Page 2 of 2 Two tormented Chinese Catholic souls
By Francesco Sisci
fact, recognized by both parties, and by the mid-1990s the concept of an
"underground church" had changed its meaning. These people were no longer
clandestine nor were their activities unknown to the local government. Rather,
they were people well known to Chinese authorities who refused to register with
the patriotic association, loyal to the principle that the association was not
recognized by the pope.
The underground priests and bishops were mostly free to lead their own
services, except for some occasional government harassment. This is not to be
complacent about the harassment, but to stress that times had drastically
changed from a period
when priests had to totally conceal their identity and activity.
This de facto legalization of underground church activity, the fact that by
1999 and 2000 most underground bishops had come to terms with local
governments, and the fear caused by the Falungong threat, created the premise
for China's first attempt to normalize relations with the Holy See.
Furthermore, despite decades of harsh repression, Chinese Catholics had never
rebelled and, even during the Tiananmen movement in 1989, they did not join the
protests. In that particular case, Bishop Zen of Hong Kong ordered priests and
seminarians to stay clear of the demonstrations. In a way, this proved to the
government that the Catholics were reliable. However, this first attempt of
reconciliation failed miserably under still-mysterious circumstances.
Beijing, basically, had decided to normalize ties in 2001, giving in to most of
the Vatican's requests. However, China learned that the Vatican had decided to
canonize 120 Chinese martyrs on October 1, China's national day. Beijing saw
this as a provocation because the Vatican had chosen national day as,
seemingly, to conceal the Catholic religious celebration during a busy national
holiday, and because the martyrs were all people killed by the Chinese
government (although none of the saints were killed after 1949). The long list
did not include people like Matteo Ricci, highly respected in China, whose tomb
has been preserved and restored within the Beijing Communist Party School area.
The Chinese signaled, many times, their concern about the canonization, but all
alarms went unnoticed in Rome. To this day, it is still not clear what
happened. Beijing still suspects that it was a deliberate act of provocation,
created with the support of the Taiwanese government of that time [3].
The Holy See claims it underestimated the gravity of the situation until, in
September 2001, Cardinal Roger Etchegaray returned from Beijing carrying a very
strong warning for the Pope. The Chinese were hoping the Vatican could, at
least, postpone the canonization, but it was already too late for that.
It was a major loss of face for China, and for then-Chinese president Jiang
Zemin, who had personally pushed for the rapprochement.
A total freeze of ties followed.
The Chinese were suspicious of the Vatican for several reasons. The Catholics
were an organized Church with their foreign head located abroad, out of reach
of Chinese authorities, as was the case with the Dalai Lama residing in India
with Tibetan Buddhists, and Li Hongzhi, head of the Falungong, living in
America. Moreover, unlike the Dalai Lama or Li Hongzhi, the pope had an
international stature, as he had a state, though minimal, and official
representatives, nuncios, in all world capitals and international
organizations.
The nature of this relation was different from that of other states. In other
bilateral relations, trade was the largest conveyor of communications.
Typically, if something went wrong on the political side, rising or falling
trade could signal the state of health of relations or provide little stings
that reminded the other party to pay attention. China and the Vatican would
have no trade, meaning, if Beijing were unhappy about Vatican policies it would
have to arrest Chinese priests. However, since these priests were, first,
Chinese, it would be like, as an official put it to me, "Slapping my own face
to show it to you. Then you don't care and I slap my face some more. In the
end, you have suffered nothing and I am sick."
Last, but surely not least, there was the ancient difficulty in drawing a line
between religion and politics, or faith in divinity and ideology. This last
point was the most controversial because it interfered directly with the party
idea of its being the ultimate decision maker on issues of state and civil
behavior.
A new era is born
These differences were eased by moves on both sides. The pope sent several
messages in 2006 and 2007 to Beijing, stressing that he wanted Chinese
Catholics to be good Chinese citizens. In fact, he claimed that there was no
contradiction between the two, and in his letter to the Chinese people, issued
in June 2007, he canceled the state of emergency in China, and, for the first
time fully recognized the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China. Because
of this, he also ended the practice of appointing bishops made by the
underground church and stressed that all new appointments had to be agreed on
with the Chinese authorities. The common choice of the new bishop of Beijing,
in September 2007, was evidence of this new relationship.
Furthermore, at the party congress held in autumn of that year, party secretary
Hu Jintao praised the role of religion in building a "harmonious society" and
on December 26, the day after Christmas, he chaired a politburo study meeting
on religion, the first ever in the history of the Chinese Communist Party.
Here, again, there was repeated only praise for the role of religion in
society.
However, the most outspoken controversies seem not to be between the pope and
Hu Jintao, as between the two souls of Chinese Catholics. For both fear being
crushed by the new normalization of ties.
The official Catholic Church worries over losing its standing, its direct
contacts with the government leadership, its control of the physical assets of
the church and its power over the hierarchy. The underground church fears being
completely swept under the carpet and sacrificed by the official church. Both
know that a time of total freedom has ended. So far both groups, in fact, have
not responded to the Chinese government or to the Vatican. Church officials did
not respond to the government, claiming they were loyal to Beijing. At the same
time, Beijing did little to interfere in the internal life of official
Catholics, seeking not to arouse opposition. The underground church did not
obey the government, as it hardly recognized it and was, also, quite
independent of Rome, claiming the distance, the particular conditions, and the
official persecution kept it separate.
Over the years, things have grown so confused and so messy that in some
dioceses there are now three bishops: one official, one underground, one
"conciliatory", and all fighting with each other for authority.
It is as if parts of the same separated body are fighting with each other,
knowing they will be sewn together again but not sure how they are going to
live with each other.
At the moment, there are two possible solutions.
First solution: To reach a minimal agreement and then build
slowly on successive revisions. This would require sending a nuncio to
Beijing to manage all the conflicting streams of Chinese Catholicism.
Second solution: To first reach a comprehensive agreement and
begin a normalization, while sending a nuncio to Beijing.
Some middle-ranking officials, on both sides, concerned with the actual
implementation of the agreement, would prefer the latter; while top leaders on
both sides might go for the former, as they are interested in reaping the broad
political fallout of the agreement (the Chinese) or, practically, begin by
sorting out the local complications of the life of the Chinese church.
Besides the larger friction, there is a growing trust between the two sides.
China and the Holy See reached an informal agreement on the choice for the
priest who became bishop of Beijing last year, after the demise of Fu Tianshan.
Fu was earlier appointed by the government but not recognized by Rome.
Conversely, following intense consultations in 2007, Beijing and Rome jointly
picked young Li Shan (born in 1965) to the prestigious and symbolic position of
Bishop of Beijing, now the virtual head of the Chinese Catholic Church.
Furthermore, for the first time since the departure of the last nuncio in
1951, the Chinese government agreed to allow four Catholic priests to celebrate
one mass each week in five foreign languages during the Summer Olympic Games.
The masses, to be held in three central churches, will be conducted in Italian,
Spanish, German, French and Korean. English-language masses are already
celebrated by Chinese priests. These masses are intended for the foreign
community that will flock to Beijing for the period of the Olympics and
Para-Olympics, running through September 20 and, thus, their political impact
will be minimized. However, this is seen as a major political event as the
government will concede some 50 occasions (the total number of masses) to
foreign, uncontrolled priests to preach the Catholic creed in "communist"
Beijing. The event is being interpreted as important proof of a new trust
between China and the Holy See.
Yet, in the end, both sides are clear that the agreement cannot be just a
political barter of small clauses on a piece of paper. Present China is the
continuity of a millennial tradition, and the Vatican represents the only
continuity of 30 centuries of Western civilization, as it inherited the
tradition of the Jews, the Greeks and the ancient Romans all the way to the
present, and in agreement or in opposition to it, the Christian tradition is
largely defined by Rome.
If these two traditions manage to find common cultural grounds, a deeper
dialogue, beyond the petty economic or political bartering between China and
the Western world could be put in place.
In the end, what will also matter will be to find common values going beyond
the issue of national integrity, something that was forced onto China by
Western powers in colonial times. China, before adapting to "modern Western
concepts" of a nation state, was something close to the American melting pot:
you could speak Chinese, you behaved like a Chinese, therefore you were
Chinese, despite the color of your hair, your skin or even your accent.
Meanwhile, in the West: "In their rebellion against Christianity, the nations
of Europe have exhausted and demoralized themselves. After the catastrophes of
the past century, they are neither Christian nor nationalist." [4]
In China, influential thinkers such as Zhao Tingyang, Huang Ping, Li Xiaoning,
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui are striving to create new doctrines that go
beyond the notion of the nation, as the post-Westphalian nation-states imposed
onto China since the 19th century. In this sense, their effort appears parallel
to similar elaborations going on in the US. However, this is a whole new
subject that goes beyond the scope of the present article.
This new cultural project should be the real basis for the renewal of
international organizations like the United Nations, the International Monetary
Fund and others that now are seen as increasingly outdated.
Notes
1. The term yuanfen that many people use when talking about how they met
the pastor they trust, belongs to Buddhist terminology. Certainly, this is used
for a lack of better words and for the common usage of the term. Still, it is a
further indication of the syncretistic nature of Chinese Christianity.
2. My conversation with a senior official in 2000, after the severe crackdown
on the Falungong.
3. The Taiwanese were very concerned about normalization of ties with the
Vatican, something that would have further isolated the island, officially part
of China although de facto independent.
4. David Shushon "Zionism for Christians", 2008, First Things (June/July 2008).
(The author would like to thank Professor Daniel L Overmyer for the long
conversation and the enlightening readings that have inspired most of this
article.)
Francesco Sisci, Asia Editor of La Stampa.
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