Past presents problems for Tibet
By Karine Gagne, Francois Pesant and Denis Burke
Sporadic negotiations between Beijing and representatives of the Dalai Lama,
the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, over the past 30 years have stalled
repeatedly. The latest invitation from Beijing came amid trouble in Tibet and
the public relations nightmare surrounding the route of the Olympic torch as it
made its way to Beijing. Cynical appraisals of these talks could be both
expected and forgivable. Nevertheless, the possibility that the stakes and
positions of the actors in these talks have changed recently should not be
ruled out.
"Almost every year, almost 500 [Tibetan refugees] at school age are coming,
then there must be 1,000 or 1,500 older people," Samdhong Rinpoche told us.
These numbers are consistent with the annual statistics published by the
Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy. The sheer volume of refugees
leaving
Tibet every year has left UN refugee centers in Nepal overwhelmed for some
years now. Such high numbers speak volumes about conditions in Tibet.
Samdhong Rinphoche was among the first wave of these refugees who left Tibet in
1959 following the Dalai Lama. Since he was elected prime minister of the
Central Tibetan Administration, he has made it a top priority to push for
negotiations with Beijing in response to these conditions. In 2002, his efforts
were rewarded as talks resumed with vigor after seven years of no
communication. In the following four years, positive steps were taken, Samdhong
Rinpoche told us, as both sides came to feel comfortable that the other was not
masking another agenda.
Measuring his words carefully, he described the six rounds of talks very
positively. "During the third round, China cleared up all their doubts and
suspicions. In the fourth round, we responded to all their questions, and for
both sides, everything was crystal clear. We know now what the Chinese concerns
are and the Chinese now know our aspirations ... there is no misunderstanding,
each one knows the other's position very well."
But without any clear catalyst, Beijing launched a campaign against the Dalai
Lama in the monasteries and convents of Tibet, reaffirming their stance that he
is a "splittist" through re-education for those who persisted in venerating
him. Not unsurprisingly, this had the effect of poisoning and stalling these
talks.
China has reinvented itself in many ways in the last three decades. Could
Beijing's stance on Tibet yet see a similar transformation?
Tibet, like so many points on Beijing's political agenda, was reassessed in the
wake of the Mao Zedong era. Prior to the mid-1970s, Beijing refused to
entertain the possibility that Tibet as a political entity, let alone the Dalai
Lama's government, warranted discussion. But the far-reaching reforms,
implemented largely under Deng Xiaoping, led to an unexpected shift in the
China's attitude towards Tibet. Beijing contacted the Tibetan administration in
India with a new message; if the exiles were prepared to rule out secession
from greater China, negotiations would be possible. The Dalai Lama signaled his
approval and negotiations have taken place several times since.
History, however, has been an almost insurmountable obstacle to these talks.
Among the many conditions demanded by Beijing was the disclaimer that Tibet had
never been an independent entity. Any such claim would mean that Chinese
military action in Tibet in the 1950s would be considered an act of aggression
and not of liberation. Neither the Dalai Lama nor any of his envoys have been
willing to concede this point. Like in so many conflicts, neither of the
opposing accounts of the 20th century history would satisfy reasonable academic
standards.
Nevertheless, this ground-level problem has far-reaching implications for the
possibilities of meaningful discussion. As long as China is of the opinion that
Tibet is (and always has been) part of its territory, and Tibet is of the
opinion that Tibet was not under Chinese jurisdiction prior to 1950, progress
will most likely continue to be evasive. Tibet's stance demands legal,
international negotiations while China's demands localized, mediated talks. In
short, the Tibetan administration in exile aspires to be treated as
representative of a nation and Beijing has repeatedly signaled that they are
not prepared to deal with them as such.
Although cynical reactions to the Chinese stance are common and understandable
to a point, it is worth underlining that Beijing has not shut the talks down
completely, though the administration's behavior has been highly unpredictable
and certainly not conducive to rapprochement. The premature termination of the
last round of negotiations undid a deal of progress on both sides, leaving
Tibet in limbo.
And that was the lay of the land as the Olympics approached. Tibetans in
Dharamsala, the current residence of the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan
Administration, were showing signs of frustration with the negotiations, the
entire political agenda was, in some ways, beginning to look stale and
outdated.
March 10 is an important day on the Tibetan calendar. It marks the anniversary
of the failed uprising in Lhasa that ultimately led to the flight of the Dalai
Lama into exile.
This year brought the Olympic Games, and a great deal of international media
attention, to Beijing. The Beijing Olympics have been China's coming-out party.
Three decades of economic reform and lightning growth have culminated in this
opportunity to showcase the country's newfound prosperity and rapid
advancement.
March 10, 2008, then, was not going to be any given Monday. Protests led to
disorder all over ethnically Tibetan China, and eventually, around the world.
Paris, London, Katmandu, and New Delhi all saw large-scale protests. Trouble
followed the Olympic flame from Greece to California to Tokyo.
And somehow, even as official state media organs were painting the Dalai Lama
as a saboteur, Beijing announced that they were prepared to meet his envoys for
another round of talks.
The Dalai Lama's top advisers heard about the invitation through the
international press as Beijing neglected to inform them before announcing it to
the media. What followed was surprising for a variety of reasons.
As governments around the world signaled their approval of the talks, some
unexpected reactions came from Dharamsala. The Dalai Lama himself was quoted in
The Observer saying "'merely meeting some of my men in order to show the world
they are having dialogue would be meaningless". Samdhong Rinpoche expressed the
opinion that the conditions in Tibet were not an "appropriate platform for a
meaningful dialogue".
Following this chilly reception to the Chinese invitation, the exiles then sent
their top negotiators, Lodi Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen, to this "inappropriate
platform". Within days of the talks, Gyari told The Times of India: "We made it
clear (at the weekend talks) that the events in Tibet are the inescapable
consequences of wrong policies of the authorities towards the Tibetans, which
goes back several decades."
Not a single country in the world recognizes the Tibetan government in exile,
including India where it is based. Yet it seemed that this same administration
had found fresh confidence. At this point, political rhetoric aside, it must
have been clear to Beijing that there are distinct limits to the power of the
Dalai Lama within Tibet.
Dharamsala's call for non-violent resistance advocating autonomy within China
and not independence is a blessing that China has yet to fully appreciate. As
riots spread across Tibet and dissident Tibetan groups became more vocal at
protests around the world, the Dalai Lama's non-violent demands might have
seemed a lot more appealing.
And yet, the passage of the Olympic flame through Tibet saw a massive shut down
of daily life and some incendiary remarks from the local Communist Party leader
Zhang Qinli. The July round of the 2008 talks achieved little, though further
talks have been scheduled for October.
The wide politicization of the Games that the international Tibet movement
hoped for has failed to materialize. This could further drive support from the
established policy of seeking autonomy within China.
On August 21, the Dalai Lama told Le Monde that he had heard reports that as
many as 140 people may have been killed in Tibet this week. His unconfirmed
report was not taken up by the international press.
Neither the exiles nor Beijing are prepared to concede to the other's version
of history, but today as frustration looms large in the Tibetan diaspora and
China shoulders the mantle of responsible world player, they need to find a way
to reconcile the present.
(Karine Gagne spoke to Kalon Tripa Samdhong Rinpoche in his office in
Dharamsala, India. With Karine Gagne and Francois Pesant in Dharamsala and
Denis Burke in Amsterdam.)
Karine Gagne is a Canadian writer and anthropologist conducting research
among the Tibetan community in exile in India. Francois Pesant is a
freelance photojournalist based in Montreal, Canada. Denis Burke is a
writer and editor based in Amsterdam where he recently completed research on
Chinese- Tibetan affairs in the 21st Century.
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