Page 2 of 2 China's military awaits new satellites By Peter J Brown
been spent on application development and ground infrastructure in China
itself.
"These activities may well be winding down as the lessons learned and physical
infrastructure developed under the Galileo project are integrated into the
larger Compass program," said Gibbons.
When the first Compass geostationary orbit (GEO) satellite was launched in
2000, it was seen as a regional program. But things changed dramatically when
China announced in September 2007
that it was converting its plan for a regional system into a full-fledged GNSS.
"US and Chinese representatives have met three times to discuss coordination of
frequency compatibility between GPS and Galileo. I have not heard of a formal
agreement having been reached on the subject, however, US officials have told
me that China appears to consider GPS a 'legacy' system with a prior claim to
its frequencies, which China will respect," said Gibbons. "As for Galileo,
however, the issue of signal compatibility has definitely not been resolved as
of the most recent meeting of the bilateral technical working group in December
2008."
To avoid an overly technical description, in a nutshell, assigned frequencies
are the sticking point, and whereas the US and China have resolved these
issues, the Chinese and the Europeans have not.
Paul Verhoef, head of the Galileo program at the European Commission (EC),
describes the talks between China and the Europeans as quite complex.
"Cooperation between China and the European Union in satellite navigation
continues. However, we are currently reviewing this cooperation in light of the
recent changes in the Chinese and European GNSS policy and programs," said
Verhoef. "It is still too early to predict their outcome. The removal of
interference through modified signaling is a key element of compatibility which
in its turn is the goal of the ongoing technical talks between Galileo and
Compass. The EC remains concerned about the current signals of Compass."
The fact that China's launch schedule for Compass is a few steps ahead of the
Europeans' launch schedule for Galileo - or perhaps even way ahead - adds
another twist to this tale. And yet, Hagt detects one more important reason why
the talks between China and Europe are proving to be so difficult. Europe
desires greater independence from the US, and is shifting towards a more
unified focus on security. In the process, the Europeans are not growing closer
to China.
"The Europeans are beginning to consolidate a common security policy with space
as an important part of that. We can see that from a number of recent moves
such as the Global Monitoring and Environmental System," said Hagt. "China was
never under the illusion that Galileo would supplant the need for their own
system. But, they were expecting to get far more out of the cooperation in
terms of technical know-how, system management and market access."
Besides the fact that China does not consider Galileo to have the same "legacy"
status as GPS, Gibbons sees China eager to develop its own commercial market
for its Compass user equipment, in direct competition with the GPS market.
"[China] would like to supplant the GPS brand with the Compass brand. However,
technologically, [Compass] user equipment will be very compatible - even
interoperable - with GPS and other GNSS systems' signals," said Gibbons.
"Indeed, China will also try to implement some product differentiators -
enhanced capabilities and unique signals and/or services - to achieve a
competitive advantage over the other GNSS services, not just GPS. They may well
implement such a value-added Compass capability domestically or regionally."
When it comes to military dimensions, Gibbons emphasizes that China and other
nations undoubtedly have the ability to jam GPS over wide areas, and that
Compass is not needed to accomplish this objective. He refers to the US DoD
annual report to Congress, "Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
2008," where it states, "UHF-band satellite communications jammers acquired
from Ukraine in the late 1990s and probable indigenous systems give China today
the capacity to jam common satellite communications bands and GPS receivers."
The phenomenon of satnav hacking, perhaps as a cyber-warfare variant, has not
gone unnoticed in Beijing either - see for example, "Number Of Factors May
Impede Situational Awareness" by this writer [2].
"DoD's Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) program under development for the past
decade seeks to address a GPS jamming scenario. This can be through
countermeasures, typically against ground-based jammers, but with DoD's ASAT
capability presumably against space-based jamming should Compass or any other
satellite platform (GNSS or otherwise) be used in such a fashion," said
Gibbons. "At least equal in the panoply of US contingency planning, though, is
creating more robust navigation capabilities that do not depend on a single
system, even though GPS clearly is the cornerstone PNT system for NAVWAR."
Gibbons urges readers to consider the broader strategic options and
implications of actions taken in any particular situation as well as the fact
that China already builds much of the electronics for GPS consumer mass market
products.
"What will be the political risk of contravening agreements or assurances given
bilaterally or multilaterally to ensure compatibility of GNSS services? What
will be the marketplace risk for taking actions against a critical
infrastructure on which goods and services worth hundreds of billions of
dollars depend, as well as on which other critical infrastructures including
those in China supported by GPS such as communications networks and power
grids?" asks Gibbons.
As China and the US increasingly mirror each other in terms of relative
vulnerabilities, and in capabilities in space - anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons
are on this list - and on the ground, Gibbons emphasizes that there is also, "a
risk of self-jamming that arises in generating intentional interference in or
near a band where one's own space-based PNT signals are located".
"The US has given clear indications that interfering with the availability to
GPS is something that it would do only under the most extreme circumstances -
although it has retained the right to do so, and probably has done so locally
in theaters of conflict," said Gibbons. "As is occurring throughout the world,
GPS / GNSS utilization, and therefore, practical dependency [on it] is only
going to grow more widespread in China's critical infrastructures and
applications."
That said, under the 2004 National Security Presidential Decision directive on
space-based positioning, navigation, and timing, the US is seeking to improve
methods for interference detection and mitigation as well as broadening the
foundation of PNT capabilities overall through its National PNT Architecture
initiative, according to Gibbons.
"As with other areas of leadership in GNSS, I believe that the US approach
might well be adopted by other nations," said Gibbons.
Either way, the GNSS revolution is well underway. China is deploying Compass
quickly and is quite confident that it is heading in the right direction.
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