China, Taiwan tiptoe towards detente
By Erdong Chen
In Asia, gifts matter. Consider the gift exchange during the recent high-level
chat between Taiwan's new President Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Yunlin. Chen is the
chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS),
Beijing's primary negotiation body with Taiwan. He recently went to Taipei for
five intensive days as the highest profile mainland visitor in the last 60
years.
Although Chen only met Ma for a brief talk, they did manage to exchange gifts.
Ma gave Chen a fine porcelain ornament. Porcelain, a key symbol of Chinese
culture, is also known as china. Ma's gift, then, can be interpreted as a sign
of the "One
China" consensus because what he gave Chen was one "china". Indeed, under the
framework of the "1992 consensus", which allows both parties to interpret the
term "one China" differently, Beijing and Taipei are willing to promote their
bilateral relationship while remaining ambiguous about more sensitive issues.
Both parties across the Taiwan Strait have been much more pragmatic and
realistic after the Beijing-friendly Nationalist Party took office following
Taiwan's presidential election earlier this year. Chen Shui-bian, the former
president of Taiwan, insisted on both political and cultural separation of
Taiwan from its mainland rival.
His successor, Ma, rejected the pro-independence approach and renewed talks
with Beijing in order to thaw the long icy cross-strait relationship. After
Ma's inauguration in May, representatives from the Taiwan-based Strait Exchange
Foundation (SEF) met with officials from ARATS in Beijing for the first time in
nearly 10 years. The visit marks a recent warming trend between Beijing and
Taipei, though the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the major opposition
party in Taiwan, continues to claim Ma's approach has led to a tremendous loss
of Taiwanese sovereignty.
Both sides of the Taiwan Strait have been avoiding direct confrontation on
sensitive issues like sovereignty these days, focusing instead on economic
reciprocity. Ma has promised that he would neither propose unification talks
with Beijing nor advocate independence, which would spark a potentially
catastrophic war. The majority of Taiwanese favor this status quo, which is a
kind of de facto independence. However, fundamental disputes between Beijing
and Taipei remain, such as Taipei's desire for more international space and US
arms sales to the island.
Landmark meeting
The landmark agreements signed during Chen Yunlin's recent visit ranged from
trade and transportation to food security. The two sides discussed broader
cooperation through economic, financial, and cultural exchanges. These
agreements also finally established the long-debated "three linkages" of direct
postal, transportation, and trade links across the Taiwan Strait.
The Taipei-based SEF and the Beijing-based ARATS signed 13 agreements in total,
tripling direct cross-strait charter flights, initiating tax-free cargo
shipments, and shortening the delivery time span for postal services. The lack
of direct transportation, which required the transfer of flights and cargo in
Hong Kong before reaching the ultimate destination, perennially troubled
businessmen on both sides and increased costs substantially. These artificial
barriers against free trade across the Taiwan Strait were probably the most
self-defeating policy of Chen Shui-bian's administration, as it sacrificed
numerous business opportunities on the altar of politics.
Having suffered an unprecedented economic recession and rising unemployment
rate under Chen, the Taiwanese want fundamental changes in their economic
environment and expect Ma's Beijing-friendly approach to turn around the
economy. In contrast with his predecessor, who was afraid of the potential
sovereignty risk of economic dependence on Beijing, Ma is willing to tie Taiwan
more closely to the most booming market in the world. By pitching Taiwan as a
destination for mainland tourists, Taipei has acknowledged the obvious benefit
of exploiting the market on the other side of the strait. At the same time,
Beijing is more than happy to lure more Taiwanese businessmen to invest in its
enormous market.
Accompanying Chen Yunlin on his historic trip were high-profile officials from
mainland financial institutions. Negotiators from both parties started
discussing the possibility of banks from each side establishing branches in the
other. At the same time, clearly influenced by the recent tainted milk case,
SEF and ARATS agreed to promote bilateral cooperation on food security. Given
the poor reputation of China's food and drug security, Beijing is taking pains
to convince Taipei it is making every effort to regulate the market. A few days
before departing for Taiwan, Chen Yunlin publicly apologized to the Taiwanese
for the tainted milk.
Continued divide
Based on these positive discussions, the next three-and-a-half years under Ma
may well be a boom time for cross-strait relations. However, fundamental
disputes between Beijing and Taipei persist. For instance, Taiwan continues to
desire more international recognition as a state even though most countries in
the world do not recognize it as such. It has lobbied to be awarded observer
status in the World Health Organization (WHO) but has been rejected 12 years in
a row. It will try again in May 2009 in hopes for more flexibility from
Beijing.
Beijing treats this issue with tremendous caution, as it's connected with the
legitimacy of its communist rule. Since Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan after
his defeat in China's civil war in 1949, China's Communist Party (CCP) has
claimed sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing has also chosen not to give up the
option of using force against Taiwan if necessary. The CCP, at least in the
near future, isn't likely to acknowledge Taiwan as an independent state.
Nevertheless, as long as Taipei doesn't declare formal independence, Beijing is
willing to sidestep the sovereignty issue.
The distrust between Beijing and Taipei also stems from military confrontation.
The arms race across the Taiwan Strait has persisted for decades. Beijing
modernized its military force by substantially increasing its military budget.
Relying on the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the United States to
"provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character", Taipei continues to place
arms orders with Washington. In October, Washington sent Taipei $6 billion
worth of advanced weapons. The package contained $3.1 billion in Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 guided missile systems, a sophisticated array of
missiles, radars, and control systems designed to defend against missiles and
aircraft.
Also included in this deal were $2.5 million worth of Apache attack helicopters
and support systems, more than $300 million in spare parts for F-5 and F-16 jet
fighters, and $47 million in Javelin guided missiles and command systems.
Beijing harshly denounced this deal and warned that it threatens the triangular
relationship of Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. At the same time, the deal
also triggered debate within Taiwan. Some believe that Taipei wasted too much
money in buying US weapons, many of which are unnecessary and undercut Taiwan's
own arms production capability. In addition, the deal threatens the military
balance across the strait with a new round in the no-win arms race.
US stakes
The changes that have occurred across the Taiwan Strait in the six months since
Ma took office are considerable. The three linkages are in place, and the two
sides are contemplating increased economic and social integration.
The United States can play an important role in supporting these developments.
President-elect Barack Obama didn't address Taiwan a lot during his campaign.
Four years ago, though, he declared that the United States "should be firm on
issues that divide us [from the Beijing government] - like Taiwan - while
flexible on issues that could unite us". It's likely, then, that the next
administration will continue to abide by both the Taiwan Relations Act and the
Three Communiques in formulating its Taiwan policy. Obama's support for the
latest arms sales suggests he will maintain the status quo on this issue as
well.
The Obama administration should continue to hold to the principle of strategic
ambiguity with regard to China and Taiwan. Washington needs to cooperate with
Beijing on economic issues, North Korea, and even anti-terrorism endeavors. By
maintaining a long-term strategic partnership with the rising superpower while
also raising human rights concerns, Obama can mitigate the pain of the
financial crisis and establish his own credibility by managing economics wisely
and effectively. At the same time, though Washington acknowledges Beijing as
the sole legitimate representative of China, it should never tolerate any form
of military action in realizing the cross-strait reunification. The Bush
administration sent several wrong messages to the Chen Shui-bian government,
infuriating Beijing and compromising the delicate status quo. Obama, the
consummate diplomat, won't be likely to make such obvious missteps.
Perhaps the next US president can also find some new common ground between
Taiwan and China. Obama deeply understands Taipei's desire for more
international space and Beijing's permanent opposition to the arms sales. He
could accommodate both sides here by arranging a quid pro quo with Beijing, in
which the United States provides security assurances in exchange for Beijing
allowing Taipei observer status at the WHO. The cross-strait relationship is on
the verge of a significant detente. With delicacy and diplomacy, the Obama
administration can help the two sides get along even better.
Erdong Chen is a Foreign Policy In Focus contributor and a student at
American University. He interns at the American Center for International Labor
Solidarity.
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