Page 1 of 2 The highs and lows of Sino-US relations
By Jing-dong Yuan
MONTEREY, California - Sino-United States relations in 2008 continue to remain
relatively stable despite the fact that this was an election year in the United
States. In past US presidential elections, the China issues tended to be raised
by candidates for partisan and electoral purposes. Bill Clinton, for example,
criticized president George W H Bush's China policy while candidate George W
Bush characterized China as a strategic competitor.
However, this year, China has more or less stayed out of US presidential
politics. While both president-elect Barack Obama
and John McCain raised some contentious issues regarding the bilateral
relationship that range from trade deficits to human rights, by and large the
two candidates also emphasized the importance of maintaining a stable
relationship with a rising power.
The high point of the bilateral relationship, from Beijing's perspective, was
President Bush's attendance to the August 8 opening ceremony of the 29th
Olympic Games. The Chinese were especially appreciative of Bush's decision to
go to Beijing against calls for boycott in the aftermath of the March riots in
Tibet, and despite the criticism of China's positions on the Darfur issue that
led many world leaders to stay out of the opening ceremony. Bush went as he
originally had committed, attended the official opening of the new US embassy
in Beijing and encouraged respect for human rights and freedom of expression in
China.
Other highlights of the year in bilateral relations include continued
high-level dialogues on security and economics between the two countries and
modest progress in military-to-military ties. Beijing and Washington cooperate
on the North Korean nuclear issue within the framework of the Six-Party Talks,
although the multilateral process seems to have again stalemated, with
Pyongyang refusing to accept the proposed verification provisions. The latest
round of the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) was held in early
December in Beijing, amid the deteriorating global financial crisis that poses
serious economic dislocations to both China and the United States.
Overall, Beijing and Washington have maintained close cooperation on issues
ranging from the global "war on terrorism" to North Korea's nuclear weapons
program. In addition, the two countries have strengthened and further
regularized mechanisms aimed at managing disputes and responding to potential
crises that in the past used to irritate bilateral relations. Bilateral
security, arms control and defense consultations, in addition to economic,
environmental and scientific cooperation, enable the two sides to discuss their
differences through dialogue, and with strategic visions.
However, the year has not completely gone without ruffles. While the Bush
administration has been explicit with regard to its "one China" policy, it
continues to implement policies to the contrary. Bush met with Dalai Lama in
the White House and the administration announced a US$6.4 billion arms sale
package to Taiwan in early October that includes PAC-3 missile defense systems
- despite the fact that after the March election of Ma Ying-jeou, cross-Strait
relations have noticeably improved. The latter event has caused Beijing to
suspend a number of bilateral consultations, including on nonproliferation and
defense. Congressional criticisms of China's human rights records have also
acted as an irritant in bilateral relations.
Beyond these incidents and frictions, fundamental differences remain between
China and the United States over military alliances, the role of nuclear
deterrence, missile defenses, use of force, and the resolution of the Taiwan
issue. Both continue to view each other's objectives and policies with caution
and even suspicion. The 2008 Department of Defense annual report on China's
military power clearly reflects this view, characterizing China's defense
modernization efforts as aimed beyond the Taiwan Strait. As a rapidly rising
power and the reigning superpower, China and the United States will face
important structural and perceptual challenges that would have far reaching
implications on regional peace, security and the stability of the post-Cold War
international system in the coming decades.
Cooperative, yes, but a complex relationship
The year 2008 is important for China and for Sino-US relations in a number of
ways. China celebrated the 30th anniversary of the decision made at the
historic 3rd Plenary of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Committee to embark on
economic reforms and open up to the outside world. The Summer Olympic Games
were also a stunning success that declared the arrival of China as a great
power and showcased its achievements not only in athletics but also in its
economy, architecture and through the seamless organization of the global
event.
The year also marks the 30th anniversary of the simultaneous announcement by
Beijing and Washington of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations
between the two great countries, ending three decades of hostility and
confrontation. Today, Sino-US relations are perhaps one of - if not the most -
important bilateral relationships in geostrategic, diplomatic and economic
terms. To his credit, President Bush has seen this relationship grow and mature
and made his contribution during his eight-year tenure in the White House.
Chinese and American leaders nowadays often refer to their relationship as one
of stakeholders and partners, cooperative and candid, but also complex.
Perhaps most important, the momentum for regularized and high-level dialogue
and consultation continued apace in 2008. Presidents Bush and Hu Jintao
maintained close contacts and regularly exchanged views on important
international, regional and bilateral issues during official visits, at
multilateral meetings, and through telephone conversations. Strategic dialogue
at the deputy foreign minister level has now included participants from the two
militaries. Military-to-military exchanges up to early October had also grown,
including, for the first time, exchange visits by each other's delegations of
non-commissioned officers.
In the Asia-Pacific region, Beijing and Washington share important common
interests. Both value and strive for a de-nuclearized Korean Peninsula through
the Six-Party Talks. The two countries also agree that the reduction of tension
and maintenance of the status quo and stability across the Taiwan Strait serve
their interests. Washington welcomes the peaceful transition to the Ma
Ying-jeou administration and is positive about recent developments across the
Strait that have generally improved the atmosphere and provided conducive
conditions for peace and stability. Likewise, China and the US support efforts
in the global war on terrorism, albeit with different emphases on tactics,
targets and intensity as it is applied in the region.
But differences remain. These concern the region's future security architecture
and the respective role of China and the United States in regional affairs.
Beijing advocates a New Security Concept that promotes dialogues, diplomatic
solutions to disputes and the development of multilateral institutions. While
Beijing at the moment does not seek to challenge US presence in the region and
indeed may value the latter's continued engagement as a stabilizing force, over
time it is likely to become more assertive in what it considers its sphere of
influence and this may clash with Washington's desire to remain the dominant
power in the region. For this very reason, the Bush administration sought to
consolidate alliances in the region, relocate major weapon systems and
platforms to the western Pacific and continued to develop and deploy missile
defenses in East Asia in an effort to dissuade and deter against potential
threats from rogue states and/or non-state actors.
The most sensitive issue remains Taiwan. The October announcement by the Bush
administration to sell $6.4 billion worth of weapons systems to Taiwan has
triggered strong reactions from China. Beijing immediately put on hold a number
of ongoing bilateral consultation and suspended military-to-military exchange
programs and high-level visits. According to Chinese analysts, this is the
fifth time since 1989 that Sino-US military ties have suffered a setback.
Beyond the Asia-Pacific, Chinese policies on Iran, Africa and Central Asia are
at serious variance with US interests and preferences. Beijing has supported
limited United Nations Security Council sanctions on Teheran but maintains that
diplomacy rather than additional sanctions is the best way of dealing with the
nuclear impasse. It is strongly opposed to the use of force even in the face of
clear non-compliance. Likewise, from Darfur to Myanmar, China has also adopted
policies and approaches that are based on its own principles and national
interests, which are perceived by Washington as undermining its objectives to
isolate and force changes in the two ruthless regimes.
While the Bush administration has been credited with managing the complex
relationship with China rather well, despite - or perhaps because of - its
preoccupation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its priorities in combating
terrorism, debates continue within and outside the administration on the
critical issue of how to deal with a rising China in the long run. Indeed, the
rise of Chinese power has generated wide-ranging discussions and speculations
on how Beijing will use its growing power resources - economic and military
capabilities, political influence and “soft power” - to advance its interests
in both regional and global settings and how a rising and presumably more
assertive China will challenge the dominant position of the United States in
Asia.
While many analysts say that Beijing will likely face - and is already facing -
serious domestic challenges of maintaining steady economic growth, addressing
growing social unrest due to income inequality and unemployment and sustaining
growth with secure and sufficient energy supplies and without further damage to
environment - which combined can impose significant constraints and limitation
on its exercise of power - there is also significant consensus that China's
power will continue to grow in
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