by the system. Formerly, the imperial system could
stop businesses from threatening the status quo. Now the nation wants to
improve the status quo, and therefore it has to push for new businesses and
then factor in the constant changes to the social and political fabric of the
nation. Moreover, business-driven growth means urbanization, depopulation of
the countryside, decimation of the peasant class, the end of ancient rural
China and the birth of a new, urbanized China. This course will follow the only
existing pattern for urbanization - the Western one.
Most importantly, the overall system has discarded the ancient notion of
stability and embraced the notions of change and
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